IN THE NAME OF ALLAH

THE BENEFICIENT,THE MERCIFUL

"THESE PEOPLE THE SAME CULTURE,WHICH PRODUCED THOSE PEOPLE LIKE PREVIOUS MINISTERS AND MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR COUNTRY. THE PRIVIOUS MEMBERS OF PARLIMENTS, MINISTERS,LEADERS AND INTELLECTUAL ELITE WHO WERE EDUCATED BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE IRAN ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CREATION OF THE DISASTERS WHICH STRUCK OUR NATION, IT WAS THE SAME PEOPLE WHO MASQUERADING UNDER THE NAMES OF NATIONALIST, MUJAHID, FEDAYE AND VARIOUS OTHER TITLES PERVADED SOCIETY AND REFUSED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY ALONE AND POURED THE NATIONS WEALTH INTO POCKETS OF THE FOREIGNERS WHILST KEEPING A SHARE FOR THEMSELVES. IT WAS THESE PEOPLE WHO SURROUNDED THE SHAH AND WHO ARE NOW ACTING AGAINST THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT"

IMAM KHOMEINY

MANY THANKS TO THE ALLAH THE ALMIGHTY THAT, WITH THE DAWNING OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, THE RELIGION OF ALLAH GAINED NEW LIFE. MOHAMAD'S TRADITION AND ALI'S SHI'ITE FOUND THEIR TRUE FOLLOWERS, AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION BECAME A GOOD CRITERION FOR THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO RECOGNIZE THE REAL FACE OF THOSE CLAIMING TO BE THE DEFENDERS OF HUMANITY, JUSTICE AND FREEDOM. WITH ALLAH'S HELP AND FAVOR AND IN FULFILMENT OF PREVIOUS PROMISES, SOME MORE DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE AMERICAN DEN OF ESPIONAGE HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION TO BOTH MUSLIM AND OTHER OPPRESSED NATIONS OF THE WORLD. THIS COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS IS A BRIEF OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN ESPICIALLY THOSE OF THE LAST DECADES. MOST OF THE DOCUMENTS ARE CONCERNED WITH THOSE WHICH HAVE A LONG HISTORY.

SINCE POLITICAL PARTIES AND ACTIVITIES IN THAT FORM BEFORE THE REVOLUTION WAS A WESTERN PHENOMENON HISTORY OF THESE POLITICAL PARTIES GOES BACK TO THE DAYS WHEN WEST'S CULTURAL DOMINATION SPREADED THROUGHOUT SOCIETY.

THOSE ACTIVE POLITICAL GROUPS WHICH THE AMERICAN SPIES HAD COUNTED ON, AND GATHERED INFORMATION ABOUT, ARE THE NATIONAL FRONT, LIBERATION MOVEMENT, ZAHMATKESHAN PARTY, RADICAL MOVEMENT, TUDEH PARTY AND OTHER GROUPS WHICH WERE CREATED FROM THESE GROUPS, SUCH AS, THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY AND GUERRILLA GROUPS SUCH AS FEDAYIAN KHALG AND MUJAHEDIN KHALG KANOON VOKALA (LAWYERS ASSOCIATION) , WHICH WAS A POLITICAL ENTITY , HAS ALSO BEEN MENTIONED, BUT IT WAS INDEPENDENT FROM THE ABOVE MENTIONED POLITICAL PARTIES.

OF COURSE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE SHAH'S TIME , HAVE NOT BEEN MENTIONED, BECAUSE , BASICALLY THE AMERICAN SPIES, DID NOT REGARD THEM AS SOMETHING SEPARATE FROM THE REGIME ITSELF. DESPITE THE DIFFERENT TITLES AND CLASSIFICATIONS, THERE IS NO REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE GROUPS. AS THEIR ACHIVEMENTS WERE TO SHOW LATER ON WHEN THEY RETURNED TO THEIR OWN NATURE. ALTHOUGH THEY USED TO MAKE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST ONE AN OTHER, BECAUSE OF THEIR SIMILAR ORIGINS, THEY SHOWED THEIR REAL FACES AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, AND BECAME UNITED WITH EACH OTHER IN TAKING A STAND AGAINST ISLAM AND THE PEOPLE.

TO STUDY THE HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN IN THE LAST DECADES, ONE HAS TO STUDY THE SITUATION OF THE INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR STRUCTURE, BECAUSE MOST OF THE FOUNDERS AND COORDINATORS OF THESE PARTIES WERE INTELLECTUALS AND GRADUATES FROM ABROAD AND IRAN. UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES INSIDE IRAN WERE INFLUENCED BY WESTERN UNIVERSITIES AND ACTING AS THEIR BRANCHES IN IRAN. PROPOGATED

WESTERN CULTURE AND MATERIALIST CIVILIZATION THROUGHOUT SOCIETY.

AS WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE BECAME LESS THEISTIC AND MORAL STANDARDS DECLINED. THE INTELLECTUALS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAN WHO HAD BEEN TRAINED AT CENTERS OF MODERN CIVILIZATION AND SCIENCE BECAME SEPERATED FROM THEIR OWN CULTURE WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY FELL INTO DECLINE.

WESTERN INFLUENCE AS A GENERAL MOVEMENT SPREAD THROUGHOUT SOCIETY AND ALL SYMBOLS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION SUCH AS CONSUMERISM, BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM, LUXURIES ETC.. BECAME HIGHLY RESPECTED AS VALUED. THIS WAS HOW WESTERN AFFILIATIONS WITH THEIR SPECIAL PHILOSOPHICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND BECAME A CHRONIC DISEASE FOR INTELLECTUALS AND EDUCATED PEOPLE IN SOCIETY. ONLY THOSE WHO ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES WITH PURE ISLAMIC CULTURE AND REAL MUSLIM SCHOLARS COULD SAVE THEMSELVES FROM WESTERN CULTURAL DOMINATION.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS WHICH WERE FORMED BY EASTERN(1) AND WESTERN AFFILIATED INTELLECTUALS, HAD THE WEST IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT. ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS GOES BEYOND THIS INTRODUCTION, AND WE SHOULD LINK THEIR POLITICAL STANDS STANDS WITH THEIR PHILOSOPHICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKROUNDS. OF COURSE BESIDE THOSE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES OVER THE LAST DECADES, THERE WERE INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS LED BY CLERGYMEN AND ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENTS. THIS POPULAR MOVEMENT, IN ADDITION TO ITS FIRM POLITICAL STAND AGAINST FOREIGN DOMINA-

(1) WE REMINED YOU THAT PRESENT EASTERN CULTURE ORIGINATES FROM THE WEST SO THERE ARE NO REAL BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THESE TWO CULTURES. EASTERNIZED IRANIANS RETURNING FROM THE WEST BROUGHT THIS UNPLEASENT GIFT FOR US.

TION CHALLENGED BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN PREVALENCE IN IRANIAN CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY.

DESPITE A LACK OF STRUCTURED ORGANIZATION THEY WERE ABLE TO FORM AN EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP FOR THE MUSLIM MASSES IN THEIR SOCIAL STRUGGLES.

THOSE MASTER MINDING THE ABOVE MENTIONED GROUPS WERE TOTALLY COMMITTED TO WESTERN CULTURE AND THEIR STRUGGLE RESULTED IS NO MORE THAN WESTERN IDEALS AND DESPITE THE GRANDIOSE TITLE THEY GAVE THEMSELVES, THEY WERE UNABLE TO VISUALIZE IRANIAN INDEPENDENCE. WHILE CRYING OUT NATIONALIST SLOGANS, THEY SAW THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE AS LYING UNDER THE AMERICAN SUPPORT . THERE WERE FURTHER GROUPS WHO CHANTED ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS AND DECLARED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ESCAPE THE YOKE OF AMERICAN DOMINATION WAS TO CALL FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE EASTERN SUPPER POWER, BUT THESE SCHEME GROUPS WERE LATER OVERCOME BY WESTERN ATTRACTION AND ESTABLISHED THEIR POWER BASE IN FRANCE.

"The world is in tow parts, the soviet bloc and the west. one can not stand apart from this situation entirely.

Sadeqi, Gholam Hosein Doc. 3

BY ANALYSING THE CONDITION OF THE SOCIETY AND THE DATES WHEN THESE PARTIES WERE ESTABLISHED TOGETHER WITH THE PERIODS OF THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THESE GROUPS, WE ARE ABLE TO UNDRESTAND THEIR REAL NATURE. IN THE BEGINNING OF THE BRITISH COLONIALISIM DOMINATED IRAN AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BETWEEN 1953 (WHEN THE CIA PLOTTED A COUP RESTORE THE SHAH TO POWER) AND THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION BY CRIMINAL AMERICAN IMPERIALIST RULE. THE FACT THAT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS IN IRAN WERE NOTHING BUT THE PUPPETS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLONIALISM ESPECIALLY DURING THE DECEASED SHAH'S REIN IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE WIDESPREAD PRESENCE OF FOREIGN COLONIALISM IN OUR COUNTRY.

IRAN'S STRATEGIC LOCATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ITS VAST ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO AMERICA, CAUSED THE WORLD-DEVOVRER, THE UNITED STATES, TO TURN IRAN INTO ITS PRIMARY BASE FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN REGION. DETAILED DOCUMENTS ABOUT THIS ARE DISCLOSED IN BOOK NO. 8 IN THE SERIES OF THE DOCUMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN DEN OF ESPIONAGE. BESIDES THE BASIC INTERESTS OF IMPERIALISM IN IRAN WHAT SHOULD BE MENTIONED, ARE THE METHODS EMPLOYED BY THE IMPERIALISIM TO SAFEGUARD THESE INTERESTS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE FIRST STEP FOR THIS PURPOSE WAS TO SPREAD WESTERN CULTURAL DOMINATION AND ALIENATE SOCIETY FROM ITS FUDEMENTAL ISLAMIC NATURE. THIS COULD BEST BE ACHIEVED BY PROPAGTING THE BASICS OF THE WESTERN CULTURE IN DIFFERENT FORMS THROUGHOUT THE SOCIETY. IN ONE PART OF A DOCUMENT IT STATES:

"But there are things we can do to improve our own position among the Iranian intellectual community and to CHANNEL their thinking toward a more constructive approach toward representative government.

It is also recommended that we encourage more mind-to-mind communication, in addition to the usual visual and other esthetic presentations. This will involve elaboration of a new type of program for visiting Americans of intellectual stature, which might be combined with the requirements of neighboring posts. Proposals are also made to limit the study of Iranians at sub-standard American educational institutions, and concerning the creation of an Institute of Persian Studies in Tehran."

The Iranian Intellectual Community

GRADUALLY SOCIETY BECAME POLARISED AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE CHARGED, CITIES WERE CHANGED AND TECHNOLOGY IMPORTED, A LARGE BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM WAS ESTABLISHED AND THE NEW INTELLECTUAL

ELITE WHO CONSTITUTED LARGE PORTION OF URBAN CIVILIZATION AND WHO HELD THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUNDS WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WERE FORMED. MOST OF THESE SCHOLARS WERE ATTRACTED BY THE BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM OR ENTERED THE RULING BODIES THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS. OF COUSE THIS CLASS (WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS (1) HAD THEIR OWN CULTURE WHICH DIFFERED FROM THAT OF THE MUSLIM MASSES WHO RELYED ON RELIGIOUS AND DIVINE BELIEVES AND WHICH BY RETAINING CERTIAN IGNORANT TRADITIONS MOVED DAILY TOWARDS WSTERN CORRUPTION.

MOST OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH WERE FORMED IN OUR COUNTRY WERE ESTABLISHED AND GREW IN THIS UNFAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE. THE MAIN COORDINATORS OF THESE PARTIES WERE THOSE SAME SCHOLARS WHO WERE ATTRACTED BY WESTERN CIVILIZATION. TO STUDY THEIR POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE WORLD-DEVOURER, AMERICA THESE SCHOLARS CONTINUALLY STRESSED ON THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM JUST AS THE PRO-EASTERN SUPPORTERS JUSTIFIED THEIR STANDS BY STRESSING ON DANGER OF U.S. IMPERIALISM. THESE PEOPLE FREQUENTLY BECAME ATTRACTED TO THE OPPOSITE CAMP LATER ON AND AT NO TIME FOUND AN INDEPENDENT IDENTITY FOR THEMSELVES. IN ONE PART OF DOCUMENT IT STATES:

He thought that if "free" elections were held his party would win most of the seats in Tehran. He agreed that his group represented a more effective barrier to communism and the USSR than the unpopular men in power.

SANJABI DOC. NO. 2

I believe that the bilateral pact with the United States offers a more substantial guarantee for Iran against Soviet aggression. And I am certainly not inclined to give up this bilateral agreement freely, that is, without gaining something equivalent in return. The only time we

can be sure of the Soviets is when we can be sure of the United States.

Again, Iran alone cannot accomplish anything vis-a-vis the Soviets. Only by maintaining good and proper relations with the west, and only with the help and understanding of the West, we can maintain good and safe relations with them.

SANJABI DOC. NO. 4

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(1) OF COURSE WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THE SIGNIFICANT PART PLAYED BY THOSE CONCERNED INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICS WHO ADOPTED AN ISLAMIC STANCE AND WHOSE ACTIVITIES CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. ALSO IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION RESTORED MANY OF THE MISGUIDED WESTERN INFLUENCED PEOPLE TO THE ISLAMIC PATH AND AT PRESENT TIME MANY MANAGERS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC ARE THOSE INTELLECTUALS AND THE EDUCATED WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ATTRACTED TO ISLAM.

He beiieves in the necessity of U.S. support as the least of three evils in a world where neighbors of the Soviet Union cannot afford to stand alone.

SALLEH DOC. NO. 8

If United States wants a free country to work against the Soviets, it must help the National Front.

KESHAWARZ SADR DOC. NO. 1

WHEN THESE PARTIES OPPOSED THE SHAH'S REGIME, SINCE THIS OPPOSITION HAD NO REAL BASIS, THEY NEVER REJECTED THE AMERICAN DOMINATION AND EVEN ASKED AMERICA FOR HELP IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SHAH.

America should guide and assist Iran down the road to Western democracy so that the people can be free.

KESHAWARZ SADR DOC. NO. 1

We of the NF feel that it is important at this time that we should show the United States that we are very reasonable persons, not wild xenophobes and hot radicals.

DARIOUSH FOROUHAR DOC. NO. 3

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM COULD NOT THINK OF A BETTER SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SHAH'S REGIME, BECAUSE THE SHAH PROVED TO BE A GOOD PUPPET FOR THEM, AND CONTINUED THEIR OVERALL SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH'S REGIME. IN SPITE OF ATTEMPTS BY THESE GROUPS TO GET CLOSER TO AMERICANS IN ORTHER TO GAIN POLITICAL POWER, THE AMERICANS DID NOT PAY ANY ATTENTION TO THEM, BECAUSE AS LONG AS THE SHAH WAS IN POWER, THEIR INTERESTS WERE WELL SECURED AND THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ANY OF THESE GROUPS. SOMETIMES THEY USED TO ALLOW THESE POLITICAL GROUPS TO GROW UP IN IRAN'S SOCIAL SCENE IN ORDER TO PRETEND THAT THERE EXISTS A GOVERNMENT SYSTEM SIMILAR TO WEST, AND, SOMETIMES IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONDITION OF SOCIETY THEY USED TO FORCE THESE GROUPS TO KEEP QUIET. THESE GROUPS DID NOT HAVE ANY POPULAR BASE AMONG THE MASSES AND WERE FORMING A GROUP OF OPPOSITION INTELLECTUALS. FOR THIS REASON, THEIR ACTIVITIES WERE WITHIN FRAMEWORK WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN DETERMINED BY AMERICA AND ITS PUPPET REGIME. THIS WAS OBVIOUS BECAUSE THEIR FINAL GOAL WAS TO ESTABLISH A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, SIMILAR TO U.S. GOVERNMENT. EXTRACTS FROM DOCUMENT COULD BE A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR THEIR DEPENDANCE ON WEST.

and that a judicious blending of the West's accomplishments with the heritage of Persia will create a nation of world significance.

HOSEIN MAHDAVI DOC. NO. 8

He went on to praise the American political system and the hope and example which it gave to the world. Bakhtiar then began to analyze American interests in Iran, beginning by saying

that he thought the United States' long-run interests here would be best served by developing a government responsive to the wishes of the people which would permit a degree of freedom.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 13

U.S. officials with whom Moqadam has met assess him as a balanced, pro-American, intellectual man who is sincere and communicates frankly. ....Moqadam has always been friendly to US officials and is willing to carry on substantive dialogues.

MOQADAM MARAQEE DOC. NO. 2 (1)

He (Morteza Bazargan) wanted to reassure USG that a government run by National Front would be friendly to U.S. .

Bazargan said that Iran, under the National Front, would seek best possible relations with the West and would even continue to sell oil to Israel.

MORTEZA BAZARGAN DOC. NO. 1

Since the beginning of the constitutional regime in Iran, we have wanted to have here what we have heard existed in the United States.

DARIUS FORUHAR DOC. NO. 3

In an interesting allusion to the Sussians, Nazih said that if we (Iran and the U.S.) have some problems we (Iranians) should remember that the U.S. is "with us" and that the USG would help in resolving problems caused by other foreigners.

KANON VOKALA DOC. NO. 3

I have the opportunity in the past to have meeting with United States ambassadors and high ranking officials on account of my positions and national responsibilities. I believe that such contacts can be beneficial to the understanding and betterment of relations between the two nations.

BAQAI'S LETTER TO SULIVAN

LMI officials said their movement seeks a policy-level meeting with American officials to present their case for seeking U.S. support in arranging transition from present authoritarian government in Iran to a more democratic system.

LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN DOC. NO. 9

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(1) IT IS NECESSARY TO NOTE THAT RAHMATOLLAH MOGHADDAM MARAGHEY WAS AN AGENT OF CIA WHOSE DOCUMENTS WILL BE PUBLISHED IN FUTURE.

OF COURSE WE SHOULD EXPECT THESE FROM THOSE WHO HAD BEEN TOXICATED BY WESTERN CULTURE.

The purpose of Congressional Fellowship which Mr. Matin-Daftari has recieved, is to enable outstanding young men to gain experience in democratic government by working with a Senator or Representative throughout one complete session of Congress.

MATIN DAFTARI DOC. NO. 1

The telegram of condolence sent to the United States by the Student Committee of the National Front included these interesting phrases: "Those who fight for the freedom of their nation know how liberal ideas grow in the younger generations. Kennedy was the symbol of such ideas. Kennedy, who was the author of "profiles in courage", is now himself an image of courage and an eternal example of courage for the younger generation."

NATIONAL FRONT AND INTELLECTUALS

IN A CORRUPTED SOCIETY THE GREAT SATAN'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC , CULTURAL AND MILITARY DOMINATION BECAME DEEPER AND DEEPER. ANY POLITICAL MOVEMENT WHICH STRUGGLED FOR POWER WITH GIVING LITTLE LEGITIMACY TO THE REGIME, HAD TO WORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK PREDETERMINED BY THE SATANIC GOVERNMENT. THE METHODS EMPLOYED BY THESE GROUPS WERE THE ONES WHICH IMPERIALISM

ALREADY KNEW HOW TO DEAL WITH AND THIS IS THE OBVIOUS OUTCOME OF ACCEPTING THE SUPREMACY OF "TAGHOOT".

WHEN BOTH THESE GROUPS AND THE REGIME WHOM THESE GROUPS CLAIMED TO BE FIGHTING WITH, AGREED ON REJECTING THE DIVINE VALUES, IN ONE PARTICULAR TIME, THE SO-CALLED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REGIME, BECAME STRUGGLE AGAINST THEMSELVES AND REJECTION OF THEIR OWN EXISTANCE:

Iranian oppositionists having no identifiable program of their own that differs radically fromm what the Shah is doing, prefer to emphasize the negative.

For most, to change course now would be tandamount to rejecting their own personality and identity, and for those who are on in years- a rejection of a lifetime of effort and sacrifice.

NATIONAL FRONT (MAINLY)

Saleh agreed with Sadeghi's comments and said that unfortunately the NF can do nothing at present because of the relentless pressure from the government security services. In a sense, however, the Shah's reform program is doing the NF's work for it.

ALLAHYAR SALEH DOC NO 17

FIRST TIME WHEN THE COORDINATORS OF INTERNATIONAL OPPRESSION DIRECTLY GOT IN TOUCH WITH THE LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS WERE ABOUT THE AMERICAN ENGINEERED COUP IN 1953. (MEETING WITH BAGHAEE IN 20 NOV. 1950 AND MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR IN 10 NOV. 1952) .

THE PERFIDIOUS AMERICAN IMPERIALISM PREPARED ITSELF TO REPLACE WITH BRITISH EMPIRE, AND AS THE FIRST STEP THEY HAD TO CONTROL THE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS EXISTING IN SOCIETY, AND BEGAN THEIR DIRECT CONTACTS WITH LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS. THE GREAT SATAN HAD TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES IN THESE CONTACTS. FIRST, THESE GROUPS BECAUSE OF THEIR

VARIETY WERE GOOD SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL ISSUES ESPECIALLY ABOUT OPPOSITION GROUPS WHO HAD PROVED THEIR DEPENDENCY TO THE GREAT SATAN, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SHAH'S REGIME IF THE SITUATION GETS WORSE. THESE GROUPS COULD PRETEND TO BE AN OPPOSITION GROUP AND ENTER THE SCENE, AND CHANNELIZING THE PURE SOCIAL MOVEMENT, COULD GAIN THE POWER. ATTEMPTS DURING THE CLIMAX OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION TO PROPOUND SOME OF THESE GROUPS AS THE LEADER OF OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH, WHICH IS BEING DISCUSSED IN THIS BOOK, ARE GOOD EXAMPLES IN THIS REGARD.*

* IN ANOTHER SERIES OF DOCUMENTS WHICH GOD WILLING, WILL BE PUBLISHED IN THE FUTURE, THE UNSUCCESSFULL ATTEMPTS BY THE AMERICANS DURING THE CLIMAX OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, TO BRING TO POWER THE MODERATE LIBERALS WHO WERE THE LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS, WILL BE EXPLAINED.

THE DOCUMENTS EXPLAIN THIS FACT VERY VELL.

SOURCE: Government official with good connections in political opposition groups.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 5

SOURCE: Member of the National Front with access to National Front leaders.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 7

SOURCE: A well-educated Iranian who is a National Front member.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 10

This is from a usually reliable sourse, from a central council member of the FMI.

FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF IRAN DOC. NO. 1

SOURCE: A well-educated Iranian who is a National Front committee member.

MATIN DAFTARY DOC. NO. 2

The source is a member of the National Front with access to National Front leaders.

MATIN DAFTARY DOC. NO. 3

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A POLITICAL MOVEMENT INITIATED BY BEST SOURCES OF IMPERIALISM, CAN NEVER BECOME A THREATENING MOVEMENT FOR GREAT SATAN'S VITAL INTERESTS IN IRAN. THE MASTER MINDERS KNEW HOW TO PREPARE THE GROUPS INTO CRITISIZING AMERICAN POLICIES

He was also described in one report as mouthing a more anti-western, anti-American line than his colleagues. This might have been due to his obvious ambition and his desire to outshine rival leaders in the NF with the workers and university milieu which had become his special party responsibility.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 20

Matin daftary is well acquainted with the US and admires its principles; but, like many American-connected Iranians, he often feels constrained to adopt a critical attitude when in the presence of other Iranians.

MATIN DAFTARY DOC. NO. 15

As a consequence of the foregoing, Mr. Sepahbodi alleged that Dr. Baghai, the leader of the Workers Party, thought it necessary to speak out publicly against the United States. Mr. Sepahbodi believes that had Dr. Baghai done otherwise the mass of the people would have believed the stories in the newspapers, which are said to be communist inspired, that the U.S. embassy in Tehran is giving financial aid and moral encouragement to the Party. Mr. Sepahbody thinks it was in the interests of good Iran-American relations that America be castigated in order to preclude any possibility that Iranian would believe that the U.S. was a supporter of the party.

WORKER PARTY DOC. NO. 4

IT IS NATURAL THAT A MOVEMENT WHICH ACCEPTS AMERICAN SUPREMACY AND RELYS ON DIPLOMATIC CONNECTIONS, WILL NOT COUNT ON POEPLE'S POWER.

COLONIALISM HAD NEVER HAD FULL AUTHORITY IN AN ISLAMIC LAND AS MUCH AS THEY HAD DURING THE DISGRACEFUL REGIME OF MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT IMPERIALISM WOULD KEEP THIS MALICIOUS ELEMENT TO SECURE ITS INTERESTS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THOSE WHO BETOOK THEMSELVES TO IMPERIALISM, EMPLOYED METHODS SUCH AS ENTERING INTO THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY AND PARLIAMENT BECAUSE IMPERIALISM WAS FULLY SUPPORTING THE SHAH'S REGIME.

The Shah consented to Baghai's election to the Majlis.

BAGHAI DOC. NO. 12

When asked whether the moderates could not reach a concensus on changes they would like to see which might not be too alarming to the Shah and the present authorities, Matin-Daftari said most of them would be happy with a Parliament in which they could speak freely.

MATIN DAFTARY DOC. NO 19

AT THE SAME TIME ALL THESE GROUPS BELIEVED THAT THE SHAH SHOULD RIEGN AND NOT RULE, AND MONARCHIC CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE PRACTICED. THIS WAS BECAUSE, THEY NEVER EVEN DREAMED THAT THE SHAH ONE DAY WILL BE DEPOSED, AND ALL THEIR ATTEMPTS WAS TO MAKE AMERICA GIVE THEM A SHARE IN GOVERNMENT WITH THE SHAH.

On the matter of Organization he seemed to advocate such a loose grouping of political parties that only such nebulous goals as freedom and constitutionality would serve as common denominators.

MATIN DAFTARY DOC. NO. 4

I then asked him how he viewed the future role of the Shah

Moghadam said he agreed the Shah was needed, both to keep the army under the control and to prevent any possible chaos that might result from a sudden collapse of authority.

RADICAL MOVEMENT DOC. NO. 1

Then, (Bazargan) choosing his words carefully said the LMI believes in the constitution. "If the Shah is ready to implement all provisions of the constitution, then we are prepared to accept the monarchy."

LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN
DOC. NO. 4

Essentially, we must retain the monarchy, but it might be possible to have a different monarchy.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 6

Dr. Sanjabi said that while the National Front had some political differences with Great Britain, it had no quarrel with the English people and particularly the English Queen, who was the sort of monarch Iranians wish they had.

KARIM SANJABI DOC. NO. 3

The people have great love and respect for the monarchy. I recall that when the late Shah was shot at the university TWenty years ago, I was at home, and when we learned of it, my wife and our servants wept, and I myself was deeply affected by the affair.

GHOLAM-HOSEIN SADEGHI DOC.NO. 3

IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE GO THROUGH THE SO-CALLED STRUGGLES OF THOSE WHO CLAIMED TO BE PROGRESSIVE, AS IT IS REPRESENTED IN THE DOCUMENTS. THIS COULD REVEAL THE REAL NATURE OF THEIR TUMULTS AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION.

Sanjabi has expressed himself as opposed to clandestine activity for the NF. He has even proposed that an agent of the National Intelligence and Security Organization(SAVAK) be invented to every NF meeting to be sure that SAVAK had the correct story rather than a garbled version from an illiterate agent.

KARIM SANJABI DOC. NO. 5

He said that he agreed with the government and the security organizations that the university was not a proper arena for political activities.

KARIM SANJABI DOC. NO. 6

He admires the U.S. but criticizes its support of Britain and the current Iranian regime. Although he does not advocate revolution for Iran, which he says would benefit only "alien and imperialistic" elements, he doubts that the present Shah would accept a limited constitutional role.

DARYUSH FORUHAR DOC. NO 7

ALTHOGH THOSE HOLDING THE ABOVE VIEWS HAD A WIDE SPECTRUM, BUT IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THEY WERE FOLLOWING SATAN, THEY NEITHER BELIEVED IN DELIVERER POWER OF ISLAM, NOR THEY PAYED ANY ATTENTION TO THE PEOPLE'S POWER. THIS WAS WHY THE CRITERIA USED BY THEM TO POSE THEIR STRATEGY AND TACTICS WAS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GREAT SATAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AND DESPITE CLAIMS FOR NATION AND NATIONALISM, THEY DID NOT PAY ANY RESPECT TO THIS OPPRESSED NATION.

Also it would be the role of a NF government to lead the people, not to be led or directed by them.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 6

WHEN THESE PARTIES WERE AT THE CLIMAX OF THEIR FALSE ACTIVITIES, THE DEVINE MOVEMENT OF THE MUSLIM MASSES OF IRAN UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CONCERNED CLERGIES IN 15TH KHORDAD (JUNE 5 , 1963) SHOWED THE REAL PRESENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN POLITICAL SCENE.

THE CHASTE BLOOD OF THE MARTYRS IN JUNE 5, SHOCKED BASES OF THE REGIME AND THE SHAH'S TROOPS STARTED SHOOTING AT THE PEOPLE INDISCRIMINATELY. AS USUAL WHEREVER THE PEOPLE WERE,

THERE WAS NO SIGN OF THESE INTELLECTUALS WHO CLAIMED TO BE THE LEADER OF THE MASSES. THEIR OWN CONFESSION ABOUT THIS INCIDENT IS INTERESTING.

The National Front was not directly involved in the riots.

THIS DOCUMENT CONCERNS HOSSEIN MAHDAVI'S METING WITH THE EMBASSY OFFICER WILLIAM GREENMILLER AT THE EVENING OF JUNE 5th, (15th OF KHORDAD)

Some left wing National Front students were involved in the incidents that took place at the University at about noon including the display of the banner saying "Death to the Bloody Tyrant" and the burning of a government jeep. As soos as the National Front leaders including Mahdavy were informed they called SAVAK and told them to stop the demonstration at the University, which was subsequently done.

Mahdavy said Pakravan(CHIEF OF SAVAK) had cleared the National Front of responsibility and had told the nation over the radio this afternoon at 5 p.m. that the National Front was not involved.

HOSSEIN MAHDAVY DOC. NO. 4

WITH THE START OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CONCERNED CLERGIES ESPECIALLY THE HONORABLE IMAM WHO IS THE CHASTE DESCENDANT OF THE PROPHET (P.B.U.L), PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THESE FATIGUED GROUPS TO ENTER THE SCENE AGAIN.

The true conflict for the future will be between Islam and Communism. For this reason the Liberation Movement is moving to closer links with the religious leaders. Since Mossadeq's time, the Liberation Movement had lost its popular base and must rebuild around Islam.

LIBERATION MOVEMENT DOC. NO. 7

Although the two major Iranian terrorist groups had contributed to the popular national attitude that nothing positive could be accomplished until the Shah and his foreign supporters were removed, they were not implicated in the anti-US action of late 1978.

No concrete evidence linked the IPS to the 1978 student/religious unrest until October 1978.

MUJAHEEDINS AND FEDA'IANS DOC. NO. 1

OF COURSE, THIS TIME THEY DID NOT ENTER THE SCENE THEMSELVES, BUT THE WOUNDED IMPERIALISM WHOSE HAND WAS PLUNGED UP TO HILT IN BLOOD OF OUR DEPRIVED MUSLIM PEOPLE, ENTERED THEM TO THE SCENE TO SAFEGUARD ITS MOST IMPORTANR BASE IN THE REGION AND OBSTRUCT THE GREAT ROARING MOVEMENT OF THE MUSLIM UMMAH WITH ASSISTANCE OF ITS OWN TRAINED INTELLECTUALS. AT THIS POINT THE GREAT SATAN'S DIPLOMACY BECAME ACTIVE AND AT THE SAME TIME WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE, THE OLD POLITICAL GROUPS WERE PROPOUNDED IN SOCIETY. THE ZIONIST AND IMPERIALIST MASS MEDIA ALL OVER THE WORLD, INTRODUCED THE POLITICAL GROUPS AS LEADER OF THE MASS MOVEMENT. THIS WAS THE TIME WHEN LONG EFFORTS OF THE IMPERIALISM WAS YIELDING, AND THE SHAH'S REGIME HAD TO BE REPLACED BY THESE POLITICAL GROUPS. THE WORLD DEVOUVER AMERICA COULD NOT IGNORE ITS VITAL INTERESTS IN IRAN EASILY. THESE POLITICAL GROUPS WHO WERE EAGER TO COME TO POWER AND HAD SERVED THE PERFIDIOUS IMPERIALISM FOR YEARS, CLAIMED TO BE THE TRUE OWNER OF THE REVOLUTION. THEY HAD VARIOUS CONTACTS WITH AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, AND USED THE VAIN " DANGER OF RUSSIANS" TO SATISFY THEIR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH WEST AND THE GREAT SATAN. THEY WERE MOST AFRAID OF

THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OR AS THEY CALL THEM " FANATICS ", TO COME TO POWER, AND TO PREVENT THIS FORM HAPPENING THEY GOT IN TO ALLIANCE WITH THE GREAT SATAN UNDER THE EXCUSE OF CONFRONTING THE RUSSIANS, TO FIGHT ISLAM AND MUSLIM FORCES. THEIR ACTIVITIES HAD DIFFERENT FORMS AT DIFFERENT TIMES.

We need six month of freedom, not extreme but at least the right to meet and organize. He said if this is not done leadership of the opposition would pass to the fanatics.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 17

He was pleased that Minachi and Bazargan have said reform should come under the Shah. The mullahs cannot rule Iran.

BAKHTIAR DOC. NO. 19

AT THE POINT, ALL "KOFFAR", POLYTHEISTS AND HYPOCRITES GOT UNITED TO CONFRONT THE PURE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND FROM THAT POINT ONWARDS AMERICA HAD ALL ANTI-ISLAMIC GROUPS ON ITS SIDE.

BAKHTIAR THE PUPPET ELEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FRONT WHO WAS MORE CRITICAL OF THE SHAH'S REGIME AND AMERICA, THAN ALLAHYAR SALEH, SANJABI AND THE OTHERS, SUDDENLY LEFT THE OPPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL FRONT'S TYPE AND BECAME A PRIME MINISTER CHOSEN BY THE SHAH AND AMERICA. BAKHTIAR WHO HAD CLOSE LINKS WITH THE CIA IN BEGINNING OF THE 1960'S(1), INVITED THE PEOPLE AND THE REVOLUTION TO OBEY HIM. BUT THE PEOPLE HAD BECOME DIVINE PEOPLE AND HAD REALIZED WHO WAS THEIR TRUE LEADER AND GUIDE. THE NEW PLOTS AND CONSPIRACIES WAS REVEALED BY IMAM, AND THE BASIS AND FUNDEMENTALS OF CENTURIES

(1), THE DOCUMENTS ABOUT BAKHTIAR'S LINKS WITH THE CIA WILL BE PUBLISHEDWITH DETAILSIN A SEPRATE SERIES OF DOCUMENTS.

LONG DOMINATION, EXPLOITATION AND COLONIALI-
SM WAS DESTROYED.

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WITH ITS DIVINE FUNDEMENTALS DESTROYED THE PREPARATIONS MADE BY THE GREAT SATAN AND ITS PUPPETS. ALTHOUGH SOME WEST-TOXICATED PEOPLE HAD SOME EXECUTIVE POSTS IN THE BEGINNING (1), BUT DUE TO ITS ISLAMIC NOBILITY, THE REVOLUTION, STRAINED THE IMPURE ELEMENTS AND FORCED THE DEVIATES FROM ISLAM TO SHOW THEIR REAL FACE. AFTER THE JURISDICTION OF THE ISLAMIC LINE, THOSE BELIEVING IN WESTERN OR EASTERN DOMINATION WERE OUSTED AND JOINED THE RANKS OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME'S GROUPS AND STARTED THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. THESE GROUPS COULD NOT GET UNITED WITH MUSLIMS DURING THE SHAH'S TIME TO FIGHT AGAINST THE REGIME, BECAUSE THEIR NATURE DID NOT ALLOW THEM TO DO SO. WITH THE GROWTH OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT THE FOLLOWERS OF "TAGHOOT" SHOWED THEIR REAL FACES BETTER AND BETTER.

THERE ARE ALSO SOME DOCUMENTS IN THIS SERIES ABOUT GROUPS DEPENDING ON EAST, WHICH REVEAL THEIR DECEITFUL ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, FROM VIOWPOITS OF AMERICANS WHOM THEY CLAIMED TO BE THEIR ENEMIES.

THERE WERE PARTIES LIKE TUDEH PARTY, AMONG PARTIES WHICH DEPENDEND ON EAST, WHICH DIRECTLY WERE SERVING EASTERN BLOC.

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(1), AS IT WAS MENTIONED THE WEST-TXICATED PEOPLE HAD VERY WIDE SPECTRUM AND STILL HAS, AND THE DOCUMENTS SHOW THIS REALITY THAT HOW MUCH IS THE GAP BETWEEN THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT WHICH HAS RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND, AND THE NATIONAL FRONT WHICH BASICALLY REJECTS ISLAMIC BELIEFS. THE DATES OF THE DOCUMENTS ABOUT THE NATIONAL FRONT ITS LEADERS, AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, TO SOME EXTENT SEPRATES THESE TWO GROUPS FROM ONE ANOTHER.

The central committee receives its orders from the Soviet Union, either directly or through a specially assigned man in the Soviet Embassy.

TUDEH PARTY DOC. NO. 2

THE REST OF THESE GROUPS WERE IN LUTTER RANKS DEPENDING ON CONDITION OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONS BECAUSE THESE POLITICAL GROUPS WERE INDUCING THAT WE HAVE TO RELY ON ONE FOREIGN POWER TO FIGHT AGAINST THE OTHER, SOME OF THESE GROUPS IN THEIR EVOLUTIONARY STAGES, CHANGED TEIR PATH AND INSTEAD OF RELYING ON EAST, WERE ATTRACTED BY THE WEST. WHEN THE MALICIOUS AMERICAN IMPERIALISM DECIEVES THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN EASILY, THEN IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR AMERICANS TO ATTRACT THE GROUPS FOLLOWING THE RUSSIANS AND USE THEM IN THE DIRECTION OF THEIR INTERESTS. SOME OF THESE GROUPS BRANCHED OUT AND SOME OTHER, SUCH AS SO-CALLED MUJAHEDEEN KHALQ TERMINATED THEIR DEPENDANCE ON EASTERN BLOC AND FELL INTO CATEGORY OF GROUPS SUCH AS THE NATIONAL FRONT AND MONARCHISTS, WHO HAD ALREADY JOINED THE SOCIALIST BAKHTIAR WHO WAS AT THE SAME TIME AN AGENT OF CIA.

Contrasting indications linked the IPS to the National Front, a then-outlawed coalition of Iranian dissident groups of a moderate political orientation. The IPS seemed to avoid violence deliberately while courting (OR being courted by) the National Front to give the coalition a chance to further its standard democratic political goals.

MUJAHEEDINS AND FEDA'IANS DOC. NO. 1

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(1) DOCUMENTS ABOUT MUJAHEDEEN'S COOPERATION WITH AMERICAN INSPIRED KHALQ-E-MUSALMAN PARTY WHICH BASICALLY WAS FORMED BY SUPPORTERS OF MONARCHY REGIME, WILL BE PUBLISHED IN ANOTHER SERIES OF DOCUMENTS.

ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE CORRUPTED PAHLAVI REGIME FIRST BY LATE NAVVAB SAFAVI WAS THE REFLECTION OF THIS STRUGGLE, SINCE THEN, BESIDE MOVES AIMED AT GUIDING THE PEOPLE TOWARDS ISLAM AND PREPARING GROUNDS FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, THERE WAS ALSO SOME ARMED MOVEMENTS BY SMALL GROUPS WHICH WERE INDEPENDENT OF EAST AND WEST, AND WERE LOYAL TO ISLAM. THERE WAS ALSO EAST-TOXICATED MOVEMENTS THAT CLAIMED ADOPTING ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SHAH'S REGIME AND HAD BEEN CREATED BY TUDEH PARTY. THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY FOLLOWING THE EASTERN SUPER POWER POLICY, AND DESPITE THEIR SLOGANS IN FAVOR OF WORKERS, PEASANTS AND THE OPPRESSED THEY HAD A FEW OR NONE OF SUCH PEOPLE IN THEIR CAMP. THE NURSE OF MARXIST THINKING WAS WESTERN INSPIRED UNIVERSITIES, WHICH USED TO INVITE THE ADVENTUROUS STUDENTS TO OPPOSITION OF EASTERN TYPE IN ORDER TO SATISFY THEIR INTERNAL DESIRES. BECAUSE THESE OPPOSITIONS DID NOT HAVE ANY REAL BASIS, MATERIALIST WAY OF LIFE ATTRACTED THOSE GRADUATING FROM UNIVERSITIES AND THEY ENTERED THE REGIME'S BUREAUCRACY, AND EVEN IN SOME CASES THEY BECAME SHAH'S MINISTERS.(1)

(1), DOCUMENT NO. 4 ABOUT TUDEH PARTY, MENTIONS THE NAMES OF THOSE TUDEH MEMBERS WHO HAD BECAME SHAH'S MINISTERS, AND REQUESTED THEIR NAMES TO BE DELECTED FROM THE LIST OF THOSE WHO CANNOT OBTAINVISA TO GO TO U.S.A. .

ANOTHER GROUP WHICH HISTORICALLY IS DIFFERENT FROM THESE GROUPS, IS MUJAHEDEEN KHALQ GROUP WHICH WAS FOUNDED BY THOSE LEAVING THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT. IN THE BEGINNING THEY USED ISLAM IN THEIR SLOGANS TO STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REGIME AND ATTRACTED SOME YOUNG MUSLIMS, AND EVEN FOR A WHILE THEY HAD SUPPORT OF SOME PROMINENT CLERGIES.

THIS GROUP GRADUALLY DEVIATED FROM ISLAM, BECAUSE THEY DID NOT RELY ON GENUINE ISLAM, AND SUDDENLY THEY ANNOUNCED A MAJOR CHANGE IN THEIR IDEOLOGICAL STANDS, AND REJECTED ISLAM. OF COURSE THESE GROUPS WHO WERE IN FAVOR OF ARMED STRUGGLE WERE FOLLOWING SOME CERTAIN THEORIES OF MARXISM AND COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A MAJOR THREAT TO THE REGIME WHICH WAS DEPENDENT ON IMPERIALISM, BECAUSE THE WORLD DEVOUVER AMERICA HAD BEEN CONFRONTED BY THESE THEORIES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD AND KNEW HOW TO DEAL WITH THESE TRICKS AND VAIN SLOGANS WHICH AIMED AT LEAVING WESTERN BLOC JOINING THE EASTERN ONE.

ARMED GROUPS EXISTING IN OUR SOCIETY, DUE TO LACK OF DEPENDENCY ON THE PEOPLE, AND POLICE'S SUPPRESSION WERE DESTROYED. LATER OD, DUE TO THE BLESSING OF THE GLORIOUS ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, THESE GROUPS INCLUDING THE MUJAHEDEEN KHALQ, REORGANIZED THEMSELVES AND WITH THEIR OWN SPECIAL TUMULTS ENTERED INTO SCENE OF THE REVOLUTION. SINCE THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WAS AFTER DEVINE GAOLS AND VALUES, THIS GROUP AND OTHER WEST OR EAST-TOXICATED GROUPS TOOK STAND AGAINST IT VERY SOON.

POLITICAL GROUPS DEPENDING ON THE SOVIET UNION, WERE WORKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK PREDETERMINED BY THEIR MASTER. TO GET FAMILIAR WITH THEIR REAL STAND, FORGETTING THE FALSE PROPAGANDA, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GO THROUGH SOME DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THEIR RIVAL'S EMBASSY.

It may be of interest to note the opinion of some Soviet officials that developments in Iran are at present a source of concern both to western and to socialist countries and that Khomeini's wish to create an Islamic country with the help of an Islamic unity party represents, historically speaking, a step backwareds.

While Khomeini is not yet being openly criticized or attacked in Soviet media, he is hardly ever mentioned or qouted in a sense positive

for the Soviet Union.

The Soviet side has little - and ideologically nothing - in common with Khomeini and his Islamic revolution.

Khomeini will be officially dropped by the Soviet Union when the Islamic revolution begins to threaten vital Soviet interests. This is illustrated by repeated Soviet criticism of alleged Iranian interference in internal Afghan affairs.

TUDEH PARTY DOC. NO. 12

We think there were several possible factors that led them (SOVIETS) to cut their ties with the Shah and equally unholy alliance with Khomeini and his Islamic movement. These include:

-- The lack of alternatives. Last winter Khomeini seemed to hold all the cards. The pro-Moscow Tudeh (communist) party was weak and had been largely discredited in Iran itself. There were no other " progressive " political grouping either enough to challenge Khomeini or prepared to work with the Soviets against him.

TUDEH PARTY DOC. NO. 13

ALTHOUGH THESE DOCUMENTS, SHOW ONLY SMALL PORTION OF BITTER REALITY OF ORGANIZED MOVEMENTS EXISTING IN OUR SOCIETY, BEING DEPENDENT ON EAST AND WEST, BUT THEY PROVE THE RIGHTFULNESS DEVINE MOVEMENT OF OUR MUSLIM UMMAH. IT SHOWS, HOW THIS NATION WITH DIVINE FAVOR AND LEADERSHIP OF VELAYAT-E-FAGHIH (RULE OF JURISPRUDENT), FOUND THEIR WAY TO LIGHT AND DIRECT PATH, AND STARTED A MOVE WHICH CALLS FOR PROSPERITY AND SALVATION OF THE OPPRESSED MASSES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WITH THE PEOPLE'S DIVINE ORGANIZATION, SURPRISED ALL THE DEVIATED AND ORGANIZED GROUPS, WHICH WERE CREATED BY EAST AND WEST, AND MADE THEM IMPOTENT OF CONFRONTING THIS DIVINE MOVEMENT. AFTER THE VICTORY OF ISLAM, DUE TO FEAR

WHICH WAS IN THEIR HEARTS, THESE POLITICAL GROUPS, GOT CLOSER TO THEIR MASTERS, AND THEIR MOVES SHOW VERY CLEARLY THAT THESE ELEMENTS ARE IN THE SAME LINE WITH EAST AND WEST.

THE PROPAGANDA TUMULT, STREET ROITS, INSTIGATING TRIBAL BIGOTRY, CONSPIRACY FOR THE COUP-D'ETAT, ASSASSINATIONS, EXPLOSIONS , ETC. WHICH WERE DONE OR ARE BEING DONE BY THESE GROUPS, IN SUCH A SHORT PERIOD AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, PROVES HOW HARD THE MALICIOUS IMPERIALISM IS WORKING TO DESTROY THIS REVOLUTION. BUT THERE IS NO FEAR BECAUSE AS THE HOLY QURAN SAYS " AND (THE UNBELIEVERS) PLANNED AND GOD TOO PLANNED. AND THE BEST OF PLANNERS IS GOD ". (3:57)

THE MUSLIM UMMAH, BY HAVING FAITH TO ALLAH THE ALMIGHTY, FOLLOWING THE LEADERSHIP OF IMAM AND MARTYRDOM WHICH GUARANTEES CONTINUITY OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS MOVING TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A POWERFUL AND UNITED ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD.

WE HOPE, DISCLOSING THESE DOCUMENTS WOULD DISGRACE THE WORTHLESS THORNS IN THIS DIVINE PATH.

WITH HOPE OF VICTORY OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS AND ABASEMENT OF KUFFAR AND HYPOCRITES.

MUSLIM STUDENTS FOLLOWERS OF IMAM'S LINE

COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS ABOUT POLITICAL GROUPS IN IRAN INCLUDES:

1- INTRODUCTION
a- NATIONAL FRONT
1- NATIONAL FRONT AND INTELLECTUALS

2- NATIONAL FRONT (GENERAL)
3- SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR
4- MORTEZA BAZARGAN
5- ABDOLRAHMAN BOROUMAND
6- KARIM SANJABI
7- ALI SHAYGAN
8- ALLAHYAR SALLEH
9- GHOLAMHOSEIN SADIGHI
10- KESHAWARZ SADR
11- DARIOUSH FROUHAR
12- HOSEIN MAHDAVI
13- FREIDOON MAHDAVI
14- HEDAYAT MATIN DAFTARY
b- RADICAL MOVEMENT
c- KANOON VOKALA (LAWYERS CENTER)
d- ZAHMATKESHAN PARTY
e- LIBERATION MOVEMENT
f- THE SOCIALISTS WORKER PARTY
g- FEDAEEAN AND MUJAHEDEEN
h- TUDEH PARTY
i- POLITICAL TRENDS

Footnote to Lambrakis comment and attached.

Exciting--hardly: interesting perhaps. Bill Miller became so emotionally involved with the National Fronters that he had to be sent out of the country for his blatant and outspoken anti-Shah criticism. There is some good information here about personalities and their attitudes and how some things work via the dowre system, but in my view Miller misread what it all meant.

You will note that almost all of the National Fronters and others who were thought to be in opposition to the Shah are solid members of the establishment today. Martin Herz probably toned down some of Miller's more passionate and egregious rhetoric before the report was put into final form.

Miller most recently found an outlet for his crusader zeal as chief of the staff backing the Senate committee investigating the deeds and alleged misdeeds of CIA.

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Hosein MAHDAVY

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POUCH:
ISFAHAN
KHORRAM
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ANKARA
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KARACHI
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TELAVIV

OUTGOING AIRGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL

NO. A-351

CN 12/234

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : AMMAN, ANKARA, ATHENS, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, KABUL, KARACHI, LONDON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, PARIS, TEL AVIV

FROM : Amembassy TEHRAN DATE: DEC. 21, 1961

SUB : The Iranian Intellectual Community: Structure, Patterns, Problems, and Recommendations for U.S. Actions.

~~CA-9915~~ AID/WA/PSP/AA/3764

Summary: One of the most exciting political problems of Iran today is how to bring the younger elements of the intelligentsia into closer harmony with the regime. There are economic and social reasons for the disaffection of a large proportion of the intelligentsia and especially of the educated young people, but the basic reason is political. The Iranian "angry young man" is disaffected from his society because of the difference between his ideals and aspirations and the realities of Iranian life today. The American image is still basically favorable, but there are some disturbing indications of anti-American attitudes. In particular, the United States is bitterly criticized for its support of a regime that denies these young people the role to which they think they are entitled.

Because of the limitations on political organization and communication in Iran, the political organization of the intelligentsia takes the form of [illegible] (elites which interact upon each other but exert no coherent power of their own. This report describes a case study showing how the [illegible] system operates.

The problem is in the first instance one for the Iranian Government, but there are things we can do to improve our own position with the Iranian intellectual community and to channel their thinking into a more constructive approach toward representative government. A number of concrete steps are suggested. Stemming from the evidence of the nature of the thinking processes and political habits of Iranian intellectuals. Ways are suggested in which we can minimize our "guilt by association" in the minds of such people without giving offense to the government. It is also recommended that we encourage more careful

[illegible] years/interests, not only [illegible] documents.

CA-9915

POL:WGMiller/AFFern/cak/ajs Dec. 20, 1961

USIS-Dr. Arnold (substance); CAS; CONS - Mr. Fenton

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mind communication, in addition to the usual visual and other esthetic presentations. This will involve elaboration of a new type of program for visiting Americans of intellectual stature, which might be combined with the requirements of neighboring posts. Proposals are also made to limit the study of Iranians at sub-standard American educational institutions, and concerning the creation of an Institute of Persian Studies in Tehran.

In addition, USIS has under active consideration some eight new operational ideas, which are also set forth in the concluding section.

[redacted]

This report consists of six sections:

I. The Traditional Intelligentsia.

II. The New Intelligentsia.

III. The Student Problem.

IV. The Issues of the Intellectuals.

V. Organization of the Intellectuals.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations.

For the purpose of this report, the "intellectual community" is defined as those persons who have influence on the minds of other people because of the quality of their own minds, usually as the result of higher education. Included in this category are those young people in Iran who aspire to such status themselves and who have the intellectual capacity to share in the discussion of ideas and ideals that motivate the other intellectuals. It will be clear that by this definition the total number of members of the "intellectual community" in Iran is quite small. Their power, too, is far the most part not large. But these are the people who inspire and bestow prestige in addition, who lead opinion about politics, and among whom are some of the present and potentially most effective leaders of Iran. There are [illegible] steps we can do [illegible] to improve our [illegible]

I. The Traditional Intelligentsia

Until as recently as one generation ago, higher education almost automatically entitled a young Iranian to a position of power or prestige. There was a shortage of trained persons in almost every field, and the young intellectual returning from abroad or graduating from one of the institutions of higher learning in Iran would identify himself with the progress of his country because he was assured a place in it.

Foreign-educated intellectuals were responsible for the revolution of 1906. These men came largely from landlord and trading families and had picked up their revolutionary ideals in Europe, mostly in France. The long presence of learned Frenchmen in Iran (French professors first came here in 1852, to the predecessor of today's Tehran University) and the preference of Persians in the early 20th century for French university education account in large part for the fact that Iran's present educational, legal and much of its governmental structure are based on French models and patterns of thought.

Former Prime Minister Ali AMINI, who is an economist of distinction, Professor (and former Prime Minister) Manouchehr EQBAL, Professor Ali Akbar SIASI, Dean of the Faculty of Letters and one of the intellectual leaders of Tehran University, Abdullah ENTEZAM who until recently headed the NIOC (the national oil company), Minister of Education Parviz KHANLARI and Professor Kand Senator Ahmad MATIN-DAFTARI of the Law Faculty at Tehran University, are a few of the many in positions of great influence who received their higher education in French schools and universities. These are all men who might be termed members of the older generation of Iranian intellectuals. Former Prime Minister Mohammad MOSSADEQ studied political science in Paris and received his doctorate of law in Switzerland. Although his young, hot-headed disciples today would not look at him as an exponent of the traditional intelligentsia, Mossadeq in fact belonged to the same breed of men as those who made the revolution of 1906. He was concerned with political ideas almost to the exclusion of the economic, administrative and technical requirements of his time.

Some of today's members of the "traditional" intelligentsia are still the product of religious education. Most of the elite around the turn of the century were educated by learned mullahs usually at schools called maktabs where the Qoran was recited and memorized, where children were taught Persian literature, to write Persian and to do simple arithmetic. The large cities contained and still contain religious colleges (madressehs) where learned mullahs teach religious students interpretation of the Qoran, religious law and religious philosophy. The leading clerics then continue their education at the great religious centers of Qom, Kerbela and Najaf. All the renowned ayatollahs of the present day such as Ruhallah-ol-Musavi KHOMEINI, Hadi MILANI, Mohsen HAKIM, Seyed Kazem SHARIAT-MADARI and Haji Agha Hasan QOMI followed the full traditional pattern of religious instruction.

Both foreign-educated intellectuals and religious traditionalists were involved in the great sweep of nationalism that characterized the Mossadeq period in the early '50s. Men like Ahmad KASRAVI, the outstanding intellectual of his period and

a man of encyclopedic knowledge, provided a philosophical base for the movement. On the left, there were communists like Bozorg ALAVI who were trained in Soviet, French and German universities and were considered by their countrymen to be among the most talented people of their time. On the far right were the reactionary mullahs and fascist extremists exemplified by men like Ayatollah Sayed Abol Qasem KASHANI and fanatic Fedayan terrorist groups.

Today the religious-educated elements exercise little influence among the Iranian intelligentsia, but other traditional elements still sit in places of high position and prestige. Most of them come from wealthy families. Examples are such eminent men of letters or science as Senator Issa SADIQ, 72, four times Minister of Education; Senator Rezazadeh SHAFAQ, 68, professor emeritus of literature and former Chancellor of Pahlavi University; Senator Sayed Hasan TAQIZADEH, 85, eminent litterateur and one of the leaders of the constitutional movement of 1906; and Senator Mahmud HEDJAZI, 65, novelist. It is no accident that these men are in the upper house of Parliament. They are there to provide a moderating and responsible influence, but the Senate of course has no power today and the intellectual influence of such men on the younger generation is strangely limited.

During the reign of Reza Shah a new type of intellectual made his appearance on the Iranian scene. This type, because of their expertise in running the governmental apparatus and especially its technical aspects, may be called the technocrats. Since the economy was still relatively uncomplicated, Reza Shah was able personally to supervise the beginnings of industrialization and he was able to discipline his technocrats and make them serve him loyally. But the category of technocrats became important in Iran only when they arrived in large numbers upon the scene, during the last ten or fifteen years.

While a large proportion of the traditional intelligentsia belongs today to the "pillars" of the regime -- there are exceptions, of course, such as Amini who commands some respect among younger people -- the same is not true of the mullah element which has been antagonized by the Shah's land reform and enfranchisement of women. The religious cities of Qom and Meshed are centers of religious opposition to the regime. More important, of course, is the fact that the religious elements have access to the countryside that the government cannot easily reach and they still have considerable influence in the cities among the middle class, especially in the bazaar, and to some extent among labor. Although Ayatollahs Khomeini and Milani have disclaimed opposition to the Shah's reforms and pictured their anti-regime position as based on constitutional grounds, there is doubt that the clergy as a whole is truly interested in the kind of thoughts that motivate many of the younger generation and the "new" intelligentsia.

II. The New Intelligentsia

The sheer number of young Iranians obtaining advanced training has made it impossible for them to use education any longer as a means to assured power and position. In this respect, the change has been almost revolutionary. Today one third of all Iranian children eligible for schooling attend school. In Tehran, it is estimated that sixty-five per cent of the population is now literate. Ten years

There are also a substantial number of technocrats who have remained in the government and are loyal to it in varying degrees. Manuchehr GODARZI, the Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the High Administrative Council, has a Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of California. Reza ANSARI, head of the Khuzistan Water and Power Authority and former Minister of Labor, was educated at the University of Utah. Dr. Ali RASHTI, formerly of the Plan Organization and now a Majlis deputy and the prospective editor of the newspaper of the New Iran Party, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia. During his 11-year residence in the United States, he acted for a period as a spokesman for the Mossadeq government. Nasser AMERI, now Director for Regional Development in the Ministry of Interior, was also educated in Utah. Amir PARVIZ, who is in charge of cooperatives in the Ministry of Agriculture, is a Tehran-educated member of the National Front opposition. Dr. Gholam Reza NIKPAY, Iran's foremost oil economist, holds a Ph.D. from London. What all these men, with the exception of the most dedicated oppositionists among them, have in common is a concern with the merits of issues, the techniques of development, the correctness of policies in achieving what they are supposed to achieve -- in other words, government of reason and equity and efficiency. In so far as they are disaffected, they are repelled by what they consider the hypocrisy and inefficiency of the regime rather than motivated by ideological considerations.

What makes the heritage of the Plan Organization so important is the fact that its atmosphere of intellectual probity, as well as the personal magnetism of Ebtehaj, could inspire such energies and leave behind such fierce loyalties, both personal and national -- though not necessarily political. Something of the same spirit is also found today in the engineers and technicians of the Khuzistan Water and Power Company. What the Plan Organization had in its heyday and what the KWPC still has today is the autonomy that enables these organizations to bestow their own rewards, removes them from the machinations of a corrupt bureaucracy, and permits them to be uncompromising in their standards of performance.

If one looks at the names of the most eminent scholars and most popular teachers at Tehran University, one finds two patterns: The first pattern is the expected one of meritorious elder academics rewarded by the regime and reasonably loyal to it but strangely lacking in appeal either within the faculties or among the students -- as contrasted to younger, more exciting minds who are almost universally identified with the opposition. The other pattern is one of cooperation even among professors of diverse political persuasions in opposing the efforts of the regime to discipline the university, its faculties and students.

There are three faculty members known as the "three musketeers" who for different reasons and from very different points of view have mobilized attempts by the government to control the university: Dr. Ali Akbar Siasi (cf. Section I), renowned psychologist and three times Chancellor of the University as well as former Cabinet Minister; Dr. Gholam Hossein SADEQI, a distinguished philosopher and once Minister of Interior under Mossadeq; and Dr. Yahya MAHDAVI, distinguished professor of literature who is relatively apolitical. These three do not share common political views, but they went together to the Shah to protest the brutality of government repressive measures at the University in 1961. Ever since that time they have continued to work together in opposing government interference in university matters.

ago, there were 8,000 students at the University of Tehran. Today there are 14,000, plus about 6,000 in National University and the provincial universities, and an additional 15,000 Iranian students studying at universities abroad. In fact, at the present time there are more Iranians studying abroad than from all the other countries of the Middle East combined.

There are now students and graduates of the University of Tehran who were born of peasant parentage. From all social strata and geographic directions of the country, and notably from the rising middle class, high school graduates press every year for admission to institutions of higher learning, regarding such learning as a right rather than a privilege. Last fall, there were 16,000 candidates for admission to Tehran University, but only 3,500 of them passed their Persian and foreign language tests and when they failed of admission their resentment took almost explosive proportions. But the resentments of those who were admitted did not seem any smaller. The young university generation, and the young generation deprived of such an education, seem both composed largely of "angry young men" who feel cheated out of the rewards that the previous generation had obtained from higher education.

Other countries have to a large extent replaced France as the mecca of the ambitious young Iranian. Of the 15,000 Iranian students studying abroad, no less than 5,000 are now studying in the United States (according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) Germany, which offers education most cheaply, comes next with approximately 4,000 Iranian students. There is little comfort in the large number of students in the United States because, while some outstanding Iranian students go to America and generally the well-born and wealthy send their children there, most of the Iranian students in the United States are poorly prepared and go to sub-standard American educational institutions. (Of a representative sample analyzed by the Embassy's Consular Section, only 7% had A averages, 38% had B, 42% C and 12% D. Distressingly, about 45% of Iranian student visa applicants proposed to attend schools which appear to be among the bottom 5% of American educational institutions. But since the war, some of Iran's most brilliant young intellectuals have come from first-class American educational institutions, so the prestige of American education is still very high.

The new generation of technocrats was largely educated in the United States. Cyrus SAMII, Reza MOGHADAM, Khodadad FARMANFARMAIAN and Hossein MAHDAVY who were the "brains" of Iran's Plan Organization during its heyday three to five years ago, were all educated in America -- Samii at the Universities of Michigan and Kansas, Moghadam at Stanford, Farmanfarmaian at Stanford, Harvard and Colorado, and Mahdavy at Princeton (in addition to Oxford and the Sorbonne). All four left the Plan Organization in 1961 and Samii and Moghadam left the country to take up employment with the International Bank and Fund. Farmanfarmaian has recently become Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, and Mahdavy teaches economics at Tehran University. Foremost among the technocrats is Abol Hasan EBTEHAJ, former head of the Plan Organization who belongs to the older nationalist generation. All these men have in common an attitude of opposition to the current regime, an opposition that is held in varying degrees, ranging from Mahdavy's outright hatred to Farmanfarmaian's grudging cooperation with the Iranian Government.

left P.O. in fall of 1962

Typical of the contrast between generations is the relationship between Professor Mohsen MOGHADAM, a traditionalist art collector and archeologist, and the younger Dr. Ezatollah NEGAHBAN, now probably Iran's foremost archeologist. Moghadam was trained in the old French tradition while Negahban was trained at the School of Oriental Studies at the University of Chicago. Moghadam attempted an excavation at Marlik Tepe and found nothing, while Negahban dug later at the same site and made what is probably the most important discovery in Iranian archeology of this century. Perhaps understandably, ever since that time Moghadam has hated Negahban. Soon after Marlik Tepe yielded some priceless gold objects, the site was bought by Princess Ashraf and the contents of the mound found their way to art dealers throughout the world. Negahban has been outspoken against the regime because of these actions; whereas Moghadam has been silent. Among Iranian students what has happened to the Marlik treasures is an eminently political issue. The feud between the French-trained Moghadam and the American-trained Negahban is rather typical of the strains that exist between professors according to the training patterns they represent.

Tehran University, where both Negahban and Moghadam teach, is without a doubt the intellectual center of Iran, the place where the most eminent intellects of Iran are to be found, where the most exciting ideas are discussed, and also where the problems of Iranian youth are brought to a sharp focus. Not all the important professors at Tehran University are anti-regime. Professor Sayed NAFICY, a highly regarded teacher of literature, keeps aloof from politics. Dean Hassan ARDEBILI of the Law Faculty is a pillar of the regime; and Minister of Justice Mohammad BAHRI teaches law there. However, Baheri often is booed by his classes and only recently Dean Afshar was housed in by hundreds of shouting students who showered him with National Front handbills whose dissemination he had prohibited. Jahanshah SALEH, the Chancellor (who has been Minister of Health and Minister of Education in past governments and is, in addition to being head of the Medical School, also the Queen's physician) seems to have foresworn his former political role at the university and confines himself in that regard to taking pot-shots at Minister of Education Parvin KHANLARI, who also teaches literature there.

Chancellor Saleh was appointed by the Shah six months ago and began a program designed to convert Tehran University into an American-style university from the French model in which it was supposedly cast. His efforts have met with resistance from faculty, students and even the governmental bureaucracy. The faculty, largely French-oriented, opposes his "dictatorial measures" and feel that his program tends to discredit their pedagogical methods and cultural orientation. The students, despite the fact that he is a brother of Ilahyar SALEH, leader of the National Front, believe his efforts are being made to rid the University of opposition to the regime. The government, for its part, has repeatedly interfered in his work, has sent troops and police into University grounds in violation of agreements, and embarrassed him by placing informers among his immediate staff. Perhaps more important, the government has not given Chancellor Saleh the funds and administrative support he has declared immediately necessary for the carrying out of urgent reforms.

Probably the most eminent intellect at the university is Professor Gholam Hussein Sadeqi (mentioned above as one of the "three musketeers") who is a philosopher and historian and is not only respected but liked by the students with

whom he works more closely than is customary there. He is a leader of the National Front. In the School of Engineering the most popular teacher was Professor Mahdi BAZARGAN who has the ability to electrify his audience with his ideas and is admired for the courage of his political convictions. A leader of the Freedom Movement of Iran which is part of the National Front, Bazargan is currently being tried on a charge of treason because of his co-authorship of leaflets attacking the regime. Other National Front leaders in the School of Engineering are Professor Abdol Hossein KHALALI and Professor Hossein SAHABI. In the Faculty of Law, Professor Karim SANJABI, who is widely respected for the quality of his learning and liked for his human qualities, is a National Front leader; and so are Professor Manouchehr ATAI of the School of Agriculture and Professor Said FATEMI of the Faculty of Letters. These are the most important persons in this category.

An interesting case study of the inter-action between the National Front and the regime at Tehran University is found at the Institute of Social Studies and Research, which is part of the Faculty of Letters. Here some of the most exciting ideas are being developed, and current work projects are on such subjects as the Iranian middle class, an analysis of the Tehran bazaar, certain aspects of the current land reform, comparative studies of Iranian history, translation of important foreign works in economics and sociology, and even a study for SAVAK (the government security agency) on the causes of the June riots. The Institute is presided over by Dr. Sadeqi but is directed by Dr. Ehsan NARAGHI, an ex-Tudeh member and well-known SAVAK agent. All the other members of the Institute are members of the National Front, among them Dr. Hossein Mahdavy who has been mentioned earlier. Naraghi, despite his connection with the regime, is also privately critical of it and is especially bitter that his former Tudeh connection is being held over his head as a means to force him to report to SAVAK about student and faculty activities. He has made his connection with SAVAK known to his associates and has on occasion given warning to them of Government intentions toward them.

The Progressive Center, which at present controls the majority in the Parliament, is sometimes referred to as a group of pro-government intellectuals and certainly considers itself a body that originates new ideas and programs for the government. The number of prominent intellectuals in that organization is actually small, however. Dr. Gholam Reza NIKPAY, who works closely with the Vice Chairman of the Center (Amir Abbas HOVEIDA) in the NIOC, has already been mentioned in connection with the "technocrats". Dr. Hossein HEDAYATI, who teaches law at Tehran University, Dr. Mahmud ZIAI, French-trained gynecologist and long-time Majlis deputy, and Dr. Bahram KAZEMI who is also regarded as a legal authority, are among the few real intellectuals in the Progressive Center. Unfortunately this group has failed so far to radiate ideas in the Iranian intellectual community, and its influence among young people in particular is very limited.

III. The Student Problem

Although not all students qualify for inclusion in the category of intelligentsia, they must be singled out for special consideration because it is among this milieu that the greatest amount of effervescence is found as well as the most acute form of disaffection from the regime in Iran — and, more important to us, also the most outspoken criticism of the United States. It is certainly true, as is pointed

out by exponents of the Iranian Government, that the agitation among university students encompasses only a minority among them; but the malaise and frustration among the students is exceedingly widespread and this furnishes an ideal medium in which agitation and radicalism can operate. It is among the students that the political problems of the Iranian intelligentsia come into sharpest focus, because it is among the students that anti-regime sentiments of the educated intelligentsia find the most resonance.

The problem is not entirely political. Disappointments and uncertainties about future employment certainly are an important factor, especially in view of the current economic stagnation in Iran which even further limits the opportunities of even the most gifted students. The conflict between generations, involving estrangement from parents still bound up in the traditional way of life, is undoubtedly a psychological element in the frustration of the young intelligentsia, leading to an attitude of rebellion against authority. Physical living conditions of many of the students are poor, their traditional society provides inadequate outlets for their sexual urge, and there is a dearth of recreational facilities for them. The Universities are overcrowded, and much of the teaching at Tehran University is of poor quality. These factors must not be minimized, but they do not go to the heart of the problem, which is political.

Essentially, the alienation of many of Iran's students from their political society is due to the differences seen by them between their ideals and aspirations on the one hand and the realities of the situation in Iran on the other. In a country as cynical about politics as Iran, it is surprising and also refreshing to find that idealism and especially a belief in civil liberties and democratic government are sincerely held by so many young people; but these beliefs are often coupled with such violent attitudes toward the government and sometimes with such radical nationalism that one may have doubts that these young people, if they were propelled into authority, would observe to the principles of due process, would respect minority rights, or would act responsibly in foreign affairs. Their opposition to the current regime in Iran is on the grounds that it is an autocratic dictatorship, but the hero of many of them is Mossadeq who started out in the liberal tradition but wound up an autocrat himself.

Yet it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance to these young people of the very ideals that are espoused by the United States. One of the most interesting political phenomena in connection with the radical students at Tehran University is that, while they condemn the United States for its support of the Shah and its acquiescence in what they regard as the hypocrisy, repression and nepotism of the current regime, they often desire above all to study in the United States and they blame the United States not so much for its general conduct in foreign affairs as specifically for its support of the current regime in Iran. There are some neutralist tendencies among the students and some disturbingly favorable minority views about the USSR -- as will be shown further below -- but at no time has student identification of their ideals with America come out more clearly than after the recent assassination of President Kennedy when their genuine shock and grief were over the loss of a man whom they regarded as a champion of their own aspirations.

The telegram of condolence sent to the United States by the Student Committee of the National Front included these interesting phrases: "Those who fight for the freedom of their nation know how liberal ideas grow in the younger generations. Kennedy was the symbol of such ideas. Kennedy, who was the author of 'Profiles in Courage', is now himself an image of courage and an eternal example of courage for the younger generation." Yet the issue of the National Front periodical which published this telegram also harshly criticises American policy in Iran. The ambivalence between extreme admiration and extreme hatred of the United States requires some rationalisation on the part of these students, and this rationalisation sometimes takes the form of conjecture that the late President was in favor of forcing the Shah to adopt democratic policies, but that those intentions were frustrated by conservative advisers and others further down in the bureaucracy.

Although the Embassy has made special efforts to cultivate students and maintain good contacts both among non-political students and among National Front student leaders, we must of course be careful in generalising about student opinion and admit that we do not have sufficient detailed information about it. Therefore special interest attaches to the available evidence from some recent public opinion surveys among students at the University of Tehran, by the Marketing and Public Opinion Research Division of the National Institute of Psychology. One poll conducted in late 1961 showed that, when asked for what purpose they attended the university, 43% responded that they did so "in order better to serve their country." One question read: "In my estimate the greatest need of the youth of Iran is to have more ...." and the respondents were asked to choose one of several alternatives. 14% chose recreational facilities; 33% chose "opportunities for participation in productive work"; but 40% chose "freedom for political expression." In the same poll, the students were asked to indicate the country they believe is doing most for world peace. India was chosen by 47%, the United States by 17% and the Soviet Union by 8%.

A more recent and more searching poll, conducted in the spring of 1963 through a reputable German polling organization, showed a slight shift in emphasis. The sample of 300 students still gave evidence of being idealistic: Under "aspects of personal behavior" which the students value most, "working for social justice" received a score of 82%; "ambition and a desire to get ahead", also 82%; "doing one's duty" 81%; "loyalty to mankind" 80%; "personal freedom" 79% (and "obedience for authority" only 14%). On the other hand, various questions dealing with the US and the USSR showed an increasing respect for the latter. Asked about their preferences for study in foreign countries, as many as 10% chose Russia (as against 37% choosing the US, 15% France and 14% England.) 93% believe that Russia leads the world in space development, and no less than 52% consider that the USSR also leads the world in "general scientific development" (as against 30% who believe the same of the US). 22% said they enjoy Russian films most (as against 14% who prefer US films). Asked whether certain countries were "doing what they should to help the developing countries maintain their independence", Russia received a score of 31% whereas the US received only 26%.

Asked to arrange certain attributes of countries in order, the students gave the USSR the following priority characteristics: Strong, hard-working, efficient,

practical, progressive and disciplined. The characteristic "aggressive" received a score of only 19% (whereas in the case of the US the score was 33%). By contrast, Iran was scored highest in the categories of boastful, peace-loving, reckless, self-indulgent and wasteful. The US was credited with many positive characteristics, but when the questions plumbed students attitudes on foreign aid, it turned out that 89% felt that the effect of American aid is "to make the rich richer" and only 8% thought American aid "improves the standards of living of the many." 27% felt that foreign aid has had the effect of promoting social change, but 32% thought it was preventing such change and 29% said they thought it did not have much effect one way or another. 50% thought that the US is "too much on the side of having things remain as they are."

There was an interesting priority for economic over political needs, since 42% said that the first thing that needs to be done is "to work toward change and betterment of the economic situation", 34% gave priority to "improvement of education, health and public morality" whereas only 18% put political change first. On the other hand, in answer to another question, a disturbing 35% opted for such things as "revolution, changing the regime, establishing socialism, freedom of press and speech, quitting the military pacts, eliminating the influence of foreigners"; and 55% stated that "some force may be necessary" in order to accomplish the changes that are deemed necessary. "The option was so phased that "force" related to action taken by the government.) According to student leaders close to the Embassy, the radical trend among students toward both left and right is accelerating because the students see little possibility of improving the situation through peaceful means. Because the US is associated with constitutional democratic means of bringing about political change, the failure of American policy in Iran to help achieve the ideals of these students is being regarded increasingly as evidence of American hypocrisy and as proof that peaceful processes are not an available option for the young Iranian intellectual.

Dr. Iraj AYMAN, who heads the Institute for Psychological Research and teaches sociology at the University, recently commented to Embassy officers about a questionnaire he had handed out to a sample of high school graduates, which among other questions asked them to indicate their political sympathies. They were free to put their name on the questionnaire or to refrain from doing so. A remarkable proportion of them (the exact figures are not yet available) indicated a preference for the National Front even while putting down their names, which he interprets as evidence of the strength of their convictions. At the same time, Dr. Ayman remarked about the singular inability of university students to "verbalize", which makes it difficult for the professor to determine their opinions in the course of conversation. As for the persons they trust most, he said that his research has led him to the conclusion that the individuals who have the greatest influence upon their thinking are without a doubt professors who are capable of articulating ideas. (The 1963 poll also bears this out.) Although the students are omnivorous readers, they place no credence in the public media of information -- in fact, they probably share the almost instinctive reaction of older intellectuals that if the government announces some news, it is probably not true.

Communist organizational activities among students appear to be a minor factor at present, not necessarily because there is no receptivity for such influence but because SAVAK has been particularly effective in penetrating the Communist

organizations among students, breaking them up, and arresting their leaders. There is evidence that such communist cells as exist are frequented, disoriented, sometimes in disagreement with each other, with some even blaming the Soviets along lines very similar to the accusations lodged against the United States by National Front student leaders. SAVAK has of course also penetrated the National Front student organization, but National Front sentiment runs so deep that even the arrest of a few dozen of their leaders does not cripple that organization. As the top layer is removed, as recently happened when 25 of the National Front student leaders were arrested, others move up to take their place. This is possible because National Front student groups are not in themselves prohibited, just as the National Front itself, while under constant pressure, is not an illegal organization.

The question is sometimes asked whether the National Front student leaders are professional agitators -- as is the case with some Iranian students abroad -- and whether they are actually interested in their academic work. While there are some hooligans among the student leaders, the evidence is that they are the exception rather than the rule. Sialeur BEHELIOL, the Chairman of the Student Committee of the National Front, recently received his degree in Medicine with the highest honors. He was elected head of the committee not only for his zeal and organizational abilities but also because of his intellectual achievements. Behrus BORUMAND, another student leader in the Faculty of Medicine, has consistently received straight A's in his examinations. Borumand was the recipient of a Pahlavi Foundation scholarship because of his impressive scholastic record, but this was cut off last year because of his refusal to stop his political activities. Last year Borumand spent almost six months in prison, but at the end of the year despite this handicap he led his class at the Medical School. That school, as a matter of fact, has a high proportion of the best students at the University. It also has a markedly high level of anti-regime sentiment.

Among other student leaders of importance is Hasan Ebrahim HABIBI, the son of a mullah, who received a B.A. degree in Law and for the past two years has been in charge of the newly formed Documents and Records Center at the Institute for Social Studies and Research. Also on the student committee of the National Front is Hasan PARSA, a secondary school teacher in Tehran. Parsa acts as liaison between the university and high school students. Both Habibi and Parsa were outstanding students. Another prominent member of the student committee is Abol Hasan BANI SADR who has been a militant member of the National Front since the age of fifteen. The son of a mullah, Bani Sadr received a B.A. degree in law and theology and then worked for three years as the leader of a research group in the Institute for Social Studies and Research, doing so well that he was recently awarded a fellowship for further study at the University of Paris.

Student unrest at Tehran University has in the past assumed such proportions that the Government resorted to military intervention, and this intervention in turn has exacerbated the opposition sentiments among both students and faculty. Although SAVAK repression continues, the Iranian Government recognized several years ago, when Ali Amini was Prime Minister, that a positive policy is also called for. A Youth Guidance Office was established in the Prime Minister's office (it is currently headed by Nasser KHODAYAR, an ex-Tudeh SAVAK agent and former journalist) and a program was launched to provide a student center and recreational activities

with the idea of keeping the minds of the students off politics. The government-sponsored Youth House, currently headed by Iraj GOLSORKHI (another ex-Tudeh), has been a disappointment. Golsorkhi is widely regarded as a SAVAK agent, and few self-respecting students set foot in Youth House. In fact, one of the most amazing aspects of the student situation is that the government has been totally unable to form even a small pro-government group at Tehran University. This cannot be due to the total absence of pro-government sentiment. It is probably due to the fact that self-respecting students do not wish to bear the odium that attaches to pro-government activity in the student milieu.

IV. The Muses of the Intelligentsia

An important indicator of the state of mind of the intelligentsia is the tenor of the works of its writers and artists. Because a work of art does not have to be compromised or qualified for tactical reasons, it can express in an unencumbered form the thoughts and sentiments of the intelligentsia of which the artist is a part. Because the work of art is paramount, artists and writers hold, in terms of their art, relatively uncompromised positions. Most of the Iranian writers and artists of distinction are far to the left politically with a large number of communists and communist sympathizers among them.

The intelligentsia of Iran have always been deeply influenced by poetry. The novel as a popular form has just come to Iran and the effects of some novels have been almost as profound upon the Iranian reading public. Iranians express their emotions far more openly than we do in the West. For example, many highly educated and sophisticated Iranians wept in public at the news of the death of President Kennedy. The martyrdom stories of Ali, Hassan and Hossein bring tears to almost any Iranians eyes. Poetry and moving prose can provoke a deep response, almost without parallel in the West. Because the emotional receptivity of the Iranian intelligentsia is so deep, poetry is at least as important a means of conveying political beliefs as skillfully argued political tracts.

While newspapers are censored and political pamphleteering is vigorously suppressed by the security organizations, novels and poetry have been published with relatively little difficulty. Even works by leading active communists, bitterly critical of the regime like Bozorg ALAVI, are freely available in book stores in Iran. Sadeq CHOOBAK's novels, Ali Eslami NADOOSHAN's essays, or AFGHANI's descriptions of middle class life are all written in a spirit of discontent and opposition.

In poetry, the most widely read authors have broken with traditional forms, meters and subjects. The new forms and the new subjects are full of violence, outrage, and opposition. New forms in poetry are paralleled by new forms in painting. While traditional forms still go on, such as miniature painting and Qoran illumination, abstract painting and paintings of social comment are the forms most appealing to the intelligentsia. The fact that artists are now of the intelligentsia and not illiterate artisans is of importance. Modern Iranian painters paint for themselves rather than for royal or aristocratic patrons. The paintings of Behjat SABR, Reza GHAZENI, Nasser OVEISSI and Joly and Monir FARMANFARMAIAN are all to some degree abstract -- that is to say, radically different from Iran's traditional styles. These painters are all politically opposed to the regime and its policies.

There is a popular anthology widely circulated in Iran called An Anthology of Free Verse. In it are contained a large number of bitter if beautiful poems condemning the regime and its actions. Many of the writers are Communists. Among the authors represented is Siavush KASRAHI, a supporter of the National Front whose brilliance as a poet has made him one of Iran's most highly regarded writers. A favorite poem of many National Front members is a poem written on the theme of a story from Firdowsi's Shahnameh, the national epic of Iran. The poem is entitled Arash-e Kamangir, Arash the Archer. The tale from Firdowsi written 800 years ago tells of how the boundry between Iran and the Iranian enemy, the Turanians, was made after many years of war. It was agreed that an arrow would be shot from a mountain top by Arash. Where the arrow fell would mark the border. The legend goes that Arash weighted the arrow with his heart and the arrow flew from Amol to Mery, a journey of forty days to gain for Iran the land it deserved. In so doing, Arash gave his life. The poem by Kasrahi on this theme makes constant allusions to the present situation, and it is unmistakably clear who the Iranian patriots are and who the oppressors are.

A few lines from another poem by Kasrah may indicate the curious mixture of bitterness and regret that characterizes the poems which so poignantly affect the intelligentsia. In this poem, the author expresses his belief that future generations of poets will not have to write of grim oppression nor have to voice heartfelt resentments that dry up the fullness of his art:

> There will be a poet after me
> Whose palette will have new colors.
> He'll blow these deadening ashes
> From the warm glow of tomorrow's fire.
> He'll splash radiant hues of forgetfulness
> Over the grim harshness of today's oppression.

It is significant that the editor of the anthology in which anti-regime poems like this appear is Darious HOMAYOUN, regarded as Iran's finest journalist, who has only recently been fired from Ettela'at, Iran's leading newspaper, for his articles criticising the policies of the regime.

In the field of motion pictures, Iran has one outstandingly gifted director in the person of Farrokh GHAFFARI who produced a film entitled "South of Tehran" which is available only for private showings because it was never released in view of censorship objections to its depiction of the seamy side of Iran's capital city. Ghaffari is a leftist, but his work enjoys the esteem of many members of the intelligentsia who are not of his political persuasion.

Because of censorship few journalists of integrity are evident in Iran. Ali Asqar AMIRANI, the editor of Khandaniha, is widely read for his masterful ambiguous articles which manage to tread a fine line between criticism and praise of the regime. Towfiq, a very popular humor magazine, manages to make savage political commentary through the device of clever caricatures. So far, the security forces have, in an exceptional and curious concession to wit, allowed these bitter caricatures to pass largely uncensored. One reason there are so few journalists

of distinction in Iran is that most of the newspapers will not pay their writers a living wage. Only Kayhan International pays its writers an adequate salary. There are several writers on that paper of exceptional ability with courage and integrity rare in Iran. They are Shaul BAKHASH, Hassan ZARGHOAR and Shahrough AKHAVI, all sympathizers of the National Front. Their articles and editorials are of course censored, but occasionally some remarkably outspoken pieces of writing by these men appear in print -- but such articles are of course accessible only to readers who know English. The larger Persian-language edition of Kayhan does not carry them.

V. Organization of the Intelligentsia

With news and comment censored, with political organizations prohibited or at least closely monitored by the Government, with the right of public speech and assembly shridged for the opposition, the forms of inter-communication in the intellectual community have taken strange and stunted forms in Iran. In the absence of parties, Iran has for a long time had a plethora of personality cults, such as Moaffar BAQAI's so-called Toilers Party, which are little more than small bands of followers devoted to the leadership of strong personalities rather than to comprehensive programs. The clique, well-known in the case of Iranian politics, is also the substitute for organization in the intellectual milieu. In fact, political and intellectual cliques overlap. The distinguishing characteristic of such cliques is that they often have influence upon each other, but not as a rule upon the general public.

Among the intelligentsia, political discussion, the development of ideas, and sometimes planning for future action take place in the dowre. In these circles or cliques the Iranian intellectual can indulge his great propensity for criticism, for seeing the weak points of any situation, for finding the worst possible interpretation of an event, and for expressing his distrust for those in authority. There is much rumor-mongering and tale-bearing, but there is also serious and constructive discussion and some practice of the dying art of conversation. Perhaps the addiction of Iranians to rumor and gossip should not be charged against them. In a situation in which important elements of information are not publicly available, it is almost a vital necessity to seek some institutional means of exchanging news and comment, to test one's knowledge of current events, in order to be able to cope with one's environment. The dowre is a normal and logical means by which the intelligent Iranian meets this particular need.

The dowre is a group that meets regularly for reasons of common interest. Most dowres are weekly but some may meet only once a month, others more often. Aside from regular gatherings of friends or families, dowres are formed to promote particular self-interests. Those who are active politically and socially may go to several dowres a week. Some carry this to extremes. For example, a young American-trained engineer known to this Embassy, Hamid QARIBI, who is widely known as an opportunist, is a member of not less than twelve dowres.

Most dowres are not long lived because their unifying objectives are usually not broad enough to overcome petty jealousies and personal rivalries. In 1959 a collection of "bright young Iranians" including Mr. Khodadad FARMANFARMAIAN (see Section II), Dr. Manuchehr GOODARZI, now Deputy Prime Minister and head of the High

Administrative Council, Reza MOGHADAM and Cyrus SAHII (see section II), Dr. Jahangir AMOUZEGAR, former Minister of Finance, and Dr. Jamshid AMOUZEGAR, former Minister of Agriculture, formed "The Emerson Club" whose purpose was to discuss the over-all policies of Iranian development as well as the problem of how to work in a regime whose authoritarianism they basically oppose. Other members of "The Emerson Club", which died after a year, and of two successive dowres known as "Our Club", are Homayoun ANSARI, geologist with the NIOC, Cyrus QANI, lawyer in the Development Bank, Dr. Iraj VALIPUR of the High Administrative Council, and Dr. Majid MAJIDI and Rasul BAKHTIAR of the Plan Organization. "Our Club" is still in existence and it is likely that the problems and concerns of development in Iran will make this dowre a continuing and influential one.

The Progressive Center began in 1959 as a dowre of nine persons. It is still run by that original dowre consisting of Hassan ALI MANSUR, former Minister of Commerce and currently the leading contender for the post of Prime Minister, Amir Abbas HOVEIDA, Deputy Manager of the NIOC, Mohamad Taqi SARLAK, former Minister of Industries and Mines, Dr. T. KALALI, former Deputy Minister of Labor, Mohsen KHAJEHNOURI, a former Mossadeqist presently the head of the Workers Insurance Organization and a Majlis deputy, Dr. Hossein HEDAYATI, professor of law at Tehran University, Engineer Faridun SOTUDEH of the Ministry of Industries and Mines, Dr. Zia SHADMAN of the Ministry of Finance, and Dr. Qolam Reza NIKPAY, head Economist of NIOC. This original dowre is the core of the Executive Committee and controls the 400 persons who make up the Progressive Center.

Some dowres have been long lived. Former Prime Minister Ali Amini has a dowre which has met on Wednesdays for over twelve years. This group includes such people as Abdullah ENTEZAM, former Director of NIOC, and Nasrollah ENTEZAM, former Cabinet member and former President of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Entezams, like other members of Amini's dowre, are active members of other dowres. Another well known and long lived dowre is called Iran Jovan - Young Iran - and has gone on since the 1920's. Ahmad ARAMESH, reactionary and neutralist journalist and former head of the Plan Organization, Dean Ali Akbar SIASSI (see Sections I and II), and the RASHIDIAN brothers, well known businessmen and guild leaders, are among the members of this dowre known for its pro-British tendency.

There are dowres associated with Freemasonry, three or four of which are well known. Their membership is usually twelve in number and the meetings take place invariably on Sunday evenings. Senator Hossein ALA, former Prime Minister and Minister of Court, Seyed Hasan TAQIZADEH, Senator and leader of the 1906 constitutional movement (see Section I), Dr. Loghman ADHAM of the Ministry of Court, Manucher EQBAL, Director of the NIOC, Abdullah ENTEZAM (see preceding paragraph), Jafar SHARIF-EMAMI, Senate President and former Prime Minister, and Javad MANSUR, Deputy Director of the Development Bank, to name a few of the most influential, are known to be Freemasons. When Dr. EQBAL was Prime Minister in 1958, eleven members of his Cabinet were members of a dowre associated with Freemasonry called the Hafez Club.

There are small dowres that meet in what are known as khanehqahs (places where Sufis gather ostensibly for meditation but largely for political discussion).

General Farajollah AQ-EVELI, head of the Army Bank, Dr. Hossein MAYAB, former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Mossadeq, Abdullah ENTEZAM, and Ebrahim KHAJEH-NOURI, lawyer and former government official are members of a khanegah. Despite the fact that the political persuasions of these men differ, their common interest in Sufi mysticism makes political discussion a possibility and political compromise a reality.

There are dowres which are avowedly political in nature such as Jahanshah SALEH's Etefaq-e-Melli (Alliance of the Nation) which has among its members Dr. Ahmad MATIN-DAFTARI, a prominent conservative, and Dr. Jalal ABDOH, Iranian Ambassador-at-large and a well known neutralist. Dr. Saleh is a former member of the National Front. Abdoh and Matin-Dafteri hold opposing political views. What makes this political dowre possible is the fact that they are colleagues at the University of Tehran and have formed the dowre with the specific purpose of discussing points they have in common rather than their differences.

A close look at one dowre may help to indicate how this institution works. On Thursdays, Ali FARMANFARMAIAN, Director of the Pars Oil Company, holds a dowre in his home in Shimran. This dowre is usually attended by a number of his brothers including Cyrus Farmanfarmaian, businessman and physicist; Karim Farmanfarmaian, banker; Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank; Qurush Farmanfarmaian, paratrooper; -- and their wives as well as some of Ali's sisters such as Settereh Farmanfarmaian, head of the Institute for Social Welfare. Other brothers and sisters from this large and influential family also attend from time to time. Among other regular participants are Iraj HEDAYAT, the nephew of the former Chief of Staff and a petrochemical engineer; Cyrus QANI of the Industrial Mining and Development Bank; Hossein Mahdavy, National Front leader; Reza KHAZENI, architect; Mahmud IZADI, representative of the large English consulting and construction firm Humphre & Laing; Farhad DIBA, manager of several concerns and agencies and relative of Queen Farah; and Morteza KAZERUNI, son of a wealthy Isfahan textile mill owner. The regular members and their wives or companions bring friends from time to time. The social range of Ali Farmanfarmaian's dowre extends from the Court to the lowest reaches of the bazaar. Most of the people who come to Ali's home are of roughly the same age, from 30 to about 38. They are all well educated: Oxford, Cambridge, Sorbonne, Harvard, University of California are well represented. Many are Ph.D's. All but a few are deeply involved in some aspects of business, banking, academic life or in one or two cases self-indulgent pleasures. Their wives are also well educated and extremely sophisticated.

If we next look at the dowre connections of the foregoing members of Ali Farmanfarmaian's dowre, the pervasive nature of this system becomes apparent.

Ali Farmanfarmaian, who is head of a company which produces motor oils, is a leading member of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce. He goes to several dowres centered about banking and business interests whose members include the present Minister of Economy, Naqhi ALIKHANI. Because he is recently divorced, he goes to still other dowres where young women eligible for marriage can be seen. One woman he has been regularly is the daughter of Senator Parviz KAZEMI, which leads to another series of interlocking relationships. There is in Tehran a fast young set close to Princess Ashraf's court that meets at the Kolbe night club near the

Darband Hotel on Thursday nights. Ali is also a member of this set. Through another dowre, he has a voice with the Shah through General Amir KHATEMI who, like Ali, is an ardent water skier.

Cyrus Farmanfarmaian is a physicist trained in the United States who has translated a number of American scientific texts into Persian. These efforts and his academic interest in physics have brought him into contact with the publishing and academic world. Cyrus belong to a number of dowres involving these professions. Cyrus' wife Marvin, is a very talented dress designer. Her tastes and friends involve still other dowres.

Khodadad (known by his friends as "Joe") Farmanfarmaian is extremely active in banking, planning, diplomatic and family circles. He is the most active socially of all of Ali's dowre and in a way is most outside of the traditional circles because of his high government position and his many friendships among foreigners. But Khodadad's friends and acquaintances are on occasion of use to other less prominent members of Ali's dowre.

Qurush Farmanfarmaian, known as "Q", was drafted into the armed services and is serving his duty as an instructor in the paratroops. His social activities are closely circumscribed by the requirements of his military duties, but his friends who have attended the University of California, his military colleagues and his family leave the chance for very few lonely moments. It was "Q" who told Hossein Mahdavy, a National Front leader, that the paratroops were ready to move against the student demonstration planned to take place in Baharestan Square before the election last September. It was this tip in part that helped prevent bloodshed. "Q" is not a member of the National Front, nor are most of Ali's dowre, but because of their common disgust with the regime, their personal loyalties are maintained despite differing political affiliations.

Settereh Farmanfarmaian is one of Iran's outstanding women social workers. Her professional interests have brought her into contact with other leading feminists, with the Court of the Queen, and with Princesses Ashraf and Shams. Her connections have often been used to help other members of the dowre.

Iraj Hedayat owns a large mechanized farm in Fars in which he is much involved. Through his uncle, General Hedayat, the former Chief of Staff, he is closely connected with the upper echelons of the military and their families.

Cyrus Qani, the son of a distinguished doctor, scholar and diplomat, has a dowre of his own on Sunday nights. His circle includes Javad and Hassan Ali Mansour and the members of the Industrial and Mining Development Bank. On both sides of his family he is related to leading religious figures. Although Qani is a leading member of the National Front he often goes to dowres held by former Prime Minister Ali Amini and still another held by Senate President Jafar Sharif-Emami.

Hossein Mahdavy is one of the leaders of the National Front and is most involved in party meetings and dowras involving members of that party. One of his closest friends, Hedayatollah Matin-Daftary, is the son of Dr. Ahmad Matin-Daftary, Iran's leading lawyer and jurist and a long standing pillar of the regime. Mahdavy was called by Abol Hassan Ebtehaj "Iran's brightest young economist" and often attends the dowras and parties of his former colleagues and subordinates from the Plan Organization. Hossein's family is a large and influential one -- almost as large and influential as that of the Farmanfarmaians. Their political ideologies range from socialist to arch-conservative, but family loyalties often transcend particular political views. When Mahdavy was arrested by SAVAK last June, his family, his friends in Ali's dowra as well as friends from other dowras worked for his release. Petitions from family and friends reached the Prime Minister and the Shah and he was released after a short internment.

Reza Khazeni is married to a cousin of Hossein Mahdavy. He is an architect trained at the University of California. His wife Shirin is a graduate of Cambridge in Oriental languages. An artist as well as an architect, Reza's interests carry him into the dowras of Iranian painters and writers, many of whom (see Section IV) are oriented politically to the left.

Mahmud Isadi, a Cambridge graduate, works as the representative of an English engineering firm. His interests in tennis and skiing and his remarkable story-telling talent lead him into many dowras. His family is related to the Khajenouris, one of whom is a leading member of the present Majlis. His aunts and uncles are close friends of Princess Fatimah and General Amir Khatemi, Chief of the Air Force. Mahmud often skis and plays tennis with General Khatemi, not without advantage to his business interests.

Isadi's closest friend is Farhad Diba, an Oxford graduate in philosophy, politics and economic who now helps his father run the Park Hotel and the Jaguar and Renault car agencies. His family relationship with the Queen necessitates some life at Court. Prince Shahram Pahlavi, son of Princess Ashraf, is a close friend as are a number of the court hangers-on. Farhad is chairman of the Oxford-Cambridge Society in Tehran. At an Oxford-Cambridge dinner held in November, Farhad brought together, as he has for the past few years, many of Iran's top intellectuals. Many of those who attended the dinner were National Front members, while a minority were identified with the regime. The bond of similar education makes for friendships that are above any ideological beliefs. There is no question that Farhad Diba would willingly help his friends like Hossein Mahdavy when in difficulties, but political affiliations would have little to do with it. Common education, friendships and pastimes would have far more to do with his decision to offer political help.

What is most evident in Ali Farmanfarmaian's dowra are the strong friendships that have grown out of similar education. Over lunch, games of chess and

backgammon, political discussions take place. All without exception have little respect for the regime. Some see no alternative, while others are violently opposed.

Most dowras of a political nature are anti-regime in sentiment. A few, such as the National Front dowras and the circles around figures such as Ali Amini, General Ali Akbar Lorghan or Mozaffar Bagai, are actively in opposition. Others are merely intellectually opposed to all or some of the Shah's policies. Still others have particular grievances such as the several small landowner dowras which are anti-land reform. Those dowras which are composed of members of the middle class have been in opposition since the reign of Reza Shah. What is new is the opposition of groups that formerly supported the regime, such as landlords and mullah groups.

It would be misleading to convey the impression that there are hundreds of dowras in Tehran and in other major provincial cities that are seething with discontent and plotting to overthrow the regime. While there are only a few that do meet this extreme description, almost all are opposed to the present autocratic rule of the Shah. Significantly, the opposition of the intelligentsia so clearly articulated in closed cliques is not expressed to the growing mass of literate workers and peasants. The masses are prone to demagogery, and subjected to propaganda in the press and on the radio. They are not being educated in the political, economic and social problems of their country. They are, on the contrary, constant targets for emotional persuasion, presently by the regime, but a breakdown of authority would leave them prey to whatever forces controlled mass media.

While the dowras is a place to air ideas and political views with freedom and without fear of interference, dowras do not contribute much to political action needed in Iran today. They are at best small enlightened self-interest groups. Members of the hundreds of dowras that exist in Iran no doubt include many of the future leaders of Iran, but sustained and intelligent national leadership in the increasingly complex situation in Iran can only come through the medium of effective political parties. Government by clique has already been found to be inadequate to the enormous task Iran has before it. These cliques do not reach down to the growing literate masses among the workers and peasants. This is their limitation, and in that limitation lies the problem of the Iranian intelligentsia. The students, who are the most radical element of the opposition, are the only one of its elements that is prepared to go out on the street and influence the masses. But the students listen to the older members of the intelligentsia.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Disaffection with the regime on the part of substantial elements of the Iranian intelligentsia, and especially of educated Iranian youth, is a serious problem for the Iranian Government. To the extent that this problem relates to the United States, it involves "guilt by association" with the current regime. Since there is no present realistic alternative to our policy of supporting the Shah, and since we probably should not be overly influenced by attitudes of the intelligentsia which represents no immediate power factor in Iran, it could hardly be recommended at this time that we change our overall policy to meet this problem. However, while we cannot solve it, we can mitigate the problem in so far as it relates to our own image in a milieu from which will come the future leaders of Iran.

An outstandingly successful instance of such mitigating action was the speech given by Ambassador Holmes on the subject of "The Consent of the Governed" at the Iran-America Society in Tehran on May 22, 1963. That speech struck a most responsive chord with the Iranian intelligentsia. Since the Ambassador was talking about the United States, no one could accuse him of interfering in Iranian affairs, and nobody did so. Other occasions can be found to make similar points.

For instance, the visit to Iran of a distinguished and articulate Jeffersonian scholar such as Professor Saul K. PADOVER of the New School for Social Research, with a special effort on the part of the Embassy to publicize his visit and have him meet with Iranian intellectuals, could be a further step in the same direction. An essay contest related to such a visit, sponsored by the American Embassy, could contribute to making this a major event. Other ideas will be explored along the same lines.

B. USIS has been and is currently engaged in reformulating its program with a view to shifting the emphasis from mass communication to careful targeting on selected leadership groups both in Tehran and in the provinces. Obviously, the intelligentsia represents one priority target, and the program reflects an awareness of its importance. But more can and must be done. (See Section I below.)

In general, we are impressed with the receptivity of the Iranian intelligentsia and especially of Iranian educated youth for American ideas and for information about America. The structure and patterns of communication of the Iranian intelligentsia are such that the spoken word carries more weight with them than the written word or other visual media. These are people who like to talk and listen, to argue and debate, who are interested in new ideas and impressed by intellectual excellence. Iran is therefore a country that is unusually well suited to a carefully targeted program to bring to bear American men of letters, social scientists with interesting and exciting ideas, and political thinkers. Visits by such men will not solve our problem, let alone the problem of the Iranian Government, but they will help to mitigate the particular problem that is of most concern to the United States.

American intellectuals, including distinguished liberals and other scholars such as Henry Steele Commager, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Max

Lerner, Oscar Handlin, Jacques Barzun, Lionel Trilling, Clinton Rossiter, etc. can serve to activate the favorable sentiments that exist for the United States -- while spreading ideas that badly need to be spread in Iran, about the realities of democratic politics with their need for compromise, respect for minorities, and the development of a popular consensus. Iranian youth in particular tend to emphasize the negative, i.e. their opposition to the regime, rather than acquaint themselves with the positive aspects of representative government. There is a real need for them to be better informed about these aspects.

It should be pointed out, of course, that the message which such American intellectuals -- whether liberal or conservative -- bring to Iran includes not only ideas about how our own society operates and what principles underlie our constitutional system, but probably also a general attitude of sensitivity toward oppression and lack of basic liberties. They will no doubt be confronted with the kind of accusations of American support for an Iranian "dictatorship" that we ourselves are hearing from Iranian intellectuals, and their reactions to this are predictable. However, we believe that on balance the benefits derived from such visits outweigh the disadvantages, particularly if the visitors can be impressed with the need to confine their teaching and comments to American institutions and to refrain from making comments on the internal affairs of the host country. Our Fulbright professors and teachers have in general successfully operated under this limitation.

C. Since it is unlikely that distinguished American intellectuals would be willing to make visits solely to Iran, we believe that a special program should be devised for Iran and such neighboring countries as may have need for similar activities. For instance, a CENTO label might be placed on a special program to bring visiting intellectuals (perhaps not only from America) to all three CENTO countries if a similar need is felt by Embassies Ankara and Karachi. It is quite clear that the Fulbright Program is not suitable for the kind of visits that we have in mind. If funds cannot be found in the category of visiting specialists, the Department should approach one of the foundations on an urgent basis. Obviously, visiting American intellectuals of distinction would have to be paid on a basis commensurate with their current earnings, and special incentives might be necessary to make them forego their present activities for, say, one semester. Visits to Iran by such persons should be considered in terms of a duration of approximately two months for each visitor, including trips to one or two of the provincial centers of learning.

It is believed that Professor Sidney HOOK, Chairman of the Philosophy Department of New York University, would be admirably suited to investigate the possibility of establishing a program along the foregoing lines, paralleling the efforts he has made in Japan where he was unusually well received by the intellectual community even though his beliefs, notably his militant anti-communism, clashed with some of the ideas currently in fashion there. Professor Hook's devotion to the democratic ideal and his understanding of democratic practice, coupled with his sympathy for the leftist point of view even while advancing an intelligent anti-communist position, make him ideally suited for dialogues with wooly-minded foreign intellectuals who find him irresistibly attractive as a conversational partner.

D. There is considerable room as well as receptivity for an expansion of the Fulbright Program of visiting teachers of English. All eight faculties of the University of Tehran, for instance, would be glad to accept American teachers. (There are at present three Fulbright fellows at the University, all of them successfully teaching English in the Faculty of Letters, but other faculties would be equally receptive.) When there is a real receptivity for their services the presence of such Americans can sometimes help to improve our posture in this portion of the intellectual community. There are, of course, serious financial limitations on this program in Iran at the present time. If the exchange-of-persons program as a whole could be expanded, we would recommend that consideration be given also to an expansion of the Fulbright English-teaching program. We are also exploring the possibility of utilizing the Peace Corps for the teaching of basic English at the Universities.

E. A major effort should be made to see that young Iranians attend only institutions in the United States that are really able to offer the foreign student a worthwhile education. This can be done through improved counselling in Iran and also by action in Washington to insure that only qualified institutions with high academic standards are permitted to accept foreign students. The Department is urged, therefore, to review its list of acceptable institutions and remove from the list those institutions of uncertain merit. Some of those institutions have been cited in the Embassy's CM-26 of September 30, 1963 and in CM-44 of December 7, 1963.

F. We also believe that the creation of an American Institute of Persian Studies at Tehran would furnish an opportunity for Americans of intellectual stature to gain further entree with their Iranian counterparts in an atmosphere divorced from the American official presence. Every year more than half a dozen first-class American scholars of Iranian culture and civilization come to Iran under non-governmental auspices. If a place existed where they could live and work and meet their Iranian counterparts, they would be more effective in influencing Iranian intellectuals and could also usefully put forward ideas about our own culture and civilization.

Professor Richard ETTINGHAUSEN of the Freer Gallery of Art, whose recent visit here was highly successful (although he appeals to a relatively small number of scholars of his own specialty), could be approached with a view to having him take the lead in establishing such an institution if suitable private financing for it can be found. In any case, Professor Ettinghausen's return visit for a full academic year, under a specialist grant, would be desirable as a means of improving the American image in one sector of the Iranian intelligentsia.

G. The Iranian Government is confronted with a most difficult problem. Some of the country's best minds and skills are not at present at the disposal of the regime, and the elan and exhilaration of the development effort, which could come from a feeling of national unity in pushing ahead with that task, is largely lacking. A compromise between the government and those intellectuals who are standing aside is unlikely as long as the opposition insists that the Shah withdraw from his position of ruler and turn over real power to the ministries. Since

the Shah has no present intention of doing this, the Iranian Government can do little to meet the problem of the intellectuals on the political front, but it could do more on the educational front. A principal obstacle to the effective growth in academic stature of Tehran University and Pahlavi University (Shiraz) has been poor administration. The United States should use its present assistance as leverage to bring about the most important improvements in this field. Such efforts will help to improve the quality of instruction that the young people receive, but they will not solve the political problem: Better education does not necessarily moderate political attitudes, but it reduces the area of irrationality where the fanaticism of the half-educated can flourish and it can better qualify the young intellectuals to play a constructive role in the future.

H. The Shah himself has suggested that the United States step up its cultural programs involving visiting orchestras, dance groups, musicians, and others in order to counter the Soviet offensive in these fields. (Embassy telegram 1150 of June 24.) While such stepped-up programs would be useful, this should not be at the expense of mind-to-mind, rather than visual or other esthetic presentations. Nevertheless, an expansion of US cultural presentations would have a favorable effect in the Iranian intellectual community.

I. The foregoing recommendations are things that have occurred to us in connection with the analysis of the intellectual community contained in the present report. The Country Team Youth Committee, which has had the student problem under continuous consideration, and USIS, which as indicated in paragraph B is engaged in a program to sharpen its emphasis on special target groups including especially the intelligentsia, are also actively exploring a number of operational ideas along the following lines: (1) Establishment of American Studies Centers in at least three Iranian universities -- Tehran, Pahlavi (Shiraz) and Meshed. USIS considers it preferable that the impetus for this come from private Foundations and that assistance be given by the Exchange of Persons Program. (2) Doubling the presentations program, with more attention given to young intellectuals. (3) Assignment of young USIS officers to study full-time at the University of Tehran, following the Latin American pattern, with their principal mission to influence student opinion in a direction favorable to US policies. (4) Expansion of the Iran-America Society's Student Center adjacent to the University of Tehran by the rental of additional space and by enlargement of the staff. This Bi-National Student Center has been an outstanding success. It is the best available platform for visiting American intellectuals but cannot be adequately used at the present time because of space limitations. (5) Establishment of similar student centers in Meshed and Shiraz. (6) Establishment of a USIS library in Tabriz, which is the only university city of consequence in Iran that has neither a USIS nor BNC library. (7) Expansion of the present USIS documentary film production program with emphasis on positive themes of modernization in Iran. (8) Doubling the circulation of Peyvandeh, the USIS publication designed for intellectuals, which now has a circulation of 10,000. This publication contains provocative reprints of articles published in American periodicals.

It is recognized, of course, that financial limitations may preclude placing many of the foregoing recommendations in effect; but the problem is important, and when our total interests in Iran are considered, the costs of the suggested new actions are relatively not very large.

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Department of State

Amembassy TEHRAN

APRIL 21, 1969

The State of the Hard-Core Non-Communist Opposition in Iran

SUMMARY: The Shah's progressive reform program, coupled with the use of effective police power, has destroyed all organized political opposition in Iran. The remnants of old non-communist opposition parties that made up the National Front, however, still exist and while individuals who were personalities in the National Front movement are today totally inactive, they continue to be vehemently anti-Shah and as such constitute a latent threat to the current order of things.

In identifying some of the oppositionist personalities in Iran today, this report has categorized them into three separate groups for analytical purposes: 1) Young Activists, 2) Conservative Bazaar Elements, and 3) Older Intellectuals. 1) The "Young Activists", who claim they are motivated by a desire to limit the powers of the Shah, and seek to introduce what they call a "nationalist, constitutional" government in Iran; 2) "Conservative Bazaar Elements", who resent the modernizing forces unleashed on the Iranian nation by the Shah's reform programs and claim that the Shah has corrupted Iran's Islamic way of life; and 3) the "Older Intellectuals", who are politically "liberal" in attitude, but who resent the current suppression of all political activity which does not conform to the policies of the Shah and his government.

The oppositionists today pose no threat to the Shah. Indeed, we are aware of no political activity on their

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part, and no prospects for action in the foreseeable future. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that they really don't postulate any viable alternative to the Iranian monarch -- a condition which weakens their ideological position as oppositionists. Their arguments and complaints can basically be reduced to the old and well-known call in Iran for Constitutional Monarchy. In discussions with some of the opposition, however, the reporting officer has been impressed not only by their obstinate refusal to compromise or seek accomodation with the Shah's government, but by their faith in their own prophecies and predictions of political and economic evils soon to befall Iran. The Shah, who is successfully leading modernization, however, is equally confident about the rightness of his cause, appears content to retain the current political controls in Iran and let these elements smolder in their state of enforced political inactivity to await the realization of their Cassandra-like prophecies.

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The Shah, by successfully identifying himself with modernization through a progressive reform program, coupled with the effective use of police power, has over the years succeeded in destroying all organized internal political opposition to his rule. The emphasis here must be placed on the term organized for there still remain remnants of hard-core non-communist opposition elements whose continued existence constitutes a latent threat to the current order of things. The purpose of this report is to identify and locate, where possible, some of the personalities within Iran who at the moment are known to be vehemently anti-Shah, remain unwilling to cooperate with the government, and who under suitable conditions might be expected to emerge and exploit a crisis situation to achieve his overthrow. They are the individuals who have taken political action against the Shah in the past and who have suffered the consequences for their opposition. In large measure their stature as oppositionists and their importance politically today is due to their rejection of government blandishments to give up their opposition in return for good jobs and other amenities, and to their obstinate refusal to compromise in any way with the Shah's regime. It is their uncompromising attitude which serves to distinguish them from the far larger number of their compatriots who, while critical of aspects of the Shah's rule, have for the time being at least made their peace with the powers that be and have allowed themselves to be absorbed into the fabric of today's Iran.

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Those within Iran who have played a leadership role in opposition activities in the past and who remain adamantly opposed to the Shah are relatively few in number. Their appeal, however, is much broader than their number would suggest and their importance in the Iranian scheme of things cannot be ignored. Neither, however, should their potential be exaggerated since Iran's past history clearly indicates the limits to their capacity for organizing effectively to achieve their end --political power. They are today, completely inactive politically. More important, perhaps, they postulate no viable alternative to the Iranian monarchy - a condition which weakens their ideological position as oppositionists. Their arguments and complaints amount to little more than the well-known call in Iran for Constitutional Monarchy.

Almost all the individuals involved have in one way or another been identified with the National Front. They are in fact the remains of the leadership of various groups that made up the Front. For analytical purposes, they can perhaps best be divided into three categories: 1) "Young Activists," 2) "Conservative Bazaar Elements", and 3) Older Intellectuals". Of course, each of the oppositionists under study does not fall neatly into any one category, but by and large the general categories describe the basic, if not total, orientation of those involved. The groups are discussed in the order of what we consider to be their importance, that is, their capacity to cause the Shah trouble.

1. The Young Activists, as the label suggests, are the most prone to action and thus constitute a more immediate concern to the regime. Their appeal is to the "educated" young in society, primarily high school and university students, but also younger Iranians in the establishment, including the civil service, and perhaps more important, the military and police organizations. The appeal is largely emotional but also couched in intellectual terms and the cry is for "justice under law" guaranteed by the Iranian constitution. Their commitment is to the complete political modernization of Iran with special emphasis placed on doing away with what they consider the absolute authority of the Shah. Although most openly indicate their willingness to live with a Shah whose powers would have been severely curtailed, we suspect that some few, if they could have their way, would do away with the institution of monarchy in favor of a republic. In formulating their appeal for limited monarchy, full use is made of the national pride felt by most young Iranians when they reflect on Iran's constitutional movement in the early 20th century. The appeal is also made to the memory of Mossadeq and all nationalization which still evokes a deep sympathetic response among Iranian youth.

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a) Dariush Forohar, age 40, is said to be the most popular oppositionist in Iranian youth circles today. His long years of opposition activity and his leadership of the Nation of Iran Party attest to the depth of his political commitment. He was last arrested for political reasons in late September 1964 at a time when his Nation of Iran Party was considered to be the National Front's most militant and well-organized component. He was released from prison on October 25, 1966, no less opposed to the Shah, and has thus far refused all blandishments by the regime to induce him to renounce his political opposition. A member of the Nation of Iran Party who met with Forohar regularly told the reporting officer that the government's most recent endeavor took place in February 1968 when Prime Minister Hoveyda summoned Forohar to his office for a talk. During the meeting the Prime Minister offered Forohar (a lawyer by profession) a position as Legal Advisor in any Ministry, if he would renounce his opposition to the government. Forohar declined the offer categorically and has chosen instead to await the propitious moment when political action against the Shah will be feasible.

Forohar is watched by the security authorities who pay particular attention to his circle of friends. He has indirect contact with dissident-minded students at Tehran University and is generally "an encourage" on campus activities. He apparently has no income of his own but is dependent upon his wife's teaching salary. At a time when many politically disaffected Iranians have allowed their despair to move them toward cooperation with the government, Forohar's adamant stand against cooperation has served to further increase his prestige and attraction to young Iranians. It is said that he currently has a small but very dedicated following which could easily be expanded if the government relaxed controls over political activity. We are told that Forohar and his followers favor the nationalization of all important economic endeavors in the country. They would allow the Oil Consortium to continue its activities in Iran, but would expect a better monetary return for Iran. In foreign affairs Forohar would launch a "truly independent national foreign policy", and would seek a rapprochement with the "progressive" Arab states.

b) Abdo Rahman Boroumand, now about 40 years old, was a young National Front Activist who in the early 1960's was disappointed by the moderate policies of then National Front leader, Allahyar Saleh. He is living in Tehran and is still vehemently opposed to the Shah. In the heyday of the National Front he represented the "nationalists" in the Isfahan area. At the moment Boroumand is unemployed and lives off of the financial assistance given him by his wealthy father-in-law, (fmn Kasrumi) who is a factory owner in Isfahan.

c) Ayatollah Matin-Daftari, the 37 year old grandson of the National Front's late patron saint, Mohamad Mossadeq, lives in Tehran and is a

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practicing lawyer. He is widely known among oppositionists in all three groupings and can usually arrange contact with such elements. In recent years he has directed his attention more toward the young activists and particularly toward Dariush Forohar. In 1967 the security authorities became concerned about his relationship with Forohar particularly since they suspected instigation by Matin-Daftari and Forohar of the student ramblings at Tehran University. Matin-Daftari's contacts abroad are of special significance because he can act as a channel for surfacing in foreign countries embarrassing things about the Shah and his government. It is noteworthy that a prominent American lawyer, defending an Iranian student in the U.S. against deportation to Iran, came to Iran in 1968 and was referred to Matin-Daftari as the person best able to put him in touch with the Iranian political opposition. Matin-Daftari himself was subjected to a severe beating in April 1968 by persons who it is believed were acting on instructions from the authorities. Matin-Daftari was quick to try to exploit his misfortune by calling international attention to what he termed "the Shah's police state methods". His efforts to bring the matter to the attention of conferees at the Human Rights Conference in Tehran proved unsuccessful. The incident, however, was picked up by the communist clandestine radio, Peyke-Iran, and broadcast on May 9, 1968 to embarrass the Iranian government. Matin-Daftari is in contact with foreign embassy officials in Tehran including those of the U.S., UK and India. We know of no contacts with Bloc country embassies nor has Matin-Daftari ever expressed an interest in such contacts.

Matin-Daftari appears to be more intellectually-inclined than action-oriented. His cooperation with the more action-oriented Forohar, however, suggests a threatening combination which the authorities were quick to recognize in 1967 and against which they continue to exercise a constant watch. Matin-Daftari claims that his surveillance by the security police tends to be erratic but reaches a peak when the government expects trouble on the university campuses.

d) Siamak Ramalian and Abbas Shoaai, two students arrested in December 1963 for their political activity on the Tehran University campus, were imprisoned before going on trial in January 1965, following which they were inducted into the Army. Presumably, they have completed their service in the Army but there is no current information on their exact whereabouts.

2. The Conservative Bazaar Elements stand opposed to the Shah principally because they are against modernizing forces that they feel have been unleashed on the Iranian populace. They prefer to label the evil force as "western" or "foreign" but in essence their fight is against such progressive developments as the emancipation of women, the secularization of traditional

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institutions, the alleged corruption of Iran's moral fabric, and the general disruption of the traditional Iranian way of life. The Shah's regime is variously attacked for being under the tutelage of foreigners, in the hands of the Bahai's, or so corrupted as to require the government's complete overthrow and its replacement by persons who will be true to Islamic traditions and independent of foreign forces. Land reform and taxation measures are looked upon as anti-Islamic because they "illegally" deprive faithful Muslims of their just earnings and property to enrich corrupt officials of government and those in the Shah's entourage. Especially irritating to the Bazaaris is the activity of "contractors" in Iran who they charge are able to absorb much of the wealth of the country by overcharging for work projects because of their links to the Royal family. The deplorable condition of Tehran's streets, many only recently asphalted, is pointed to as evidence of the gross frauds perpetrated on the public by corrupt city officials and contractors, and the blame is placed on the Shah for tolerating such evils to enrich his friends and supporters. An exaggerated view of Israeli influence over the Shah is used to fan the latent antipathy of Iranian Muslims toward Israel.

The appeal is basically emotional and rooted in the fears and prejudices that haunt a large segment of the population. Number-wise, the conservative Bazaar elements' appeal probably is far greater number of people than does that of either of the other two groups. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that its appeal evokes a sympathetic hearing among those who are influential in the religious establishment (like Ayatollah's Qomi and Milani) who, while not essentially anti-monarchy, nevertheless, remain alienated from the Shah's regime because of government policies directed toward undercutting mullah influence over the masses.

a) Ayatollah Zanjani, in his 60's, has a long history of political activity and still retains a keen interest in such affairs. His association with the conservative elements of the National Front and his deep anti-Shah resentments are known to the authorities who monitor his activities. Zanjani, who has been jailed in the past for his political activities, is living in Tehran in a modest house in the older section of the city. He is permitted to travel to his native Zanjan and is said to spend much of his time travelling from Tehran to the religious centers at Meshed and Qom. Zanjani has for a long time maintained close ties with Abdollah Moazemi (former speaker of the Majlis during Mosadeq's Premiership, and active supporter of Mosadeq's oil nationalization policy). Zanjani also has indirect contact with exiled religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, and is said to be a link in the chain connecting Tehran's bazaaris with Khomeini in Iraq. The authorities are obviously aware of the link, but presumably, refrain from acting against Zanjani either because they don't consider the relationship dangerous, or because they find it a useful channel for feeling the pulse rate of Khomeini's ties with followers in Iran. Zanjani remains very popular among Tehran's bazaaris largely because of his unwavering antagonism toward the Shah but also, we are told, because he is respected as a learned and incorruptible religious leader. While he owns some land in his native Zanjan, his financial

support comes largely from the offerings of bazaari followers. From one source who is in direct contact with Zanjani, we hear that he still has political ambitions and would eagerly join forces with any combination of elements opposed to the Shah. Zanjani claims to be in favor of modernizing reforms, including those which are less than palatable to his own conservative bazaari followers. It is difficult to assess, however, how much of his verbal commitment to modernization is a tactic to ingratiate himself with the more liberal-minded oppositionists in Iran, and how much is a reflection of a genuine commitment. It would appear, however, that much like his other religious colleagues, when the chips are down, Zanjani would respond to the more conservative sentiments of his followers who, in the final analysis, constitute the base upon which he has built his political personality.

b) Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, in his early 60's, and leader of the "Freedom Movement of Iran" (generally identified as a conservative, religiously-oriented grouping) was tried on charges of "treason" in 1963, convicted, and sentenced to 10 years solitary confinement. He was pardoned by the Shah some three years ago and released from prison. Since his release from prison he has been living quietly in Tehran. Persons who know him have described him as an ambitious political type with a flair for demagogic rabble-rousing using religious themes. He continues to have the respect of followers, some of whom are currently teaching at Tehran University's Engineering Faculty (whose Bazargan himself taught in the 1950's until his removal from the faculty for political reasons). Little is known about his source of income at present, but it is believed that he is sustained by profits from an engineering firm in which he is a partner with other engineers. His political appeal in the past have struck a sympathic chord in the bazaar and despite his enforced inactivity in recent years, his name is known and respected by politicized elements there.

c) Ayatollah Sayed Mahmud Taleqani, in his 60's, was arrested and imprisoned with Bazargan in 1963. He was released together with Bazargan and is now living in Tehran. We have little current information on his activities since his release from prison but we know his movements are carefully monitored by the authorities. There are unconfirmed reports that in recent months he was called in for questioning by SAVAK. This may reflect activity of a political nature by him which did not sit well with the government. On the other hand, the authorities are not averse to using harrassment as a preventive against possible activity by the Shah's foes. Taleqani, who like Bazargan is associated with the Freedom Movement of Iran, is said to be very conservative in his views and deeply opposed to inroads into the Islamic way of life made by modernizing forces in Iran.

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d) Mozaffar Baqai-Kermani, age 61, leader of two political organizations (the Toilers Party and the Guardians of Freedom) is still well known to those Iranians who took an interest in politics during the 1940's and 1950's. During the peak period of the National Front's influence and when he supported former Prime Minister Mossadeq, he was considered by some to be the second most popular man in Iran. He is a skilled demagogue and his magnetic personality strikes a sympathetic chord with the older generation of Iranians in the bazaar. In the 1967's his movements have been restricted and he is prohibited from engaging in political activity of any kind. We are told that he is employed by Tehran University as a professor of statistics, but that he spends much of his spare time at home visited by close friends and cronies. There are some who suspect that Baqai has made a "deal" with the government and, therefore, is permitted to teach at Tehran University. This feeling was given further currency in October 1966 when there was talk in Tehran about the possible emergence of a third party to compete with the two established parties. A minor Persian newspaper was permitted to publish Baqai's responses to questions on Iran's political parties and at one point Baqai candidly stated that:

> ..."the reason why people have no faith in government-created political parties and groups is obvious. These parties do not belong to the people and have no contact with them. In fact, they are a nuisance for the people. Whenever the government has tried to initiate democracy, it has created its own party and consequently we see that, for instance, all members of Parliament decide on the same day to join this or that party — whichever happens to be the government one. All top officials also join the party. Therefore, the people should not be expected to believe in such parties. They are distrustful of parties tailored by the ruling class."

This publicity was shortlived, however, and neither Baqai nor his followers have been heard from since. It is said that Baqai has the loyalty of only some six dedicated followers but that he could easily collect a more impressive number of supporters should the political climate become propitious for such action.

3. The Older Intellectuals are the least prone to action, reach only a very limited segment of the sophisticated urban population, and thus are only a limited concern of the regime. Their importance, however, lies in the fact that they are more sophisticated politically than their other opposition-ist compatriots, and can better articulate their criticisms of the government and its policies. Their antagonism towards the Shah is based on principle but is further aggravated by the frustration built up by years of enforced inactivity and harrassment at the hands of the authorities. For

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the most part, they are pro-West and liberal in attitude and favor Iran's modernization. Their quarrel with the Shah is based on their demand that the monarch reign and not rule, and that Iranians be permitted to exercise their political rights to the full extent permitted by the Constitution. They take credit for originating many of the reforms recently adopted by the Shah, including land reform, women's rights, and administrative reforms, and resent government propaganda which portrays the Shah as the sole author of modernization and enlightenment. They claim that many of the accomplishments announced by the government have not in fact been realized and discount the government's statistics on literacy, economic growth, and per capita income as unreliable at best. They bitterly attack the Shah for squandering Iran's wealth on unnecessary and expensive military equipment and charge that much of Iran's money finds its way into the pockets of corrupt officials and those who are favored by the Shah's family and courtiers. Few will deny that Iran has moved ahead in recent years under the Shah's rule. All are convinced that Iran's human, natural and financial resources, if used properly over the past few years, could have put Iran much further ahead. Generally pessimistic about Iran's future under the Shah's continued rule, these opposition-ists have become modern day Cassandras predicting various economic and political evils soon to befall Iran. They remain convinced that the Shah intends to rule with an iron hand for the rest of his life and to perpetuate "autocratic rule" in Iran through his son, the Crown Prince. Statements by the Shah to foreigners regarding his intention to loosen up on the tight political control which now obtain in Iran are labeled "hypocrisy", and are received in these quarters with cynicism.

On foreign affairs, the Older Intellectuals would prefer to see Iran enjoy closer ties with the more radical Arab states because they feel that, in time, Arab nationalism is the wave of the future that will inevitably sweep away the "reactionary" regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms. Iran, without the Arab, they feel can easily come to terms with the USSR because "anti-imperialist" Russians have much in common on the international scene with their Arab counterparts. At the same time, inroads made by the Soviet Union in the Middle East are a deep cause for concern. Of special concern is the increased Soviet presence in Iran which they feel constitutes a real danger to Iran's national independent existence.

a) Allahyar Saleh, 72, founder of the defunct Iran Party and onetime leader of the suppressed National Front lives quietly at his home in Tehran and is politically inactive. Saleh, who for most of his life resented British domination in Iran, long considered U.S. support to Iran as a necessity to block inroads by both Britain and the USSR. He at one time believed that U.S. influence in Iran would lay the groundwork for representational government within a monarchical structure in which the Shah's powers would be limited.

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By late 1966, however, Saleh seems to have become embittered by what he judged to be the U.S. failure to press the Shah/regarding political controls and is reported to have said that:

> "One can no longer place any hopes in the Americans because they, too, are following the British in the policy of colonialism,... It has become obvious now that the Americans insist on working with infamous elements, oppressors, or men endowed with oppressive qualities."

Saleh is in touch with friends and political cronies but he appears to have lost whatever influence he enjoyed in the past with National Front-oriented Iranians. This loss in stature is largely due to the moderation he preached in the early 1960's when the Front, spurred on by younger activists, made an ill-fated attempt to make a comeback, and also because he is suspected by oppositionists of colluding with the government. We have no evidence to sustain such charges of collusion or cooperation and it appears that Saleh - even at his advanced age - remains adamantly opposed to the Shah's rule.

b) Shahpur Bakhtiar, 55, practices law in Tehran but, otherwise, keeps somewhat to himself. An "activist" in the National Front movement in the early 1960's, Bakhtiar in 1963 made an unsuccessful attempt to replace Saleh as leader of the Iran Party when the latter failed to rally the various elements in the Front. Experienced in labor affairs and attuned to the thinking of Iranian students, Bakhtiar under suitable conditions is capable of organizing and leading a considerable following among laborers and students. His reputation has thus far remained unblemished by any charges of collusion with the government and it is believed he would be capable of rallying those with divergent viewpoints among oppositionists. He remains deeply interested in politics and thus feels the frustrations of enforced political inactivity keenly. His resentment towards the U.S. (whose policies he blames for what he terms the "repression practiced by the Shah) appears to have grown stronger in recent years despite an outward appearance of friendship towards American officials who have known him. Bakhtiar would almost certainly seek to exploit any opportunity that should present itself for political action against the Shah's government.

c) Khalil Maleki, 64, is the leader of the Socialist League, which was known before as the Third Force. While never officially a part of the National Front, Maleki and his followers in recent years have been eager to cooperate with other oppositionist elements but, thus far, with no appreciable success. Maleki, a former Tudeh (Communist) Party member, broke with the Communists in the late 1940's to found his own movement and has to this day been consistently

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anti-communist. He was last arrested in the summer of 1965, tried before a military tribunal in early 1966, and sentenced to three years imprisonment. He was pardoned by the Shah later the same year and has since lived quietly in his house in Tehran. He meets with some of his followers occasionally but his and their movements are monitored carefully. Oppositionist elements have long suspected that Maleki may be cooperating with the Shah. The relatively light three year sentence meted out to him in 1966, followed soon thereafter by the Shah's amnesty, served to give further currency to such suspicions. Nevertheless, Maleki still retains the respect of his socialist followers, including the much younger and more action-oriented Abas Aqalizadeh and Manuchehr Safa, (both of whom were imprisoned in 1964 but who reportedly are now free and living in Tehran). Maleki also continues to have the respect of socialist-minded Iranians living abroad and we are told maintains indirect contact with them through Iranians who travel back and forth from Iran to Europe. A U.S. lawyer interested in developing evidence of political persecution in Iran called on Maleki in 1968. Maleki was permitted to meet with the foreign visitor but was "advised" by the authorities to be discreet in his comments lest he cause serious damage to Iran's reputation and force the government to take legal action against him. Maleki, long familiar with the futility of confrontation with the government, acquiesced. The Socialist leader, who suffers from poor health, lives at home in Tehran and is currently translating a book. His brother, a merchant, assists him financially. We are told that he is very pessimistic about the opposition's chances to make inroads into the Shah's power, and he appears to have resigned himself to his enforced retirement from politics. Should younger more active oppositionists decide to act against the regime, however, there is little doubt that they would seek to use Maleki's name and international prestige in Socialist quarters abroad as a magnet to attract support from Iranians and others overseas.

d) Reza Shayan, in his 50's, is one of Maleki's close associates in the Socialist League and with Maleki was arrested, tried, and convicted in 1966 for "publishing communist ideas". Shayan told the reporting officer that his and Maleki's early release from prison was due to the direct intercession with the Shah of Yugoslav President Tito and the then Austrian President who knew Maleki. Shayan is unemployed and depends upon his father for financial support. All his efforts to gain employment have been blocked by the authorities who insist that no employment will be available until he renounces his opposition to the Shah. More recently, Shayan told the reporting officer that he is now being asked not only to renounce his opposition, but to endorse the Shah's policies -- conditions which Shayan indicated he has no intention of obeying. Shayan may travel within Iran, but like almost all his fellow oppositionists, is not permitted to travel abroad. The authorities from time to time summon him for "interviews" at which he is asked about Iranian friends

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with whom he is in contact. According to Shayan, such friends are in turn interrogated and in other ways harrassed so that Shayan is reluctant to circulate outside a very limited circle of people lest he be the cause of unnecessary trouble to them. We are told that Shayan who worked for a time in the Ministry of Labor, can easily draw a following from labor, particularly because he is said to have a flare for demagogwry. Shayan blames the U.S. for what he terms the Shah's "despotic rule" and sees no loosening of the political situation in Iran unless the Shah is removed from power.

e) **Bager Kazemi**, in his 70's, was Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Premiership of Mossadeq and is well known as one of the National Front's more forceful leaders. He now lives quietly in his Tehran home and is completely inactive. While he sees political friends of the past, there appears to be no inclination to do much more than reminisce about the past and register pious hope for the future. During the funeral of Mossadeq in 1967, Kazemi joined Dariush Foruhar and Shahpur Bakhtiar in making the necessary preparations for burial. The authorities discourage, if they do not actively prevent, Kazemi from meeting with other leaders associated with the National Front.

Conclusion

Although reference has been made above to the various grievances registered by the three groupings [illegible] the Shah, this study would perhaps remain incomplete without a [illegible] of these people feel their stand in the long run will not be in vain. It may also serve to indicate the line of reasoning and at least some of the arguments used by such persons in talks with Embassy officers.

All remain convinced [illegible] Shah never has and never will be able to evoke genuine popular support from the Iranian people. He was, they believe, indelibly marked with the stamp of foreignness in 1953 when Mossadeq, "Iran's most popular leader in modern times", was overthrown (with the assistance of the U.S.) to make way for the Shah's return from Rome. Iranians they claim, resent the "ruthless suppression" of legitimate political activity guaranteed by the Iranian Constitution, and they predict that as more and more Iranians become politically conscious, pressures will mount and lead to the Shah's overthrow. The Shah's hold on Iran, they conclude, will not be able to withstand a crisis, particularly one in the economic field, which is bound to come. In this connection, oppositionists have taken heart from the recent fall of Ayub Khan in Pakistan and predict a much more rapid slide for the Shah if things begin to fall apart in Iran. Despite government propaganda about reforms and the Shah's "White Revolution", the lot of the majority of Iranians, they feel, has not been improved substantially; corruption remains rampant; and the petty tyrannies of the Iranian bureaucracy continue unabated. They point to the great disparity of wealth between the large

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number of unskilled laborers in Iran's cities, many of whom are unemployed, or eking out a living, and those who live comfortably in palace-like structures in Tehran. Those with pretentions to some expertise in economic affairs take issue with what they term the government's excessive expenditures that stem largely from the purchase of highly sophisticated military equipment against external threats which, they feel, are figments of the Shah's imagination". Some suggest that the military expenditures are a necessity for the Shah because it assures him the loyalty of the "most military machine" upon which he has built his regime. At the present time they are particularly critical of the Shah's decision to pay [illegible] for the defense of oil facilities in the south when, they claim, such facilities are not only a lucrative source of income for Iran but for the wealthy Western nations which have a greater stake in protecting their [illegible] to Persian Gulf oil. They point to the decision as evidence that the Shah remains a "puppet" of foreign powers.

Iranian oppositionists having no identifiable program of their own that differs radically from what the Shah is doing, prefer to emphasize the negative and to discount completely the stability, modernizing reforms, and the full gamut of impressive progress made in recent years by Iran under the Shah's rule. We doubt, therefore, that a change in their point of view will evolve quickly -- particularly since most, if not all, have already devoted so many years of their life to opposition activity. For most to change course now would be tantamount to rejecting their own personality and identity and for those who are on in years - a rejection of a lifetime of effort and sacrifice. The Shah, for his part, is confident of his power and in too much of a hurry to waste time appeasing his detractors who he feels have little to offer anyway except negativism. The Shah has apparently decided to stand by to live with the decision he made some years ago to ride the wave of modernization, and leave the intransigent oppositionists to wallow and watch the realization of the Cassandra-like prophecies they are wont to make.

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Encl # 2

Form for Diplomats, Officials, Eminent Persons, Journalists, etc. (Amended Sept. 1948)

Post Tehran

Date of preparation Nov. 10, 1952

CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NOTE.—Consult *Diplomatic Serial 3355 of April 10, 1941*, and references therein. Forms are to be prepared on typewriter in triplicate, one copy for files and two for Department.

Name BAKHTIAR (Surname) Shapur (Given names)

Nationality Iranian Title, if any

Date and place of birth Around 1912-14, Iran

Position Under-Secretary of Labor Date appointed July 27, 1952

Party affiliations Iran Party (no other known party affiliations)

Previous career Bakhtiar has been associated with the Ministry of Labor since he completed his education in France (around 1940). Available information on his career is incomplete. He has held the following positions: Director General of the Ministry of Labor, personal advisor to the Under Secretary of Labor, Habib Nafiey, and Chief of the Ministry's office in Khuzistan.

Languages spoken French (fluent), English and German (fair)

Attitude toward and service in the United States See below.

Family details Married. His French wife lives in France with their four children. Bakhtiar visits them about once a year.

REMARKS: (Should present a brief word picture of the individual, including race, religion, fraternal affiliations, education, reputation, personality, influence, attitude toward other nations, etc.)

Education: French college, Beirut. He has a doctorate in law from the University of Paris. He also holds a doctorate in philosophy. As a result of his education he is thoroughly French in culture and thinking. He is reported to speak Persian with a slight French accent and prefers to speak French.

Attitude toward and service in the United States: No service or travel in the United States but he has expressed interest in visiting the U.S. However, he has implied that acceptance of a leader-grant, in his case, would not be wise politically.

He does not view American policy in Iran favorably but believes that the U.S. should have followed a policy independent from the British. In his words, American policy in Iran has been the "tool" of the British. He has expressed support of the Marshall Plan, but opposes Iranian participation in regional pacts such as NATO, advocating that Iran maintain a neutral position.

His opinion of American domestic policies is that the New and Fair Deals did not go far enough in their welfare-state implications.

Remarks: Bakhtiar has a friendly personality and seems to get along with people.

He professes support of the United Nations and is sympathetic toward the ICFTU, which he considers to be socialist.

Prepared by George M. Barbis
Economic Assistant
(Title)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—24015-1

BAKHTIAR, Shapur

Remarks:

Bakhtiar first became known as a national figure during the period 1946-1948, especially because of his participation in the 1946 strike against the A.I.O.C. During his term of office as chief of the Ministry of Labor's office in Khuzistan he became popular with the workers of the oil industry. He opposed the A.I.O.C. and its labor law, and the company accused him of being an instigator of strikes among its workers.

In 1948, Bakhtiar ran for the Majlis from Khuzistan (he was not opposed by, and some say he received the tacit support of, the Tudeh) but was defeated, because, it was claimed, of A.I.O.C. and British opposition. In December 1951, he was the official Iran Party candidate for the Majlis from Khuzistan and would have run against Ali Omid (Tudeh) and Abbass Mazda (Labor Party) had the elections been held.

Bakhtiar considers himself to be a socialist of the French Syndicalist School and affirms he has followed, throughout his career, an unwavering socialist line (which to him means ownership and control of industry by the state). At present he is a leading and one of the most ardent members of the Iran Party (and of its left-wing faction). He has been compared with Karim Sanjabi and Ahmad Zirakzadeh. This left-wing faction in the past has been not unwilling to work with the Tudeh Party, if it deemed it to its advantage.

He is popular with the working class. During a recent visit to Isfahan, over 2,000 workers from the textile industry turned out to greet him. Workers' delegations often ask to see him, rather than the minister, when visiting the Ministry of Labor. Even the Prime Minister tends to by-pass the minister and consult Bakhtiar when he wants to be informed on labor affairs. He is considered to be one of the best informed persons on labor matters and exerts influence among the workers.

Bakhtiar is ambitious and in seeking to achieve his aims it is not believed he would hesitate to adopt an extremist position, aligning himself with the communists. Although there is no evidence that he is at present a communist or a member of the Tudeh Party, he should be considered to be a possible factor in the direction of cooperation with the Tudeh in Iranian politics and the Iranian labor movement.

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AMERICAN EMBASSY, TEHRAN

Memorandum of Conversation

December 2, 1953

SUBJECT: A View of the Iran Party Position

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar, Iran Party Member; former Undersecretary of Labor
Roy M. Melbourne, First Secretary of Embassy
John M. Howison, Second Secretary of Embassy

COPY TO: GTI (2)

By previous arrangement, Dr. Bakhtiar met Embassy Officers at the home of Mr. Howison on the evening of December 1. He intimated that he spoke for the Iran Party insofar as it retained an identity, but did not attempt to authenticate this claim. His remarks suggested that he was close to Abdol Hosein Daneshpur and that he had spent enough time with Hasibi in recent days to have had rather general talks with him. He expressed particular respect for Alayar Saleh, whose protege he claims to have been, Moazami, Haqshenas and Bayani. He implied that he had no knowledge of Zirakzadeh's present whereabouts; Zirakzadeh had done the Iran Party a disservice through his "error" in supporting a working agreement between the Party and the Tudeh.

Dr. Bakhtiar represented the present position of the Iran Party (or that portion of its leaders represented by him) as follows:

1. Opposition to the Tudeh and Unwillingness to Cooperate with it Directly. Dr. Bakhtiar admitted that the Iran Party and the Tudeh had many short-run objectives in common and that neither party could be expected to stand in the way of the other's attempt to achieve these objectives. This did not imply cooperation, however, either tactically or in principle.

Dr. Bakhtiar's intellectual opposition to the Tudeh and Communism appears genuine. He is prepared to accept a Communist acquaintance's definition of him as a "social democrat." He spoke of having received a Tudeh member in his home within the past few days for a discussion of current affairs. Dr. Bakhtiar's opposition to the Tudeh seems to be based largely on the conviction that the Tudeh is an anti-national force dominated by a foreign power. (As Undersecretary of Labor under Mosadeq, Bakhtiar did not very effectively resist Communist infiltration of the Ministry and the labor movement generally, and was charged by his enemies with having championed certain individuals of Tudeh sympathies.)

2. No Opposition to the Shah. Dr. Bakhtiar argues that the Shah's role is purely representational or protocolaire. He declared that the Shah had no right to "flee" on August 16; it was the duty of the King to face the country's problems on the spot even at the risk of his life. Dr. Bakhtiar was evasive when asked from fear of what force the Shah had fled. He also evinced hatred of Reza Shah, "beside whom Hitler was an angel."

3. No Anti-American Activities. Dr. Bakhtiar stated that he and other Iran Party figures now concluded that not even the most nationalist government could survive in Iran without the active friendship of one of the three great powers. Cooperation with the British had proved "disastrous" and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. would mean "no country." The support of the United States represented Iran's only hope for relative independence. Dr. Bakhtiar made only implied criticisms of current American policy in Iran. Like many younger Iranians, he thinks of late President Roosevelt as the man of the century.

4. Patience. Iran nationalists may have to wait 5 or even 10 years for the wheels to turn in their favor. "Iran is now occupied by Fascists. France had to wait 5 years for her deliverance from her German Fascist occupiers." Dr. Bakhtiar himself was in France throughout the German occupation and claims to have been active in an "anti-Fascist" resistance movement.

5. Continuing Distrust of the British. If in fact the Zahedi Government "permits the British to return" (i.e., reestablishes diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom) it will mean a return to "the former pattern" of British interference in internal Iranian affairs. The oil dispute must be solved in a manner which offers the British no opportunity to control the oil industry, which could in turn control all Iran economically and politically. Dr. Bakhtiar indicated that a "commercially equitable" settlement would be one giving Iran an income equalling a 50-50 profit sharing arrangement.

6. Honesty in Government. Dr. Bakhtiar strongly believes that the great virtue of his party and of Dr. Mosadeq's government was its freedom from corruption and the new men it brought to office. Of Mosadeq's ministers, only Fatemi was personally dishonest. The personal dishonesty of the men around him—particularly Amidi-Nuri and Dowlatabadi—was Zahedi's greatest fault. The British liked to have dishonest men in power, as they were easier to influence.

JMHowison/mpk
cc: Mr. Goodwin

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 27, 1953

PARTICIPANTS: Shapur Bakhtiar, former Under Secretary of Labor
Roy M. Melbourne
John M. Howison

SUBJECT: Position of Anti-Tudeh Nationalists

Dr. Bakhtiar called at the Embassy by appointment on November 25. The appointment followed telephonic overtures to Mr. Howison during the previous week and a short visit to Mr. Howison's office on November 25.

Dr. Bakhtiar indicated that he had been chosen by "a certain organization" to establish contact with the American Embassy. His mission was to explain the organization's general position and to ascertain whether both sides might find it useful for the Embassy to have conversations with a senior member of this "certain organization."

The "certain organization" is presumably a wing or outgrowth of the Iran Party. Dr. Bakhtiar was himself an active member of the Party and entered the Mosadeq Government on the recommendation of the Party. He indicated that one of the individuals currently associated with him was a former chief of the National Insurance Company; Abdol Hosein Daneshpur, Chairman of the Board of the Insurance Company during the last months of the Mosadeq regime, is said to have been associated with the Iran Party.

Describing his group as "true nationalists", Dr. Bakhtiar defined their position as follows:

1. Loyalty to Dr. Mosadeq, who may have made some mistakes, but still commands the affections of "80% of the people of Iran." Mosadeq's mistakes were largely attributable to his advisers, particularly Fatemi. Hasibi had also made erroneous recommendations.

2. Opposition to the Tudeh, but through constructive rather than repressive measures.

3. Non-opposition to the Zahedi Government. The group feared, however, that Zahedi would become progressively more fascist rather than more democratic. In less guarded moments, Dr. Bakhtiar indicated that he felt Zahedi's government was already fascistic. He declared that on November 12 the people were restrained from demonstrating by tanks and machine guns; that 12 thousand people throughout the country had been arrested as Tudehists, many unjustly and many hardly more than children.

They were exposed to Tudeh propaganda in prison and also had strong resentments against the Government once they were released. He affirmed the Zahedi administration was staffed with the most corrupt group of individuals seen in any Iranian Government for some time.

Dr. Bakhtiar agreed to discuss the position of his group further on December one.

JMHowison/mpk

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MEMORANDUM

To: Political Section

From: R.H. Bushner

Subject: Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar September 29, 1954

According to a reliable Iranian source in the NIOC, Dr. Bakhtiar's activities as Labor Officerin Khuzistand were almost entirely devoted to strengthening his political position. Bakhtiar was attempting to obtain election to the 16th Majlis as Deputy from Khuzistan. In order to build himself up with the laborers he would do such things as presenting benefit checks from the Laborers' Welfare Fund to each laborer personally, pointing out, "It is I the honest Bakhtiar who give you this check; the money would never come to you if the matter were left to the Government", etc. The source remarked that this was hardly fair as Bakhtiar was ina postion to hand out the checks only because of his Government appointment and all the work of preparing the checks was done by the AIOC Administrative staff.

The source added that when it became clear that Dr. Raji might win the Majlis seat coveted by Bakhtiar unless the latter obtained the votes of outlying Khoramshahr, Andimeshk, etc., Bakhtiar took extreme measures. He instigated bus company laborers who were being laid off as surplus by the AIOC with the authorization of the Ministry of Labor, and finally brought on a strike in which the laborers lay down in the roads in front of the busses.

The source also remarked that Bakhtiar took in Bakhtiari tribesmen who visited Abadan. Bakhtiar's French wife allegedly found it most irksome to have about fifty Bakhtiari tribesmen sleeping in her front room every few days. However Bakhtiar apparently kept tight control over her refusing to permit her to dance, or even attend local entertainments. During the Mosadeq regime she returned to France for a time.

According to the source Bakhtiar is a poor administrator, as well as a political opportunist. The source explained how Bakhtiar would go over the head of Dr. Fateh, Assistant Manager of the Refinery, who was responsible for assisting in making Company policy. Bakhtiar would also call Fateh in the presence of a complaining workman suggesting immediate action to meet the laborer's desire. Fateh could not of course take action on such individual cases and this would give Bakhtiar an opportunity to insist on action and leave the worker with the impression that it was Fateh and the Company who were resisting the righteous demands of the worker and the sincere efforts of Bakhtiar.

The source described Bakhtiar as a man with well developed theoretical ideas on politics who never forgot political matters for a moment. A real intriguer was the source's epithet for Bakhtiar.

RHB ushner/ rhb

INFORMATION REPORT

A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to unproved honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

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COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	WIT-5552
SUBJECT	Comments of Shapur Bakhtiar	DATE OF REPORT	20 June 1961
		NO. OF PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	WIT-5530

DATE OF INFO. 1 June 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Iran, Tehran (1 June 1961)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Government official (F) with good connections in political opposition groups. Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Shapur Bakhtiar, member of the executive committee of the National Front (NF), said on 1 June that the nationalists had certain connections with the Soviets. In his view, Soviet policy toward independent countries had changed considerably since the death of Joseph Stalin. The Soviets, he felt, were now willing to support genuine nationalistic movements in a country, and had given up the idea of imposing Communist-controlled governments in such countries. He found the Soviet attitude toward nationalism proving to be quite attractive.

2. Bakhtiar said that Ali Amini, Prime Minister, had appointed a small group of his friends to talk with representatives of the NF about cooperation between the NF and the government. Bakhtiar did not feel that any significant progress would be made.

3. Bakhtiar said that Mohammad Mossadeq was passe as a leader, but would always symbolize the nationalist spirit of the country. He said if he were appointed Prime Minister, his first act would be to pay his personal respects to Mossadeq at his village. Mossadeq belonged to another era, and would have no active role in running the country again.

Source Comment: Bakhtiar probably will be named spokesman for the National Front.

Field Comment: See WIT-5530 for another report of Amini's efforts to obtain NF support. Bakhtiar probably was aware that his remarks would be made known to United States officials.

The extent to which Dr. Bakhtiar's attitude toward the Soviets is shared by other leaders of the NF is not clear, but it is evident that NF leaders do not accept the premise that a neutral Iran having economic and political ties with the Soviet Union will inevitably drift into the Soviet orbit. Bakhtiar did not elaborate on what he meant by "certain connections".

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EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. *(Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence).* F: Reliability cannot be judged *(Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).*

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

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COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	HIT-5579
SUBJECT	Interview with Shapur Bakhtiar 1. Biographic 2. Opinions	DATE OF REPORT	3 July 1961
		NO. OF PAGES	7
		REFERENCES	0
DATE OF INFO.	June 1961		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Iran, Tehran (25 June 1961)		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Competent American observer (B).
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. Biographic data on Shapur Bakhtiar is as follows:

   a. Age: 47.

   b. Education: Early schooling, Isfahan; "my first B.A." in Beirut; "my second B.A." in France. He attended the Sorbonne and faculties of political science and law, receiving licenses from all in 1939. By 1946 he had earned his doctorate in law.

   c. Languages: Persian, Arabic, French, English (a little), and German (a little).

   d. Occupation: University of Tehran professor.

   e. Travel: France, Germany, Austria, England, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine and Iraq.

   f. Bakhtiar is a member of the National Front (NF) council, executive committee, and general organizational committee, and has special responsibility for the organization of University of Tehran students of the NF.

   g. Bakhtiar is a man of medium height, trimly built. His well-tended mustache, rather high forehead, and slightly wavy hair give him a suave and dapper look. He dresses well, and tends to appear more European than Iranian. Bakhtiar's appearance is supplemented by his behavior. His mannerisms are often European. He frequently injects French or English words or phrases in his Persian conversation. Having spent at

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least sixteen years outside of Iran, mostly in France, this is quite understandable. Bakhtiar was in France in 1939, when he volunteered for service in the French army, where he served until he was demobilized after the fall of France. He remained in France until 1946, teaching and studying, and also acquiring a French wife, who divorced him after the fall of the Mohammad Mossadeq government. She bore him four children, who have remained in his custody, and the eldest of them is now in his fourth year of college in Paris.

Bakhtiar is a man of considerable intelligence and a certain amount of personal and intellectual vanity. He is proud of his intellectual accomplishments and notes with pleasure that he was first in his class in Isfahan. He tends to talk more in abstractions, and less in specifics. While he does not appear evasive in his comments, he does not quickly inspire an easy relation of confidence. He is slightly distant, and tends toward formality.

2. The following are opinions expressed by Bakhtiar on different political issues.

Economic Aid. We are backward, but we are not without sources of wealth. Foreign aid is essential and is desirable if well spent, and in the right places. It is not good, however, if its purpose is merely to keep a government in power, as has been the case in the past few years. This is not good from the standpoint of the Americans either. Allahyar Saleh commented recently that he was amazed over the fact that the United States has given Iran over a billion dollars in the past ten years, which has had the sole effect of keeping a government in power that made the people curse the Americans. A government that is truly popular can well use foreign aid, but a government that remains only because it receives foreign aid cannot.

Foreign Advisers. We need them. We have to have them. They are no affront to our national pride if they are good advisers and doing for us what we cannot do for ourselves. They are like a doctor who comes to heal a man who is not well. It is, of course, ideal for us to employ Iranians in all such technical and professional positions, but this is not possible now. We do not have enough properly trained Iranians.

Aid from Soviets. I have not been in a position to witness first hand a Soviet aid program anywhere. But I believe that if such a program could be completely without conditions and if it did not pave the way for penetration into our political life, a truly national government could not refuse Soviet offers of aid. But this can be very dangerous, because they might use their aid program for political purposes, making sudden and unwanted pressures. The Iran Certain could come down quickly over Iran, and raising it would be difficult, indeed.

CENTO. I am a member of the Iranian group of the Afro-Asian Friendship Group, and our director has expressed some opinions on this matter. However, the NF press conference recently carried our official NF position on this question, which was quite explicit. Some of us feel more or less strongly about the matter. For example, some students have recently been outspoken against CENTO, and I have had to quiet them and calm them down. These extreme ideas must be controlled or they lead to chaos. Personally, I feel that CENTO is not beneficial to Iran. If it constituted an automatic guarantee, like NATO, it would be of more value. I see CENTO, however, as being primarily a British device whereby they can maintain their presence here - their political presence. I do not know why it was concluded by the Iranian Government, but it was a government that was not popularly supported. If I should be prime minister, I would get out of CENTO within a day, a week, a month or a year, depending on the circumstances.

Bilateral Pact. The bilateral pact with the United States is our guarantee against aggression, and neither Turkey nor Pakistan has any voice in it. I concur in maintaining this agreement. I would not mind having a similar one

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with the Soviets, but if they do not offer one, that is all right.

Neutrality. We must have neutralism in the Middle East, so that between the East and the West there will be a series of neutral and independent states. Total neutrality is, of course, impossible. I cannot be without some sympathies for France, for example. Similarly, Iran has a traditional tie with the West which cannot be simply erased. The Soviets could overcome Iran in two ways. First, by direct aggression, about which we could do little. Second, by penetration. The only way to prevent this is to give satisfaction to national sentiments, and to follow up with a serious program of economic reform and development. The people can live on slogans for a while, but then there must be some accomplishments. Incidentally, Reuters International greatly exaggerated my statements at the Jalaliyeh Officers meeting in May, saying "Front Towards Neutrality." I did comment on the desire of the people for an independent policy for Iran, and I did refer to Yahya, but it was not so indicated by that newspaper.

Elections. We make every effort to be a legal organization. We feel that the law must be respected and carried out. If it is not, then there will be a revolution - not made by us, but by others - and so there must be elections in order to forestall this possibility. I recognized the difficulties that Ali Amini faces. Before are demanding only that the elections be held, and we are sure that, if the government wants it that way, elections could be held in all the big cities - Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Kazvin, Masjid Soleyman, Ahwaz, Shiraz - without any undue or disturbances of the peace. If the government, the Court, or the army wanted to make a fuss, of course, that would be another matter. If the people become disappointed with the TP's efforts to have the elections held, they may turn to the Communists, and that is where the danger of revolution comes from.

Land Reform. In principle, there is no question: there must be land reform. At present we are studying the necessary details for implementation of the principle. We are studying the progress employed in India, and have asked the Egyptians for the scheme they have used. I think the Indian system, adapted, of course, is best suited for Iran. I see social justice as important as land reform, and that is another area that we are currently studying, in the shape of judicial reform.

Size of the Military. What is the military for? If it is to stand against the USSR, it is more at its present size. And if it is for the purpose of intimidating and beating up a bunch of students who want their rights, it is far larger than necessary. If I were to decide, I would gradually reduce their number, to about fifty thousand, and ensure that they were well trained and well equipped. I would use them to defend our borders (the gendarmerie is for the interior). Turkey is the only country that might have bad relations with a nationalist government, and the Soviets would stop any aggression from them.

Steel Mill. We cannot have industry without having a steel mill. It represents the basis for any kind of industrial development. All those so-called industries that we have now are farcical, without a steel mill. If it should be determined that we have insufficient iron or coal for the proper running of a steel mill, then public opinion will not be a force influential eg getting the government to build one. After all, the people of England are satisfied that they cannot grow pistachios, so they do not raise any hue and cry about having a pistachio industry. Also, it would be the role of a TP government to lead the people, not to be led or directed by them. Our people are not all sufficiently sophisticated and educated to tell the government which way to go. All in all, though, I believe that we must have a steel plant, for the purpose of industrial development, and a reasonable living. After all, what kind of a country is it that cannot even provide its own screws or steel beams for the simplest of constructions? Can you imagine the continuation of such a situation in the world of today?

Oil and Concessions. The concession agreement was signed against the will of the people. Mossadeq had said no to Anthony Eden, in his memoirs. Such an agreement, had it been concluded by the Mossadeq government, would not have been so repugnant but even a much more favorable agreement, concluded by the then government, could never be popular. But we have many other problems, serious multilateral problems, to solve before obtaining this one. Even good governments have so thoroughly botched their work, that even a good government will need years to straighten things out. Any policy that is firmly chosen vis-a-vis the consortium must be the one that is dictated by the situation and circumstances at that time. Of course, when the time comes for the review of the oil agreement, any revision will be accomplished through discussion and negotiation, not through sudden and extreme actions. That the exact historic of such things as nationalization are hated by the NF. One of the students at the university was saying "Death to the consortium," and we supplied him. No one has the right to make public statements on behalf of the NF that are so far from the official policies of the NF.

Soviet Attention to Iran. The Soviets are very opinionated and play at [illegible] politics. I think that the government and the Shah were very foolish two years ago / actually three years ago/ when they tried to blackmail you with all that business about a non-aggression part with the Soviets. "Give us more money," they said in effect, "or we will turn to the Soviets." And every time that they need money, they begin again to talk about "improving relations with the USSR." It is a very foolish and short-sighted policy, but it seems to work every time. Except that it can only antagonize the Soviets further. We have two thousand miles of common border with the USSR. We cannot ignore them, and we must do what we can to develop a reasonable relationship with them. But our position is not like that of Egypt or Iraq, which are distant from the Soviet Union, and can buy with them, then turn away from them. It is certainly not worth the cost of the freedom of Iran to constitute a better relationship with the Soviets, but it is all right for us to declare otherwise to have them neutral in Iran, and grant us a non-aggression pact. We must also review the 1955-6? treaty with the USSR. If we should leave CENTO, this treaty would have to be invalidated.

Tudeh (Communist) Party Strength and Capabilities. As far as I know, the Tudeh Party is composed of three groups today. First are those who still believe in and follow the leadership of those Tudehs that are now out of the country, mostly in East Germany. These foolish people still, in spite of everything, believe in the Tudeh Party of the old days. The second group is composed of those who are actually agents of the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK). The third is that group of our youths who have developed pro-Communist tendencies, who tend to be Marxist, but on a Titoist scale. That is, they do not accept everything that comes from Moscow as gospel truth. These three groups are opposite at the present time. The third group has the greatest strength. It is made up largely of young intellectuals. But they are not to be considered the tools of Moscow.

US-Tudeh Relations. I guarantee that there are no relations between the members of the NF and any Tudeh organization. The Tudehs always call us the NF of the imperialists, and it would be impossible for us to work together. During one of my speeches, I mentioned Red Imperialism. Later a leaflet came to me and complained, saying that there is no such thing as Red Imperialism. I cited Hungary as the perfect example, and also mentioned the behavior of the Chinese Communists along the border of Tibet. This leaflet would not accept that I said, however. I will tell you a fact. The only thing that kept all of us who are members of the Iran Party from being imprisoned or killed when there was a move to outlaw the Iran Party was the fact that American security officials have had explained the evildoers of the Tudeh Party, and showed them to the government, pointing out the places where they stated that Kasem Radmanesh and Eslah and others were not Tudehs, but the enemies of the Tudeh Party. The government would kill all of the NF people, claiming that they were Communists, if it were not for the fact that the Americans have otherwise and would not permit them to do so. The Tudeh does try to

use the half-freedom that now exists for their own purposes, but I doubt that they would dare to try to do anything openly, in the name of the Tudeh Party.

NF Organizational Strength. We have been in business for only ten months. We know that the government has ordered our activities stopped in the provinces, and that they are opposing us in Tehran as well. So we started our activities to make our pressure on them greater. There are many groups and ideologies in the NF, and our great weakness is that we must accept a kind of coverage of the sentiments and beliefs that they hold. We have common goals, but we are lacking any kind of general ideologies. For example, we have religious figures in the NF who could not tolerate talk of women's equality with men, or some of the principles expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights. Some of these religious figures are a considerable problem for many of us, because of the strange and uncertain views that many of them hold. Some of them are most suspect. And on the other hand, we have many feudal landlords who will not hear any talk about land reform. And so it goes. We must not be thought of as a party, strictly speaking, but as a front in the European sense, a group of different groups and individuals who have joined together for the accomplishment of certain specific goals. That is all. Our strength comes from our unity in pursuit of these goals. Our weakness comes from the lack of solidifying ideology. In spite of this, though, if we were granted real freedom by the government, it would not take us more than two or three months to complete our organization, down to the last unit.

NF-Iran Party Relations. This is a matter of internal psychology. The Iran Party, of which I am a member, contains the elite of the NF. Just count them off: Saleh, Dagar Hamed, Agher Parsa, Jehangir Haqshenas, Karim Sanjabi, myself, and others. They are the real leaders of the NF. Iran Party people hold ten seats on the NF council. Most of the important and sensitive posts are held by Iran Party people. The others, those who are not members of the Iran Party, naturally feel somewhat inferior, and hence suspicious about the role of the Iran Party. But I can assure you that the Iran Party has made concessions, and is willing to make many more concessions in the future in order to preserve the unity of the NF. The university students are not very much for parties. There are only about one hundred Iran Party members among them. Mostly they are just "Mossadeqists" and tend to be rather extreme.

Who is the Leader of the NF? Actually, no one. No one among us has all the qualifications necessary to be the kind of leader that Mossadeq was. Two or so may have excellent qualifications, but be weak in one vital respect. Hence, we do not truly have a single leader. Mossadeq himself is not, and can no longer be, an effective leader. At best he can serve only as a kind of spiritual figure. He is greatly loved by the people, of course, but he is finished, in terms of actual politics. I cannot say who might be the man chosen to be a prime minister from the NF, because that is up to the Shah, by law. But I presume that Saleh would have the best chance of being selected.

National Freedom Movement (NFM). Some of these people have been pro-Communist, you know. At the time when it was being considered, the NF asked me whether these people should be separated from the NF or not, and I said yes. Mehdi Bazargan was a member of the NF council. He complained to Bazargan that his followers constituted a clandestine organization, and there is no place for clandestine organizations in a democratic system. But these people were under the influence of Nahim Atai and Abbas Ravafian. They have a curious complex of pro-Communist ideas, mixed with religious overtones. Tudeh Party contacts are stronger here. They, like Khalil Malaki and his Socialist League, have been asking for membership in the NF. For two or three weeks this matter has been under review. They recognize that unless they become a part of the NF, they will have no influence and will be able to do nothing. And the government is encouraging them directly, in order to weaken the NF. It will be better for them to stay out of the NF, because we cannot be at all certain of those among them

who say all those extreme and pro-Tudeh things. I, for one, intend to vote against their being admitted to the NF, and I do not think that they will be accepted. Some, of course, such as Bazargan, who is very good, will be acceptable to the NF after the break-up of the NFM as individuals.

The Shah. No one in the NF has any more confidence in the Shah. "To be or not to be," that is the question that the NF and the Shah have to face. The Shah essentially has no base upon which to work, and it has been his practice to work against anyone who has been prime minister. As Lord Byron said about the existence of women, we cannot live with them and we cannot live without them. If he should be removed suddenly, a vacuum would be created that would be difficult to fill. At the same time, all our experience with him has been bad, and there is nothing to lead us to believe that he may have gained by his experience and learned his lessons. That he should reign and not rule is our dogma, but we doubt that he will accept that. Essentially, we must retain the monarchy, but it might be possible to have a different monarchy. We are not yet ready to have a republic.

Ali Amini. Originally I expected Amini to be more worthy and a better organizer than he has proved to be. He has been thinking of this job for years, but when it was finally his, he had no cadre, no cabinet, no program on which to work. I happen to know that when the Shah asked him to take the job, he went around asking friends, "Who should I put in the Cabinet?" Of course, he is not as bad as Manouchehr Iqbal, that stupid man. If my servant were made prime minister, he could not do a poorer job than Iqbal. But Amini has showed himself uncertain and hesitant at every step. Basically, he is an opportunist, who has no strong supporters and no strong enemies. He wants very much to be prime minister. If he is given enough money by the United States Government, he may stay for a while. But if the Shah told him to go, he would. He has no other strength, no friendship among the people. Amini owns only because he knows some Americans and might therefore be able to get some money.

Communist China. I think the government of Chiang Kai-shek is one of the most corrupt and undesirable in the world. But that is no reason for us to have close relations with the Communists in China. It is dissimilar to our relationship with the Soviets, because the Chinese are far, far away. There is no reason why we should jeopardize our relations with the Western world by jumping into the arms of the Communist Chinese. We must view Iran's interests first, and serve them above all else. And there is nothing in recognition of Communist China that would serve Iran's interests.

United States Position in Iran. Basically, the people of Iran, prior to August 1953, had more love and respect for the United States than for any other country. You had done many things to help us, and we appreciated it. But August 1953 was a severe blow to American prestige here. Since then, American prestige has gone down. You have spent over a billion dollars here, only to be less loved for it. I am not sorry for the billion dollars that you have given us; I am only sorry that it has gone to the wrong places and the wrong ones, and that you have suffered as a result. But in the last few years, we have sensed that perhaps the United States is coming to recognize its error. Perhaps the loss of the past few years can be recovered. I am not just speaking of Iranian interests here, but the best interests of Iran and the United States and the best interests of humanity as well. We have felt that the half-freedom that have been given to the NF are not unrelated to the new American policy. So the people look with some favor on the United States. Our government cannot do anything by itself; only with your help. If our feeling is right, then it would be unwise for the United States to help bring back a military dictatorship. General Fazlollah Zahedi was our Fulgencio Batista. There is much talk of a coup de palais these days. If such a thing should occur, it would be so clear to the people that they would rebel on the first day.

Only democratic reforms can clear the way for a good future for Iran. Any person or group that is so inclined, if it should understand that it has the moral and material support of the Americans, and if the Americans believe that the country can really be returned, thatgroup could accomplish the task. United States support would have the greatest possible effect on any such person's actions. But this must not be accomplished at the cost of servility.

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. *(Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence).* F: Reliability cannot be judged *(Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).*

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COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	NIT-5728
SUBJECT	Dispute Between Karim Sanjabi and Shapur Bakhtiar, National Front Leaders	DATE OF REPORT	17 October 1961
		NO. OF PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	0
DATE OF INFO.	July-October 1961		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Iran, Tehran (10-15 October 1961)		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Member (F) of the National Front with access to National Front leaders. Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. Sometime before the National Front (NF) demonstration of 21 July 1961, Karim Sanjabi, chairman of the NF executive committee, told Shapur Bakhtiar it would be advisable for him to resign his position as head of the organization committee because it was apparent that many persons objected to the control of important NF committees by the Iran Party.1 Bakhtiar was displeased with this suggestion. Bakhtiar was among those imprisoned for his part in the 21 July demonstration, but after his release, in a discussion attended by Allahyar Saleh, Sanjabi insisted that Bakhtiar resign, leaving Bakhtiar no alternative. Bakhtiar was very angry and thought that Sanjabi allowed personal feelings to affect his position on the matter. Sanjabi maintained that the step was taken strictly for the good of the NF, and that he liked Bakhtiar personally. At first Bakhtiar refused to attend executive committee meetings, but by October had begun attending these meetings, and Sanjabi felt that Bakhtiar's displeasure was decreasing and in time the episode would be forgotten. Sanjabi has been acting as chairman of the organization committee.2

2. Members of the NF have been aware of the difficulty between Bakhtiar and Sanjabi, and felt it grew out of a desire on Sanjabi's part to remove Bakhtiar from the forefront of NF activity because there appeared to be a personal grudge between Bakhtiar and the Shah, with the Shah personally opposing Bakhtiar. Sanjabi felt the NF would be less objectionable to the Shah if Bakhtiar were not in the limelight. Other members of the executive committee were more or less passive on this point,

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neither opposing or supporting the idea. Bakhtiar felt he was being punished for his activist bent. Bakhtiar did not even retain control of the university committee; Sanjabi was in charge.

3. Sanjabi has been very active on the labor committee, as well as on the organization, student, and executive committees of the NF. Sanjabi has said that the NF was working very hard with the labor committee, and could be successful in this field. He considered this necessary, since many workers harbored a feeling that the Tudeh (Communist) Party was the savior of labor because the NF had not done enough in the labor field and was incapable of doing more. The NF could be a safeguard against Tudeh infiltration of the labor field. Therefore, Sanjabi felt the NF should be allowed by the government to expand and organize among the workers, forming committees and preventing them from falling under foreign influence. However, the NF had been unable to make the government understand this; as soon as the NF began working with a labor leader, the government forced him to cease his activity. The NF also has been active in the farming committee, but was not hopeful about the results because of the long and tedious nature of the problems involved.

4. Shapur Bakhtiar had been holding meetings at his home on Friday mornings, largely for the benefit of younger members of the Iran Party. Apparently Bakhtiar did not use these meetings as a pretext for an attack upon the NF leadership or on Sanjabi personally, and Sanjabi did not believe Bakhtiar would do this. In Sanjabi's opinion the Iran Party should not conduct a great amount of activity outside the NF; therefore, in early summer of 1961 he resigned as a member of the Iran Party executive committee and was not a candidate, nor elected, to a leadership position. Since then, the Iran Party has been under the control of Ahmad Zirakzadeh and Allahyar Saleh. Because of the political strength of these two men, Sanjabi believed that Bakhtiar's influence in the Iran Party was decreasing. Iran Party leaders have consulted Sanjabi on their plans, but he has not been active in party affairs.

Field Comments

1. Bakhtiar was a member of the regional committee, the inspection committee, the publications and propaganda committee, the university committee, and the organization committee, as well as the executive committee and central council.

2. A member (F) of the NF central council also noted that the disagreement between Bakhtiar and Sanjabi had been developing since 21 July, and that when Bakhtiar was released from jail he favored an activist policy and considered Sanjabi weak, while Sanjabi favored a more moderate policy. Seyed Mohammad Ali Keshavarz-Sadr, NF spokesman, was nominally running the student committee, but Sanjabi actually directed the committee's work.

3. According to a former official (B) in the Mohammad Mossadeq government with good contacts among nationalist leaders and with a bias in favor of the nationalists, the dispute between Bakhtiar and Sanjabi did not appear to be serious by mid-October. They were more agreeable, although Bakhtiar was trying to maintain a powerful position for himself. He was working to organize the Iran Party. Sanjabi had more or less left the Iran Party, since he was devoting all of his energies to the NF; although still a member,

his interests there were unprotected. By nature a drastic type of person, a revolutionary, Bakhtiar probably used this revolutionary spirit to appease young people who were very activist inclined. Bakhtiar has stated that Lieut. General Teimur Bakhtiar, former security chief, has offered him assistance several times, but that each time he, Shapur Bakhtiar, refused. Bakhtiar has also said that the Iran Party was going to issue a protest against the Soviet atomic bomb testing, supposedly by 30 September 1961.

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AmEmbassy TEHRAN 230

November 2, 1961

Conversation with Shapur BAKHTIAR

There is enclosed a Memorandum of Conversation with Shapur BAKHTIAR, a member of the executive committee of the National Front.

For the Ambassador:

Harry H. Schwartz
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Enclosure:
1. Memorandum of Conversation.

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Memorandum of Conversation

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Shapur BAKHTIAR, member of executive committee, National Front
Mr. John Turner, Embassy officer

DATE: October 15, 1961

In the view of the nationalists, according to Mr. Bakhtiar, Prime Minister Ali AMINI in mid-October 1961 was no longer Prime Minister in fact. It was obvious that the Shah controlled Amini to a much greater extent than he did during the first month or two of Amini's premiership. Amini could last only as long as the United States Government continued to provide financial aid.

Bakhtiar admitted that his cousin, Lieut. General Teimur Bakhtiar, former security chief, was engaged in political activity, but said the NF would not participate in a government headed by General Bakhtiar. The NF would, however, keep an open mind as to their policy toward such a government, and if it appeared that General Bakhtiar was able to assume a responsible role and showed evidence of sincerely attempting to run an honest and progressive government, the NF would not attempt to thwart or obstruct his policies. Mr. Bakhtiar noted that the question of NF participation in any government was an extremely delicate one, since the party could not be identified with a government that failed to live up to the expectations of the people. Such identification would destroy the standing of the NF. Shapur Bakhtiar realized that the NF did not have the leadership or the unity to aspire to power at this time. He believed, however, that if NF candidates could be elected to the Majlis the resulting political experience would bring forth a leader and enable the NF eventually to form a competent government. NF representation in the Majlis also would serve to reduce political tension and contribute to sound government.

He said the NF would expect to win about twenty seats should a fair election be held, at least ten in Tehran, and two each in Isfahan, Tabriz, Khuzistan, Shiraz, and the Caspian provinces. The NF had appointed three subcommittees to draft party programs covering social, political, and economic problems, and was going to invite non-NF persons to participate in the investigative work that would precede the drafting of the programs. For example, the front would invite a man like Jalal ABDOH, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, to assist in studying political problems. The NF had reached a rather critical period in that unless it were allowed to engage in political activity, it would be unable to retain the interest it has developed among the intellectuals and middle class of Iran. Shapur Bakhtiar feared that these persons would drift to more radical groups and that the NF would practically disappear from the political scene unless elections were held and the NF given a chance to participate in the Majlis and in the general political life of the country.

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Amembassy TEHRAN 283

December 11, 1961

Embassy Despatches 486, February 8, 1960 and 400, January 24, 1961

Report on the Nationalist Opposition

Summary: See Conclusion

Introduction

This despatch will analyse the nature and power of the nationalist opposition to the Amini Government. The term nationalist is meant to cover those elements of society which have universally been instrumental in the overthrow of conservative regimes, and which have in Iran, as in the rest of the Middle East, united under the cloak of nationalism. Basically, the social composition and fundamental grievances of Iranian nationalists are those which have long characterized radical opposition movements: a middle class cramped by economic restrictions and dismayed by the inefficiency and corruption of the government, an urban labor force restless at its inability to increase its share of the economy, and those teachers, students, journalists and professional men who have lost hope that their aspirations will ever be fulfilled by the existing political system.

The Amini Government, when it first came to power, made a major effort to win the support of these social groups, recognizing that they constituted the vast majority of the politically articulate in Iran and that their numbers and influence were growing. It did not succeed in this effort, and has since fallen back on the more traditional bases of political support, trusting in the power of social and economic reforms to placate, or at least disarm, the radical opposition. A good part of the reason for this turnabout lies in the personalities of Amini and the Shah, and another part was dictated by the realities of power; but still a third part concerns the nature and power of the nationalist opposition, and it is to this that the present despatch is directed. Special attention will be paid to the National Front, with emphasis on its political appeal, its potential for leadership, and its prospects for the future. The despatch is not intended to be encyclopaedic, but merely to bring up to date the series of reports which the

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Embassy has submitted on this subject.

Aside from the National Front and the National Freedom Movement, both of which are treated in this despatch, brief mention should be made of another opposition group, the Guardians of Freedom, headed by Dr. Hosafar BAQAI. Following substantial opposition activity in the elections of 1960, Dr. Baqai was arrested and convicted on charges of inciting police to disobedience. His case has been under appeal and a decision is expected shortly. During his sojourn in prison, Dr. Baqai's organization has been inactive, except for a brief flurry during the elections of 1961. Should Baqai be released following action on his appeal, an experienced opposition politician and a first-rate demagogue would be returned to the political scene. It may be advisable to submit a separate report on Baqai if and when he is released from prison and if, as rumored, he begins political activity with anti-National Front overtones.

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The Nature of Nationalism's Appeal

The growth of nationalism has gone hand in hand with the decline of the traditional patriarchal structure of Iranian society and with the channeling of the competition for power into Western-style groups. Characteristically, these groups have been motivated by opposition to real or imagined interference in their country's internal affairs and by disgust at the ineffectiveness and stagnancy of the ruling oligarchy. Nationalism, of course, makes considerably more sense when a country is being ruled or exploited by another than when it is not--and in Iran the fact that colonialism came and went without anyone getting a good look at it has lent a somewhat elusive quality to Persian nationalism. But in any case the two strands of external interference and internal corruption have, since the beginning of the century, provided the rallying cries for nationalist parties.

Nationalism's appeal is fundamentally emotional; it capitalizes on frustration and feeds on feelings of national and personal inferiority. Iranians identify themselves with the National Front, for example, not solely because it is in their economic interest to do so but also because they have given up hope of altering their positions by other means.

Nationalist parties are forced to rely on a demagogic and irrational appeal because their followers' political and economic interests are diverse and often mutually incompatible. It is for this reason that nationalist parties seem adrift and devoid of direction, and that their political slogans are usually divorced from concrete policy proposals. The National Front itself, for years dominated by the personality of Mohamad Mosadeq, is today a party in search of a demagogue.

The Iranian Leader Image

One of the problems presently facing Dr. Amini is in fact the longing on the part of many middle and lower class Iranians for the return of the dynamic leader. Amini himself clearly hoped to play this role when he first assumed power. In fact, he was incapable of doing so. This, added to his exasperation over the irrationality of his countrymen's expectations, led him to seek support or at

least toleration from real sources of power: the Shah, the Army, the conservative interests. It is probably in the nature of things impossible for Amini to attract the unqualified support of the nationalists because of the emotional, idealised character of their expectations; these expectations, furthermore, present a major hurdle for the nationalist leaders themselves. The current Iranian leader image derives from the mystique of the Mosadeq era, and it must either be changed or fall short of fulfillment, for no such figure exists today.

The Present Nationalist Leadership

It may be well in this connection to take a closer look at the present nationalist leadership, in terms of 1) the potential of any one of its members for developing a mass following, 2) the position of the leaders within the organization and in relation to each other, and 3) their probable courses of action on major issues as members of a National Front Government. CAS reports have been relied on to a considerable extent in the following analysis.

With few exceptions, the most influential leaders of the nationalist movement are presently associated with the National Front. The following men on the National Front's executive committee are considered to be the most powerful: Alayar SALEH, Golam Hosein SADEQI, Karim SANJABI, and Shahpur BAKHTIAR. Although these men now control nationalist strategy (to the extent it can be so labeled), no one of them has attracted to himself the mass following that Mosadeq had. This is partly because Mosadeq is still alive; and while he lives the devotion that was his can be transferred only with difficulty. Even more important, however, is that today's leaders lack a forum and a real issue, both of which were essential to Mosadeq's rise to power.

Of the four leaders mentioned above, Shahpur Bakhtiar seems to be the activist of the group. He appears more willing to capitalize on anti-Western issues than are his colleagues. At the May 18 National Front demonstration, for example, Bakhtiar evoked far greater enthusiasm than did either Sanjabi or Sadeqi by his impassioned demand that Iran's foreign policy be formulated in Tehran rather than in Washington, London, or Moscow. He has a feel for the flamboyant gesture, and once said that his first act if he were named prime minister would be to make a pilgrimage to Mosadeq's home. A political opportunist, he has spared no effort to build up his image with the working class. During one visit to Isfahan, over 2000 workers from the textile mills turned out to greet him. He also has a substantial following among the oil workers of Abadan and Masjed Suleiman, where he was active in labor matters prior to oil nationalisation. Bakhtiar is often said to be too young (although he is 48) to assume the nationalist leadership. But the past ten years have witnessed an important change in the composition of the nationalists by the addition of many university graduates who are less impressed by age than were their fathers, and whose aspirations are echoed in the activist views of Bakhtiar.

In an organisation which continues to take its tone from the older, more moderate leaders, Bakhtiar's position is an ambiguous one. His association with the Iran Party, the most powerful group within the National Front, is both an asset and a liability. While he partakes of its strength, he must also share both the Iran Party's reputation for conservatism and the mistrust which it sometimes

arouses by its pontifical air and high-handed methods. He is not, moreover, among the top leadership of the Iran Party, being preceded by Saleh, Ahmad ZIRAKZADEH, Bager KAZEMI and possibly Sanjabi.

The paradoxical nature of the qualities needed to attract mass support in Iran is perhaps best illustrated by Alayar Saleh. Mild-mannered, vacillating, and unimpressive as a public speaker, Saleh has unquestionably attracted the greatest following, in terms of pure numbers, of any nationalist leader, and is in his home city of Kashan looked upon with feelings closely akin to idolatry. There are three readily apparent reasons for this: first is Saleh's reputation for absolute honesty and dedication to the people's welfare; second is the vast store of personal goodwill which he has accumulated by his willingness to see and talk to every one of the endless stream of callers who come to him each day; and third is the aura which still surrounds him owing to his having been one of the closest of Mosadeq's advisors. Among the intellectuals, Saleh draws his support to a large extent from the professional classes, which is natural for the most moderate leader of the most moderate party in the National Front. His position is weak, however, among the younger nationalists generally, and the university students in particular, who consider him too hesitant and indecisive to head the National Front.

The nationalist leaders almost to a man agree that Saleh is foremost among them and would most probably be prime minister in a National Front Government. And yet his position within the organisation is not a strong one. This is because the 34-man Central Council, as it is now constituted, is largely made up of the followers of Sadeqi and Sanjabi, and it is here that the initial struggle for power will be resolved after the death of Mosadeq. Saleh's known moderation makes him relatively acceptable to the Shah and, presumably, to the Americans; every nationalist, therefore, has a present interest in acknowledging him as a leader. But Saleh is not politically adroit, and should the National Front consolidate its position, it is easy to imagine him being relegated to a figurehead position without his ever having known quite what happened. His activity in the short-lived 20th Majlis, moreover, does not indicate that, having lost power, he would have the ability to recapture it by a dynamic exploitation of issues in the parliament.

Golam Hosein Sadeqi, Minister of Interior under Mosadeq and for many years an influential member of the Tehran University faculty, would today probably be in the strongest position of any of the present National Front leaders should Mosadeq die and a struggle for the leadership develop. Nevertheless, he is not well-known outside nationalist circles, his sheltered life and professorial manner having barred him from attracting the sort of following which adhere to Saleh and Bakhtiar. Of all the speeches at the Jalalieh rally, his aroused the least interest. As one Tehran newspaper put it, while a true patriot and constitutionalist, Sadeqi is not a man of the people. Besides the University, his only popular backing comes from among the more traditional leaders of the bazaar.

One of the things in Sadeqi's favor is that he is outside the Iran Party, and is hence a figure around which the other constituent parties can coalesce. According to a CAS analysis, he would be able to muster 12 votes in the Central Council, whereas his closest competitor, Sanjabi, would have only eight. He is

firmer and more resolute than Saleh, and is therefore a more appealing figure to the younger members of the National Front. Dariush FORUHAR, leader of the Pan-Iran Party, has said of Sadeqi that, "while less experienced and less known to the public (than Saleh), he is a much more decisive figure, and needs only more time to demonstrate his abilities to the people." Sadeqi has made no real effort to assume control of the National Front, although he was said to be involved this spring in a dispute with Kasemi and Sanjabi over questions of leadership. After the dispute, Sanjabi became chairman of the Executive Committee and Kasemi received the largely honorary post of President of the Central Council; but in terms of actual power the pre-eminent position among the leadership still appears to be Sadeqi's.

Karim Sanjabi is yet another member of the Mosadeq Cabinet who has maintained his position in the forefront of the nationalist movement. A member of the older generation of opposition leaders, he is one of those who, the younger nationalists complain, have no desire to do anything but sit around and talk. Sanjabi is an effective public speaker, and is a man of considerable intelligence and personal charm. Yet he has no following of his own, and considering his age, his temperament, and his competition, it seems highly improbable that he ever will.

Sanjabi has been as active as anyone in the affairs of the Front. As well as running the National Front executive, student, and organization committees, he has also spent time organizing the Front's labor activities. He has in recent months reportedly devoted nearly all his energies to the National Front, refusing to serve in a leadership position in the Iran Party since, in his view, it is disruptive for the constituent parties to conduct activity outside the National Front.

Leadership's Probable Action on Major Issues

The chance that the National Front could come to power in a quiet and orderly way is remote indeed. Their accession would be preceded by a period of steady slide towards instability, resulting in a chaotic upheaval in which the National Front could seize control. This would require also either active cooperation of the Army or at least tacit acquiescence of key military figures in the National Front's bid for power.

Because of the character of National Front leadership as it appears today and because of the many contradictory and diverse interests represented in the organization, a National Front government would quickly find itself beyond its depth as it faced the problems of government. Besides the grave handicap of inexperienced personnel, the National Front would be faced concurrently with the necessity and the inability of performing the work of reform and development in a better fashion than predecessor governments. This factor then, added to the bitterness and turmoil arising out of the manner of their coming to power, would make it extremely unlikely that the National Front could operate a government in any reasonable fashion and insure the stability and independence of Iran. The National Front would be unable to take up, in any orderly fashion, the policies and programs which are discussed below and which National Front leaders speak about so blandly today. More likely, a National Front government would be beset by domestic pressures and problems from all sides, as well as by their own failings

and incompetence. In the end, it could rely only on the demagogic seizure of issues which offered hope of temporary distraction for a still dissatisfied Iranian public. Out of this chaos might come a military attempt to do by force what the National Front hoped to do by slogans and appeals to the masses. We would expect a military government to arouse such resentment, however, that the kind of chaotic situation in which the communists thrive would quickly develop.

It is in the light of these considerations that the following discussion of possible National Front policy on important questions must be seen.

The nationalist movement in Iran has historically had two basic objectives: the diminution of the Shah's power and the eradication of foreign influence in the country's affairs. One of the difficulties facing today's nationalists is that the court is not so corrupt as it was nor foreign influence so damaging. However this may be, the impetus for revolution, in 1951 as in 1906, came from these two fundamental issues, and it seems reasonable to suppose that they would provide the main impetus in another revolutionary situation.

The question of the Shah's power is one which would probably be quickly resolved should the nationalists take control of the government. Sanjabi has said that a National Front Government would force the Shah to decide within five days whether he would reign or rule. This is not pure bravado; despite the Persians' known talent for accommodation, the very hypothesis of a National Front government implies a power situation so thoroughly altered that the Shah would be forced either to accept a figurehead position or leave the country. He has often said that confronted with this choice, he would leave the country, and there is no particular reason to doubt his word. It should be noted that the only nationalist organization of any current significance outside the National Front, the National Freedom Movement, would not give the Shah even this much choice, for it openly advocates the establishment of a republic.

Assuming the Shah out of the way, then, the only real way for a Nationalist Government to attract and maintain support would be to exploit those issues usually associated with anti-Westernism. Most of those questions today involve the United States. This fact would present a nationalist regime with a number of difficulties, both real and psychological. The courses of action which the leaders discussed above would be likely to follow toward five specific issues will be considered. The issues are: 1) membership in CENTO, 2) the bilateral past with the U.S., 3) aid from the West in general and the U.S. in particular, 4) aid from the USSR, and 5) revision or abrogation of the Consortium agreement.

Although they equivocate for American ears, the present nationalist leaders are, it can be safely said, unanimously opposed to Iran's continued membership in CENTO. They see the issue as a potentially valuable one, for it seems to offer a way of exploiting Iranian xenophobia--particularly vis-a-vis Britain--without irretrievably alienating the United States. In the opinion of Sanjabi, CENTO already has several strikes against it: it is the act of an unpopular government, it is believed to involve large outlays of money, and it needlessly engenders the enmity of the Soviet Union. In a similar vein, Sadeqi has said that CENTO contributes to and exacerbates the Cold War, and is in any case incapable of doing its basic job of defense; it will, he believes, atrophy as the Saadabad

Pact did once it had ceased to serve its purpose. Saleh has also expressed general skepticism regarding CENTO's benefit to Iran. Bakhtiar claims to be one of the moderates on the matter of CENTO, having, he says, calmed down University students who were particularly outspoken against it. He has stated, however, that if he were prime minister, he would withdraw from the organization within a day, a week, a month or a year, depending on the circumstances. In this he is undoubtedly sincere, and reflects the leadership's probable course of action on this issue.

The bilateral agreement with the United States seems to be regarded somewhat differently. Bakhtiar, for example, has said that since it, unlike CENTO, provides a guarantee against aggression, he would concur in maintaining it. Sanjabi, agreeing that the pact is a more substantial barrier against Soviet aggression than CENTO, would be willing to give it up only if its place were taken by an equivalent undertaking. The least enthusiastic of the leadership is Sadeqi, who has stated that Iran's best defense against aggression is economic and moral reform which, while perhaps not pleasing to the Soviets, would at least avoid giving them a pretext for attacking Iran. He added, however, that while the agreement is not much use, neither is it incompatible with Iran's independence. Saleh's specific views on the bilateral pact are not known.

On the subject of U.S. aid, one statement has been repeated so doggedly as to have become a virtual article of faith for all nationalists. To quote Saleh's version, it is that the U.S. has during the past ten years provided Iran with over one billion dollars in economic and military assistance, which surprisingly enough has had the sole effect of keeping an unpopular government in power and making the people curse the Americans. Yet despite disillusion over the U.S.'s failure to support the nationalist movement, the leadership is generally agreed that U.S. economic aid will be needed for a number of years to come. There are certain differences of emphasis. Sadeqi believes that grants are preferable to loans because they entail less foreign interference, while Sanjabi, on the other hand, thinks that all aid should be tied to specific projects so as to ensure its effective utilization. Bakhtiar has commented that foreign aid is essential, and is in fact desirable if spent well and in the right places. In sum, the present National Front leadership do not really know what they think about future U.S. aid and probably would not know what to do about it if they found themselves in power.

The question of whether to accept Soviet aid is one which divides the radical from the more moderate leadership, and it would in an NF Government probably create greater internal disagreement than any other foreign policy issue. The many caveats now expressed about Soviet aid would probably crumble under pressure from the left should the nationalists assume power. For there is a strong tendency among Iranians to believe that, for clever Persians, playing the East off against the West is a relatively simple game, particularly when the stakes are so high that each side must keep raising the ante. On the other hand, while Iranians may overestimate their ability to handle the USSR, few have any real illusions about Soviet objectives in Iran. This is illustrated by a remark made by Sadeqi to the effect that while one could easily imagine Iran continuing its present relationship with America for 150 years without losing its independence, if the Soviets were to gain the upper hand, Iran in its present form would have ceased to

exist within five years. He went on to say, however, that Iran could accept grants, though not loans, from the USSR if they were given entirely without conditions. Bakhtiar has also remarked that a truly national government could not refuse Soviet aid if it involved no interference into the country's political affairs. Saleh and Sanjabi are more cautious, with the former especially aware of the danger of Soviet penetration through economic means. In Sanjabi's opinion, Soviet aid would be acceptable only if it did not entail the curtailment of Western economic assistance; it would, in any case, he has said, be contingent upon the USSR ceasing its disruptive radio propaganda against Iran. And so on.

Ten years ago the oil nationalization issue brought Iran to the brink of economic and political ruin. Extreme passions were aroused, principally because of ancient hatred of the British, who were then in sole control of the oil industry. While at present foreign participation in the oil industry is diverse and the issue of the Consortium Agreement might not lend itself to the kind of single-minded national struggle Iran experienced a decade ago, there is no doubt that the Agreement would be one of the first issues which would occur to a government which we expect would be forced to exploit anti-foreign sentiment.

The present view of the NF is that the oil agreement is suspect largely because it was not concluded by the Mosadeq Government. Bakhtiar, for example, has remarked that the NF objects not so much to the specifics of the agreement as to the fact that it was signed against the will of the people. Any necessary revision, he has said, should be accomplished through negotiation, rather than through sudden or extreme action. Sadeqi has similarly said that if he were prime minister, he would let the agreement stand until the government could proceed toward its reform in a legal and orderly manner. These statements, which appear to reflect present NF policy, are designed to avoid alarming the Western powers. Nevertheless, an NF government would find it in its interest to adopt a militant posture since U.S. and British involvement in the oil industry is an integral part of the complex of anti-Western issues which an NF government would be forced to exploit. There are, moreover, indications of widespread latent dissatisfaction with the present arrangements, which make it seem likely that the oil question could again become an effective vehicle for demagogy.

NF Relations With the Radical Opposition

For the most part, the nationalist organization and party structure remain as they were described in the Embassy's despatch, Number 440, of January 24, 1961. One problem, however, continues to be of special interest: the degree of cooperation between the moderate groups and the parties of the radical opposition, particularly as exemplified by the NF's relations with the Tudeh (or Communist) Party and the National Freedom Movement.

The basic Tudeh strategy in Iran is the formation of a United Front with the NF. It could hardly be anything else, considering the Tudeh's present extreme weakness. Although traditional Communist strategy might call for the Tudeh to follow a hard line of agitation and incitement to revolt, it simply cannot and therefore does not. The present Tudeh organization consists of 20 or 30 low level groups, composed largely of laborers and small tradesmen, lacking effective central

direction and so frightened of SAVAK that they barely venture out of their cells. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Tudeh tries to capitalize on the strength of the NF.

CAS considers Tudeh infiltration at the top levels of the NF to be almost non-existent, although it believes it unquestionable that Communists have penetrated the nationalist rank and file. The loose organization of the NF makes it relatively simple for Tudeh members to attend meetings, and thereby keep their colleagues informed of NF activities. The recent arrests of Communists who had penetrated the Isfahan branch of the NF, and who were actively recruiting still further members when they were picked up, makes it clear that the NF leadership has been overly complacent in its assumption that the vast majority of its followers are so strongly anti-Communist that it can safely ignore the maneuverings of the Tudeh. Even so, there is not too much that a few Communists in the NF rank and file can do, except to the NF's reputation. The real threat lies in Leipsig, where the Tudeh Central Committee remains intact; permitted to resume its activities in as unfettered a fashion as 1953, it would undoubtedly find Iran equally as fertile soil as it did then.

Peike Iran, the East German radio station which broadcasts official Tudeh policy, has reportedly drawn a sharp distinction between the left and right wings of the NF, warning Iranian Communists to beware of self-styled nationalists who are in fact nothing more than bourgeois reactionaries. It has, however, enjoined Tudeh members that they must, at least in the initial stages, cooperate fully with all elements of the NF. Well may the Communists make such a distinction For if the moderates were able to retain power in an NF government, it is not likely that the Tudeh leadership would be allowed to return and pick up where it left off eight years ago; if, on the other hand, the radical wing were to gain the upper hand, it might well spell the end of Iran's independence.

The National Freedom Movement, which owes its existence to a dispute within the nationalist leadership, is a classic illustration of the type of organizational problems presently facing the National Front. Mehdi BAZARGAN, leader of the now defunct National Resistance Movement, was formally expelled from the NF on May 16, after months of charges and countercharges that NF or NRM leaders were working for SAVAK had brought relations to the breaking point. The following day, Bazargan and other leaders of the NRM, including Mahmud TALEQANI and Yadollah SAHABI, formed the NFM. The new organization set about looking for a raison d'etre, which it soon found when it let it be known that Mosadeq really liked the NFM better than anyone else. (On May 19, the leadership managed to get itself arrested trying to visit Mosadeq at his farm in Ahmadabad.)

Besides exploiting the Mosadeq relationship for all it is worth, the NFM has been able to follow a generally more radical line than the NF since its main support comes less from the professional classes than from students and lower income groups. It has been described as a curious complex of religious, pro-Communist and anarchist ideas, and in the view of NF leaders it lacks the discipline necessary to be a constituent part of the NF. Its opportunity would probably come in a period of major discontent. Although probably the largest

nationalist organization not affiliated with the NF, the number of its followers is, compared to the National Front, extremely small. The NFM has to decide whether freedom of action is worth more to it than association with a larger and more powerful organization; the NF, for its part, must determine whether it can afford to be linked with a group which is obviously anathema to the Shah. To the present, the NF has decided that it cannot, for it continues to reject the NFM's overtures for affiliation.

Conclusion: Power and Prospects

The power of the nationalists is at present almost wholly potential. They have neither a positive issue, nor a forum in which to develop it, nor a dynamic leader capable of exploiting it. While they claim to have organized 70% of the University of Tehran, the students generally refuse to do what they are told. (The University nevertheless is potentially the most powerful weapon the nationalists have, for there in one place is assembled by far the largest single group of people opposed to the status quo, and one, moreover, whose nature makes it difficult for the government to control.) The bazaar is no more inclined than the University to strike or demonstrate on orders from the leadership. And the inability of the National Front to draw out the crowds in the face of a firm stand by the government, at least when the people's emotions or immediate interests are not heavily involved, was made abundantly clear by the failure of the July 21st demonstration. The National Front's lack of will and ability to make effective public protest was even more markedly shown by the reversal of its intention to hold a public demonstration on December 5. After government permission to hold a meeting had been denied, the National Front threatened to hold a meeting in the bazaar, come what may. In the face of government firmness, however, the National Front withdrew, and nothing occurred on the scheduled date. In terms therefore of objective power, that is, the power to bring down the government or to change substantially its policies, the nationalists are for the moment largely ineffective.

An opposition is of course partly defined by the nature of the regime to which it is opposed, and the reformist policies of the Amini Government have cut deeply into the power of the National Front by making it less sure of itself and of its own role in Iranian politics. Two things in particular have cramped the nationalists: the first is that most of the short-term, domestic objectives of the present government are hardly distinguishable from their own, and the second is that, in their more balanced moments, they see clearly enough that the logical outcome of violent agitation against Amini is a military dictatorship. While they realize that the NF will lose much of its influence if the present situation is protracted, they see no way out of the impasse. For their main hope lies in less controlled elections than in the past, and Amini seems to offer more assurance in this connection than any probable alternative.

In elections in which the National Front were free to participate they could expect to capture from 20 to 30 seats in the Majlis, largely from Tehran and the larger towns. Constituting a group unified, at least in its opposition to the government, they would spark a resurgence of interest in their political

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activity, and would certainly create considerable turmoil and unrest. Even in an election in which the National Front candidates were circumscribed by the Government, the NF would, nevertheless, have an opportunity to play a much more prominent political part than at present. Without elections and in the absence of some notable failure of the present regime, it seems likely that the NF will remain a relatively ineffective political force. The University students will remain a problem--but this is a separable, if not separate, question from the NF.

For the Ambassador:

Harry H. Schwartz
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

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FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

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GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. F: Cannot be judged. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). G: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untried or inadequately tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: IRAN
REPORT NO.
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND VIEWS OF SHAPUR BAKHTIAR
DATE OF REPORT: 2 March 1964
NO. PAGES:
REFERENCES:
DATE OF INFO.: 11 - 25 FEBRUARY 1964
PLACE & DATE ACQ.: IRAN, TEHRAN /25 FEBRUARY 1964/
HIT-6438

SOURCE:

A WELL-EDUCATED IRANIAN /B/ WHO IS A NATIONAL FRONT MEMBER, FROM SHAPUR BAKHTIAR. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT/ 2 /THAT BAKHTIAR'S COMMENTS ARE ACCURATELY REPORTED/

1. SHAPUR BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HE AND OTHER YOUNG PROGRESSIVE NATIONALISTS HAD CHANGED THEIR MIND ABOUT FORMING A NEW PARTY OUTSIDE OR FROM WITHIN THE NATIONAL FRONT /NF/, AND HE NOW PLANS TO TAKE OVER THE NF LEADERSHIP AND REORGANIZE IT INTO A POLITICAL UNIT THAT IS CAPABLE OF POLITICAL ACTION. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT ATTENDED A CENTRAL COUNCIL MEETING SINCE 28 JANUARY, WHEN HE WALKED OUT OF THE MEETING, HE WILL NOT GIVE UP HIS POSITION ON THE CENTRAL COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE GIVEN TO ALLAHYAR SALEH ON 9 FEBRUARY WAS TO BE EXPECTED AND THAT THE OLD LINE CONSERVATIVES VOTED TO DO NOTHING WAS NOT IMPORTANT. HE SAID THAT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT HE WAS HOLDING MEETINGS EVERY DAY AND NIGHT WITH VARIOUS NF COMMITTEES, DELEGATIONS OF STUDENTS, BAZAARIS, GUILDS AND OTHER GROUPS.

2. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT A DELEGATION FROM THE NF BAZAAR COMMITTEE, LED BY QASEM LEBASCHI, MAHMUD MANIAN, AND CHINIFORUSHAN /FNU/ VISITED HIM AND TRIED TO PATCH THINGS UP BETWEEN SALEH AND HIM, BUT THAT HE CONVINCED THE BAZAAR COMMITTEE OF HIS WAY OF THINKING. HE WILL CONTINUE TO MEET THE BAZAAR COMMITTEE WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF SALEH'S SUPPORTERS. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT THE BAZAARIS ARE A RELIGIOUS GROUP AND UPSET OVER THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF IRAN TRIAL AND THAT ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT LIKE THEIR RELIGIOUS INCLINATIONS, HE WILL USE THEM TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THE BAZAAR. HE SAID THAT A STUDENT DELEGATION, LED BY MEHRABAD ARFAZADEH AND HASSAN HABIBI, ALSO VISITED HIM AND DEMANDED THAT HE ORGANIZE AND LEAD THEM.

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3. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HIS IMMEDIATE FOLLOWERS ARE HOSEIN MAHDAVI, ABDOR RAHMAN BORUMAND, DARIUSH FORUHAR, HEDAYATOLLAH MATIN-DAFTARI, AND MOHAMMED ALI KESHAVARZ-SADR. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT REALLY TRUST KESHAVARZ-SADR, THAT HE IS AN OLD LINE IRANIAN POLITICIAN AND WILL MOVE TO WHAT WILL BE THE WINNING SIDE. KESHAVARZ-SADR KNOWS HASSAN ALI MANSUR'S FATHER WELL AND ALSO HASSAN ALI MANSUR BUT THIS IS MOSTLY PERSONAL. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KESHAVARZ-SADR MIGHT MOVE CLOSER TO MANSUR, HE DID NOT THINK KESHAVARZ-SADR WOULD DESERT THE NF FOR THE IRAN-E NOVIN PARTY. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HE DOES NOT LIKE THE FASCIST IDEAS OF FORUHAR, BUT FORUHAR IS EXTREMELY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND HE NEEDS HIM AND HIS MELLAT-E IRAN PARTY IN HIS STRUGGLE TO OUST SALEH FROM THE NF LEADERSHIP.

4. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HIS FOLLOWERS PLAN TO BEGIN WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVANTS AND AMONG THE YOUNG ARMY OFFICERS. HE PLANS TO EXTEND HIS CONTACTS INTO THE INTELLECTUAL CLASS, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE WESTERN EDUCATED STUDENTS WHO ARE DISCONTENTED WITH THE PRESENT REGIME. HE ALSO PLANS TO ESTABLISH HIS OWN CONTACTS IN THE GUILDS AND REORGANIZE THEM SINCE IBRAHIM KARIM-ABADI IS NOT ACTIVE AND IS ALSO A FOLLOWER OF QOLAM HOSEIN SADIQI. AFTER 21 MARCH BAKHTIAR AND HIS GROUP PLAN TO ESTABLISH AN OFFICE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL WORK AND PROPAGANDA PURPOSES AND HOPE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE ARRESTED. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HIS GROUP FACES TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN THE NF. THE FIRST IS REPRESSIVE ACTION FROM THE GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY AFTER THEY SET UP THEIR OFFICE. THE SECOND IS PENETRATION BY COMMUNISTS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE STUDENTS. THERE WILL BE AN IRAN PARTY CONGRESS IN MID-MARCH AT WHICH TIME BAKHTIAR EXPECTS TO OUST SALEH FROM CONTROL. AFTER THIS CONGRESS BAKHTIAR EXPECTS TO HAVE A CLEAR ROAD IN THE REORGANIZATION OF THE NF BY USING THE IRAN PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR HIS CONTROL OF THE NF.

5. BAKHTIAR DISCUSSED THE RUMORED NEXT GOVERNMENT UNDER HASSAN ALI MANSUR AND SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT ATTACK IT BUT WOULD LET IT FALL ON ITS OWN. HE SAID THAT MANSUR IS JUST A WHIM OF THE SHAH AND AS LONG AS THE SHAH KEEPS THE POWER IN HIS HANDS, PRIME MINISTERS AND GOVERNMENTS ARE OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE. HE SAID THAT HE KNOWS MANSUR PERSONALLY BUT HAS NOT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIM SINCE HE WAS PUT IN THE POSITION OF BEING THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS POLITICS WITH ANYONE AND TRY TO CONVINCE OTHER PEOPLE TO WORK FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY, BUT THAT THE IRAN-E NOVIN PARTY IS ONLY A FRONT FOR THE SHAH AND FILLED WITH OFFICE SEEKERS, AND ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME.

6. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT THE RECENT PRO-TEACHERS LEAFLET PUT OUT BY MOHAMMED DERAKHSHESH WAS PROBABLY WRITTEN BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER ALI AMINI. HE SAID THAT THIS IS AN INDICATION THAT AMINI IS STARTING POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THAT HE MUST HAVE FOREIGN BACKING SINCE HE NEVER MAKES A MOVE WITHOUT FOREIGN BACKING. BAKHTIAR DESCRIBED DERAKHSHESH AS THE EPITOME OF THE CORRUPT IRANIAN, AN UNEDUCATED CHARLATAN AND AN UNSCRUPULOUS INDIVIDUAL.
END

IRAN

Shapur BAKHTIAR

Member of Central Council of National Front

(PRE-1955)

The leader of the activist wing of the National Front (NF), Shapur Bakhtiar is a member of the Central Council of the NF and a member of the Executive Committee of the major NF component, the Iran Party. He is preparing to challenge the NF's leader, Allahyar Saleh, for control of the loosely organized opposition movement. He describes Saleh as both too old and too moderate to effectively lead the NF, and blames the NF's present state of disorganization on its leadership. Bakhtiar would forge the NF into a strongly organized party with an emphasis on youth.

The former head of the NF University Committee, he is distressed at the decline in NF influence among Tehran University students, and the corresponding growth in the influence of the NF's major rivals, the Tudeh (Communist) Party and the fanatic, religiously oriented Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI). Bakhtiar opposes revolution and prefers a party which can gain its ends through legal methods. He objects to the Shah's control of the Government; although Bakhtiar would retain the Shah as head of state, he would place the Government under a strong Prime Minister. Internationally, he would have Iran follow a path of neutrality similar to that of India. It would be pro-West, but on close terms with the USSR, accepting economic aid from both camps. He is especially opposed to military alliances such as CENTO. Bakhtiar is bitterly opposed to Communism, and considers himself a socialist of the French syndicalist school.

Shapur Bakhtiar was born in 1914, the son of a khan of the Bakhtiari tribe. He received his early schooling in Isfahan, then attended a French college in Beirut, where he earned his first BA. In 1930 he went to France, earned another BA at the Sorbonne and in 1939 received licenses from the Paris University faculties of political science and law. He served in the French army until the fall of France. In 1946 he earned an LLD. Returning to Iran, he joined the Labor Ministry, and in 1946 took part in a strike against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) while chief of the Khuzistan Labor Office. His opposition to the AIOC and its labor policies earned him much popularity among the Khuzistan workers, some of which he still retains. In 1948 he ran unsuccessfully for the Majlis, and was accused of having the tacit support of the Tudeh Party. AIOC complaints led to his dismissal from the Labor Ministry the following year.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Shapur BAKHTIAR (cont.)

In 1951 he was the Iran Party candidate in the cancelled Majlis elections. Appointed under secretary of labor in 1952, he served as then Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq's chief labor consultant until 1953. Following Mosadeq's downfall, Bakhtiar joined the National Resistance Movement (NRM), a pro-Mosadeq coalition of NF parties and other opposition groups. He ran on the NRM ticket from Isfahan in 1954, but was defeated and later arrested for anti-Government activities. He was dropped from the NRM Central Committee and in 1955 was sentenced to three years imprisonment, but granted amnesty a year later. He was elected to the central committee of the Iran Party in 1956.

Neither the Iran Party nor the NF was able to operate effectively until 1960, when the public outcry over the rigged elections of that year permitted a revival of the old NF under Allahyar Saleh. Bakhtiar was appointed head of the Organizational and University committees of the NF. His role in the organization of various student demonstrations led to his arrest in 1961, 1962 and 1963. During the periods between his imprisonments, Bakhtiar's relationship with other NF leaders has fluctuated. He has had frequent conflicts with the more moderate leaders, particularly Saleh and Karim Sanjabi. From October 1961 to November 1962, Sanjabi replaced Bakhtiar as head of the university committee. In January 1964 Bakhtiar was considering forming a new party, based on the same principles as the NF but with a more radical approach. By February 1964, however, he had decided to work within the NF.

Bakhtiar is a rough, blunt, headstrong man with considerable political shrewdness and ambition. He is an intelligent man, and proud of his intellectual accomplishments. In 1961 he was a professor at Tehran University, but in late 1962 he was no longer teaching. He tends to talk in abstractions rather than specifics, and although not evasive, does not inspire immediate confidence. He is a good leader, however, and an earnest nationalist.

A man of medium height and trim build, he has a rather dapper appearance. He is more European than Iranian in dress and mannerisms and often injects French or English words into a Farsi conversation. His years in France have given him an affinity for that country. While he was in France, he married a French woman, who divorced him shortly after the fall of Mosadeq. They had four children, who remained in his custody; the oldest son attended college in Paris. Bakhtiar is a cousin of the former chief of the National Intelligence and Security Organization, General Teimur Bakhtiar. He speaks Farsi, Arabic, French and some English and German.

AB:ljc

28 April 1964

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT **SECRET**

Memorandum NOFORN/INTERNAL USE ONLY

File: B 50

TO Chief, Political Section

DATE: 16 May 1964
P-223/64

FROM : CAS

SUBJECT: Comments of National Front Leader, Shapur Bakhtiar

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source. The source is a well-educated Iranian (B) who is a National Front member and who talked to Shapur Bakhtiar.

1. Allahyar Saleh has sent a letter to the Iran Party Central Council and formally resigned from the Iran Party Central Council. Saleh stated that he is very tired, old, sick and has decided to withdraw from any political activity. The Iran Party was to meet on 13 May to act on Saleh's resignation. The Iran Party sent Saleh an informal note asking him to reconsider his resignation, but the Iran Party expects another letter from Saleh reconfirming his decision to resign.

2. Shapur Bakhtiar said that with Saleh inactive, he will remain at the head of the Iran Party and bring it up to strength and try to make it a disciplined group. Bakhtiar said that he would not oppose Dr. Mosadeq, the symbol of the nationalist movement, but would try to use him and his programs to his own benefit. Bakhtiar described Mosadeq as a massive egotist, who cannot agree that the National Front (NF) be put into the hands of any one man, other than himself. Bakhtiar said that other than the removal of the NF conservative leadership, nothing practical has come out of Mosadeq's recent suggestions. Therefore, it is up to the younger NF leaders to take the lead in reforming the NF, of course deferring to Mosadeq as a matter of form. Bakhtiar said that he will use persons like Dariush Foruhar but they will not take control of the nationalist movement.

3. Bakhtiar said that the NF ties with the religious community are better than with the Army, but if the NF could get a good leader and organization, the young

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading

officers who are discontent with the government would side with the nationalists. He said that the NF has contact with the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI) and the religious leaders through Ayatollah Reza Zanjani. At the present time the NF plans to use Zanjani as a mediator of the nationalist forces. The FMI trial is being delayed since the government wants the FMI leaders in jail during Moharram. Probably, when the Shah returns from his visit to the United States, the FMI leaders will be released or given light sentences.

4. The NF will work openly since if it tried to work clandestinely, the government would identify the NF with the Tudeh Party as a clandestine party and put the NF members in jail. The NF will not try to keep its plans secret since several NF people are in the pay of the government. Bakhtiar said that he and other NF leaders think that Khonji is a SAVAK agent or at least has contact with SAVAK.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading

Shahpur Bakhtiar

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Shahpur BAKHTIAR, Iran Party Leader and National Front member
Martin F. Herz, Counselor for Political Affairs
Archie M. Bolster, Second Secretary

Place: Mr. Herz's Residence

Date: November 4, 1964

In expressing his willingness to meet with Embassy officers to discuss matters of mutual interest, Bakhtiar said that he had talked with Embassy officers on numerous past occasions but had the impression that although there was general agreement among them on broad policies they had some individual opinions which were different. Bakhtiar said he had been surprised to hear from an Embassy officer not long ago that the Embassy considered that the Shah "must rule as long as he is alive." Bakhtiar said he was astonished to hear such an opinion expressed with such finality. He went on to praise the American political system and the hope and example which it gave to the world. Bakhtiar then began to analyze American interests in Iran, beginning by saying that he thought the United States' long-run interests here would be best served by developing a government responsive to the wishes of the people which would permit a degree of political freedom. He described himself as a royalist, but one who wants to see the Shah reign and not rule.

Bakhtiar made light of the present government as a group of hypocrites who promise everything and deliver very little. He said he could stand some lies if they stemmed from honest ignorance, but that he could not put up with deliberate hypocrisy. When asked if he did not think that there were some sincere patriots in the government doing their best for progress, he admitted that there were a few but said that the government would never last. He said the government's instant reaction to foreign criticism was proof that it felt insecure.

In talking of opposition policies, Bakhtiar spoke only in generalities and made it quite obvious that neither he nor his followers in the Iran Party have any real plan of action to achieve their demands. In fact, he was reluctant even to specify for whom he was speaking. He was gently critical of Allahyar Saleh, portraying him as a man with too many scruples to be a resolute and effective leader, but he did not reveal which men or which groups might replace Saleh's leadership. He said plans are underway for a meeting at which the various ideas might be sorted out but it was far from certain that the Government would permit such a meeting.

Although Bakhtiar said that at subsequent meetings with Mr. Bolster he would be willing to go into detail, we were left with the impression

Group 4
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

that he really has very little to report about present organizational activities in the National Front. His repeated comments about the need for at least a modicum of free public expression seemed to indicate that in the absence of such freedom it was difficult to arrive at a consensus among National Front elements, and in the absence of such a consensus the organization could not be re-built.

POL:AMBolster/AMHerz:alw 11/9/64

Original - Herz/Reading File
1 - CR
2 - Bio
2 - A.Bolster

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: May 19, 1965

PLACE: Caspian Hotel Tea Room

PARTICIPANTS: Shahpur BAKHTIAR, National Front leader
Archie M. Bolster, Second Secretary of Embassy

The National Front Underground

Bakhtiar confirmed rumors that the National Front is beginning to move underground because it is not allowed to operate overtly. He gave few details of this development except to say that small cells of six to seven people were being constituted and that in order to avoid attracting the attention of the security forces these cells would refrain from any publishing activities. These cells would of course meet secretly and would concentrate on organizational matters for the present. Bakhtiar professed to be unhappy at this prospect of an underground National Front because covert action for him means a negation of the constitutional approach he prefers, but he repeatedly indicated that in the absence of freedom to operate overtly this new course was the only one open to the National Front.

US Support of the Shah

Bakhtiar covered much familiar ground on this point, reiterating previous statements (see Nov. 4 memcon) that the US has supported the Shah so fully that nationalists have had no possibility of getting a fair hearing. While he was critical of our military aid, he observed that the military organization is not effective and thus the guns "pointing at Iranians rather than defending them" are not considered a threat to nationalists. He had more distaste for American moral support of the Shah, which he said left nationalists with no hope of possible future American backing should they try to gain greater freedom of political activity. He could provide no example of this moral support, and when asked what he would recommend that the US do to make its policies more palatable to Iranian nationalists his only answer was that the US should decrease its support of the Shah.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

Bio

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Greater Communist Activity

Bakhtiar expanded on another familiar line of National Front reasoning; that failure of the regime to allow legitimate political opposition plays into the hands of the Communists. He linked this particularly with National Front plans to "go underground," saying that if the National Front did not take such action it would leave the Communists a free field. Bakhtiar was particularly pessimistic about recent developments at Tehran University. He claimed that there are 200 SAVAK agents operating there, and that the slightest sign of opposition political activity by students is immediately suppressed. Such tight control of relatively overt action, he explained, simply gave the Communists a fertile ground in which to operate. He claimed that there is a definite resurgence of Tudeh activity at Tehran University, a development which he blamed particularly on Chancellor Jahanshah Saleh and his policy of suppression.

The Hoveyda Government

Bakhtiar thought the present government to be an improvement over the Mansour Government, despite his conclusion that it really has not accomplished much. He explained that Hoveyda is a more humble man and does not make such grandiose promises.

Comment:

Compared with his attitude last November, Bakhtiar seemed somewhat more action-oriented at this meeting. In place of his previous pessimistic conclusion that the National Front could not reorganize unless permitted to operate more freely, a step which the regime was not prepared to take, this time there was a hint of determination in his explanation of the embryonic plans to "go underground."

POL:AMBolster:jas:5-20-65

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The Ambassador
POL:Mr. Hess/Mdg.File
Mr. Helseth
Mr. Bolster (2)
BIO
CF
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PARTICIPANTS: Shahpur BAKHTIAR, National Front Leader
Archie M. Bolster, Second Secretary

PLACE: Mr. Bolster's residence DATE: June 16, 1965

U.S. Support of the Shah

Introducing this topic in a sarcastic vein, Bakhtiar remarked that there was no need for a change in American policy because American support of the Shah would simply play into the hands of those who foresee an explosion in Iran if the Shah continues his dictatorial regime. In allusions to the war in Viet-Nam, he compared American support of weak regimes not expressive of the South Vietnamese people's wishes to American support of the Shah. Bakhtiar referred to American actions at the time of Mossadeq's fall as "manufacturing a King," and brushed aside the rejoinder that the US could hardly have "manufactured a King" since one already existed. He observed that before 1953 the Shah had allowed some political opposition to be expressed, but bemoaned in typical fashion the present lack of freedom for political opposition, which he blamed on the US. He rejected the reply that he, like so many Iranians, tends to blame foreigners, and particularly Americans, for Iran's problems.

National Front Inactivity

When asked about the comments he had made at the last meeting (see May 19 memcon) that the National Front was "going underground" Bakhtiar said only that clandestine meetings were continuing. This could mean that such activity is being carried forward successfully and therefore should not be discussed, or that his earlier comments were only talk. In view of his pessimistic attitude during the conversation and his critical remarks about Iranian inability to organize for common action, the latter analysis seems correct.

Ali Amini

The most interesting aspect of the interview was Bakhtiar's analysis of Amini's chances to once again become Prime Minister. Bakhtiar had been reported by National Fronter Fereidun MAHDAVI, through Bill Miller (see Eliot's memcon of June 12, 1965), to be an Amini supporter, yet his remarks indicated that he is at best only ready to give qualified support. Bakhtiar said Amini

Exempted from automatic decontrol

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was not a good administrator because he could not delegate authority and kept constantly interfering with his ministers when he was Prime Minister. He also commented on the disagreements which were openly displayed at cabinet meetings and which Amini seemed unable to control. He said he thought Amini had been previously chosen Prime Minister only because Amini knew how to deal with the Americans and the Shah wanted someone who could obtain American aid for Iran and for the Shah's pockets. Bakhtiar praised Amini's initial step of dissolving the Majlis and his decision to step down over the difficulty of resolving the budget question, but most of Amini's actions as Prime Minister he dismissed as one gaffe after another. For Bakhtiar the prerequisite for any future premiership must be some agreement with the Shah as to which matters would be left to Amini's responsibility.

Bakhtiar confirmed that Amini is working hard to build up support. He thought the National Front would support Amini initially. He said Amini envisions dissolution of the present parliament and the holding of new elections several months later which would be relatively free in the cities and controlled in rural areas. When asked if Amini had made any plans as to who might be in his cabinet, Bakhtiar said he did not know because he has not seen Amini for some time.

Prime Ministerial Qualities

Bakhtiar gave as the three necessary qualities which any Iranian Prime Minister or Cabinet Minister must have the following: 1) a good reputation, particularly as to honesty; 2) ability to do his job well; and 3) a workable program. His comments on Amini (see above) seemed to imply doubts as to Amini's acceptability on the latter two counts. He thought Abdoh would be weak on point two because he did not know his own country well, particularly the rural areas. Although he did not comment directly on other potential Prime Ministers in relation to his list of needed qualities, he did say he would prefer Alam to Eqbal despite Alam's somewhat lesser intelligence because he was much less pretentious.

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Department of State FORM DS-4 1-3-55 **TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: Dec. 11, 1967

TO: AmEmbassy TEHRAN — For the Attention of: Mr. Armitage

FROM: Department of State (EA/LAO)

TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE	TO THE DEPARTMENT
[ ] For Transmittal to Addressee at the Discretion of Post	[ ] Dept. Information Only
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[ ] Transmit to Foreign Office	[ ] Enclosure to Previous Despatch
[ ] Submit Report	[ ] Reply to Dept. Request
[ ] Reply to the Individual	

[ ] Transmit to: [ ] Inform: (U.S. Agency)

REFERENCE: Letter Herz to Armitage a/o Dec 8

ITEMS/REMARKS: Transmitting the enclosure, a letter from a former Iranian political personality, in an unusually friendly tone.

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NUMBER AND DRAFTING OFFICE

FILE NO.	SIGNATURE
	M. F. Herz
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED	OFFICE: EA/LAO

le 15 sept. 1967

Cher Monsieur Herz

Je suis désolé d'avoir manqué la réception qui a été organisée à l'occasion de votre départ.

J'aurais voulu sincèrement être ce jour là à Tébé. J'aurais aussi eu l'occasion de présenter mes hommages à Madame Herz et mes meilleurs sentiments à vous.

Je vous souhaite donc – à Madame Herz et à vous même : bon voyage, grand succès et excellente santé –

Avec mon sympathique souvenir – Amicalement vôtre

e/ D. Bakhtiar

Shapour Bakhtiar

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, National Front
John Stempel, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Tehran

DATE & PLACE: September 24, 1978 - Iran Sokna Apartments

SUBJECT : National Front Moderate on Iranian Politics

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, ECON, OR, USIS, BIO, DAO
NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B, AMCONSUL ISFAHAN

A close contact of U.S. Consul McGaffey had offered to set up a meeting between a National Front figure and an Embassy officer. When Stempel arrived at the appointed rendezvous, Dr. Bakhtiar introduced himself. There were no others present. Bakhtiar said it was important to have contacts with the Americans even if they would not agree on many things. It was important for the Americans to realize that the opposition has no confidence in the Shah. When Stempel pressed Bakhtiar as to whether the National Front would participate in parliamentary elections next year. Bakhtiar replied that this would not be possible unless there was freedom to discuss problems and to organize. "We need six months of freedom, not extreme freedom, but at least the right to meet and organize." He said if this is not done, leadership of the opposition would pass to the fanatics. Martial Law was unnecessary because it hindered the organizational process and it was not really necessary to maintain public order.

Relations within the National Front: In response to a question, Bakhtiar described the Front as a group of pretty independent people. He said that he and Dr. Karim Sanjabi and Dariush Forouhar had not advocated violence and cooperation with religious fanatics. Eng. Bazargan, on the other hand, and his group had cooperated fully with religious individuals associated with Khomeini and Shariatmadari. Bazargan mixed politics and religion, and negotiations with his group had fallen apart because he had allowed his friends to p u s h him toward the religious group. Bakhtiar said the Front would make common cause with any organizations except the Communists and the Free Masons, who were not like the Free Masons he respected in America and France. Bakhtiar thought the reconstituted National Front could make common cause with more moderate religious elements and that this was the only hope to develop a massive following for social democracy.

Political Situation Now: He described National Front press coverage in France and Britain as good--much more satisfactory than

in America. He said it was the Front's view that certain changes might be possible under Sharif-Emami. Eventually the Shah's whole system had to be dismantled. Parviz Sebeti had to be removed from SAVAK because he is associated with torture and foul dealings. Bakhtiar was ambivalent on the question of working within the present system but thought it might be possible to develop the conditions for proper National Front activities. He thought it was important to work with the present parliament to get free speech and free assembly. If the social democrats do not triumph, Iran, and by extension America, will be faced with a choice between dictatorship or Communism.

Bio Note:
Bakhtiar is a slender man in his mid 50s whose French is excellent and English adequate. He is more urbane and sophisticated than many opposition leaders and speaks for a segment of the National Front.

Comment:
It is not clear what sort of popular following Bakhtiar has. He is a person whose name is sought for endorsements and he is interested in continuing to meet with Stempel. It seems clear that this contact answers a need felt by the Front faction composed of Sanjabi, Forouhar and Bakhtiar for a U.S. Embassy contact.

Mr. Bakhtiar lives at Number 24, Sombol Street (near the Dutch Embassy). His telephone number is 247206.

POL:JDStempel:lab:9-26-78

POL ~~GE~~ ~~GP~~
10-17-78

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

SUBJECT: Discussion of National Front Views

PARTICIPANTS: Shahpour Bakhtiar, Executive Committee, National Front
John D. Stempel, American Embassy, Tehran
Congressman Stephen Solarz
Stephen Shalom, Friend of the Congressman

Bakhtiar opened the discussion by describing the National Front view of the Shah--an absolute monarch for years who had presided over a corrupt regime and had created no political institutions. He acknowledged that many had supported the King, but it was not easy to do so now. Intellectuals did not support the Shah because of lack of freedom. Merchants thought the ruling family had enriched itself and religious leaders were disappointed at the lack of attention given to religious matters. The National Front seeks a democratic solution. It wants a constitutional monarchy if the Shah will seriously utilize the constitution and accept limits on his power.

Bakhtiar said the recently established free press remained to be proven in practice. There had been "minor modifications" but it was near impossible for the National Front to publish itself on paper. (Embassy comment: It is our understanding that newspapers will be permitted to publish freely, but there has been too little time to establish this in practice yet.) Bakhtiar said the National Front was very wary of participating in elections unless they are totally free. If they were not, the Front would abstain. He described the National Front opposition to the Shah as basically secular, but in alliance with religious leaders. Bakhtiar said the Shah could not continue a foreign policy because "he has no base in the nation." He thought the National Front offered the only alternative to today's corrupt regime or to a Soviet takeover.

Bakhtiar said the Front would not block sales of oil to Israel and described himself as a secularist--oil sales were purely business. He was not challenged on this point, but went ahead to assert that U.S. fears that Persian Gulf oil would fall into the hands of foreign powers were easily placate--no government in Iran could afford not to sell its oil. Congressman Solarz was gracious enough not to discuss the Mossadeq period in this context. In response to a question from Solarz as to what the U.S. should do, Bakhtiar said it should stop supporting the Shah. Since the Shah had no support in the Nation, if the U.S. would stop its military and political support, the Shah would obviously fail. In response to a question of what the future would bring, Bakhtiar said the month of December (Islamic month of Moharram) would probably see some large demonstrations particularly on the high holy days, tenth and eleventh of Moharram (Dec. 12-13).

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Shahpour Bakhtiar, Iran Party Leader and Member of Executive Board of the National Front
John D. Stempel, Political Officer
W. Gregory Perett, Political Officer

DATE & PLACE: October 22, 1978; Bakhtiar's Home, Tehran

SUBJECT : Internal Politics

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, ECON, OR, DAO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA
INR/OIL/B

Bakhtiar expressed great concern over the near future of Iran in light of pervasive civil unrest. While he also looks ahead to the elections, he said they will not matter if the government cannot defuse the present combination of strikes and agitation. The next month is critical. If troublemakers such as the Tudeh Party cannot be brought under control, the Soviets will infiltrate the country, especially in the north and west, and the Baluchis may also move against the integrity of Iran.

He saw some hopeful signs on the religious side. National Front representatives, as well as Dr. Minatchi and Bazargan (whom he was careful to separate from the Front) were in contact with Khomeini in Paris. He was pleased that Minatchi and Bazargan have said reform should come under the Shah. The mullahs cannot rule Iran. Khomeini, meanwhile, has shown new flexibility. Bakhtiar felt that Khomeini's move to France broadened the Ayatollah's horizon a bit. In Paris he meets many Iranians who have studied in the West, including America. He has not changed fundamentally, but he now attacks the Tudeh Party, a position he did not take previously. In addition, Khomeini has dropped his insistence of two or three months ago on an Islamic government. He speaks instead of the need for Islamic justice. Nonetheless, Khomeini's personal hatred toward the Shah still dominates other factors. If Ardeshir Zahedi, visiting in Paris, tries to contact Khomeini, Bakhtiar thinks the Ayatollah will refuse to receive him. Even Shariatmadari would reject such a meeting.

As for a way out of the immediate crisis, which Bakhtiar repeatedly said he desperately wants, the present government is ill-equipped to find it. The Shah does show a certain new mellowness, but the Cabinet is riddled with untrustworthy men. Five ministers are ex-Tudeh Party members and six or seven are Freemasons, including Sharif-Emami, the leader of Iranian masons. Forughi and Amin are also Freemasons; Bahktiari had forgotten the other names but would furnish them later.

Moreover, the government was hopelessly involved in the very corruption it was supposedly stamping out. As head of the Pahlavi Foundation, Sharif-Emami made a fortune selling confiscated land at thirty tomans a square meter. Bakhtiar had firsthand knowledge of the Prime Minister's corrupt past, because the oppositionist formerly directed a construction firm which was forced to have dealings with the Pahlavi Foundation. Former Minister of Agriculture Rouhani confiscated land under a nationalization act and then when the firm wanted to build a factory, it was told it would have to buy this land at the price set by Foundation surveyors. Bakhtiar objected and eventually received word from the Shah--he could have liberty or remain head of the company. He got out of the company.

Given the makeup of the government, it is difficult to see who will cooperate with it. Even Shariatmadari will not do so openly without Khomeini's consent. The National Front will cooperate, but only under strict conditions. In the first place, the Shah must apply the Constitution "with material guarantees." He must acknowledge that he will reign without ruling, and he must admit, albeit indirectly, that he has been in the wrong. The Government, not the Shah, must be responsible for national policy, although the Shah may "supervise". He must promote prosecution of all corrupt public figures. When asked if that included Hoveyda, Bahktiar responded, "especially Hoveyda", for he is the symbol of the entire corrupt system. Finally, a "neutral government" must conduct the election.

This last issue dominated much of the discussion. Bakhtiar reiterated that an unblemished, purely transitional government should come into being to run the elections. The Shah might, for example, appoint a leading judge. Embassy Officer Stempel probed to see whether the Front could not accept something less than a special election government--perhaps a special election board or system of observers. Bahktiar did not reject these ideas out of hand, but neither did he respond warmly.

Bakhtiar then speculated about the mechanics of the election itself. He is certain the Tudeh Party will do badly. On the other hand, it is difficult to persuade moderate Iranians to organize politically, because the official parties of the past have turned them off political parties in general. The Front will probably not contest more than half the seats for the Majlis. For one thing, the Front does not oppose every incumbent; some of them are acceptable. If the Front wins 30-50 seats, it will probably be able to garner enough independent votes to form a government (Comment: A very rosy view indeed.). The Front is strongest in urban areas and will concentrate there. Bakhtiar himself will run somewhere

in the "solid South"--Abadan, Ahwaz, or Isfahan. He has family connections in the south, and these are still important in Iran. Speaking like an old campaigner, he judged the party must put up religious candidates in Tehran, Qom, and Mashad, whereas in the industrial cities like Isfahan, secular candidates would fare better. He said Bazargan and Minatchi, whom he emphasized are not National Fronters, both lack a popular following. Bazargan is "a decent fellow who has been surrounded by some worthless people." As a result, it is difficult to work with him.

Embassy Officer Stempel asked, with regard to American media interest, which National Front leader spoke the best English. Bakhtiar offered the name of Ahmad Madani (phonetic) a former Vice-Admiral who was demoted to Captain after he criticized Admiral Ramzi Attai and others for corruption. He could have died for his transgression, but General Jam intervened to lessen his punishment. He now teaches in high school. His wrecked career has given him a pessimistic outlook, but he does in any case have excellent English.

COMMENT: Like other moderate opposition leaders, Bakhtiar appears alarmed by civil unrest which the Front claims it is not trying to promote. His concern for "Tudeh" activity sounds like a military man's view of the scene and illustrates concern of some opposition leaders that they are being passed by the underground left.

POL:WGPerett:11-1-78
Contribution:
POL:JDStempel

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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CLEAR: NONE
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ADM DAO CHRON/1

E.O. 12065: RDS DECEMBER 29, 1998 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: BIOGRAPEIC SUMMARY ON SHAPUR BAKHTIAR

1. BAKHTIAR WAS BORN IN 1914, SON OF A KHAN OF THE BAKHTIARI TRIBE. DETAILS ON HIS EARLY LIFE, FRENCH EDUCATION, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE WITH FRENCH WOMAN, EARLY CAREER, ETC., ARE CONTAINED IN CIA BIO REPORT OF 28 APRIL 1964.

2. BAKHTIAR IS ONE OF THE FIRST RANK LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, ALMOST ON A PAR WITH KARIM SANJABI, TO WHOM HE HAS LONG BEEN A RIVAL, AS WELL AS A COLLEAGUE. AT 64 HE IS CONSIDERABLY YOUNGER THAN SANJABI AND OTHER OLDER NF LEADERS SUCH AS SADIQI AND ALLAHYAR SALEH, BUT OLDER THAN DARIUSH FORUHAR, WHO IS COMING INTO HIS OWN AS A TOP NF LEADER AND HAS BEEN SUPPORTING SANJABI'S INTRANSIGENT LINE AGAINST THE SHAH WHILE BAKHTIAR HAS FOR THE MOST PART BEEN KEEPING SILENT.

3. A RECENT SRF REPORT PUT BAKHTIAR AMONG THE MORE MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS OF THE 'OLD "OLD GUARD" NATIONAL FRONT. WE WOULD AGREE, BASED ON HIS INACTIVITY AND THE TENOR OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH AN EMBOFF WHOM HE HAS BEEN SEEING OFF AND ON FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS. EMBASSY REPORTS FROM THE EARLY 1960S CHARACTERIZE HIM AS SOMETHING MORE OF AN ACTIVIST AND "LESS MODERATE" THAN SANJABI AND OTHERS ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACTIVITY THEN. HE WAS ALSO DESCRIBED IN ONE REPORT AS MOUTHING A MORE ANTI-WESTERN, ANTI-AMERICAN LINE THAN HIS COLLEAGUES. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DUE, HOWEVER, TO HIS OBVIOUS AMBITION AND HIS DESIRE TO OUTSHINE RIVAL LEADERS IN THE NF WITH THE WORKERS AND UNIVERSITY MILIEU WHICH HAD BECOME HIS SPECIAL PARTY RESPONSIBILITY.

4. BAKHTIAR HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY ANOTHER RECENT SRF SOURCE AS AN "ADVENTURER" WHO IS SUSPECTED OF HAVING SECRET TIES TO THE SHAH. HE HAS ALSO BEEN SUSPECTED OF BEING "A FRENCH AGENT". WE SEE NO EVIDENCE FOR EITHER OF THESE SUSPICIONS, BUT THAT THEY ARE VOICED SUGGESTS BAKHTIAR IS LESS THAN A TOTAL NF "TEAM PLAYER". AN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT JUST TOLD US HE HAD CALLED BAKHTIAR WHO CONFIRMED MANDATE TO FORM GOVERNMENT AND PLANNED INCLUDE OTHER HONEST, UNTAINTED PEOPLE BEYOND THE NF. THAT WOULD SEEM TO US LIKELY, SINCE HIS CREDENTIALS WITHIN THE PARTY MAY NOT BE THE BEST WITH RIVALS SUCH AS SANJABI AND FORUHAR.

5. ON A VISIT TO HIS HOME ABOUT A MONTH AGO, EMBASSY OFFICERS FOUND BAKHTIAR BRIGHT, PLEASANT, AND RELAXED IN THE FAMILY SUBURBAN HOUSE TO WHICH HE HAS CONFINED

HIMSELF, HE TOLD US, FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. IN 1965 HE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT THE NATIONAL FRONT WAS REORGANIZING ITSELF TO GO UNDERGROUND. IT MUST HAVE BURIED ITSELF VERY FAR DOWN, FOR IT CERTAINLY HAS SHOWN LITTLE SIGNS OF LIFE IN RECENT YEARS -- BEYOND THE HANDFUL OF TOP LEADERS WHO HAVE CAUGHT THE PUBLIC EYE. YET SECOND-RANK OLDER LEADERS DO EXIST; EMBOFFS HAVE ON OCCASION MET OR BEEN TOLD OF THEM. WHAT SEEMS TO BE LACKING IS ANY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION TO RECRUIT THE YOUNG.

6. BAKHTIAR TOLD THE SAME AMERICAN REPORTER TODAY THAT HIS RELATIONS WITH THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP ARE "EXCELLENT" IF THEY ARE, THEY HAVE ESCAPED EMBASSY ATTENTION. HE ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE LOST ANY ROOTS HE MIGHT HAVE HAD AMONG THE BAKHTIARI TRIBE. (FORMER SAVAK CHIEF,GENERAL TEIMUR BAKHTIAR, WAS A COUSIN.) YET BAKHTIAR IS FOND OF DESCRIBING HIMSELF AND SANJABI/FORUHAR AS THE ONLY TRUE DISCIPLES OF MOSSADEGH, DEPRECATING THE "PURITY" OF OTHER LEADERS SUCH AS MEHDI BAZARGAN (WHOSE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN SHOWS MUCH LIVELIER SIGNS OF A YOUNG ORGANIZATION, AND IS CLOSER TO THE MULLAHS). HE SIMILARLY DEPRECATED TO EMBASSY OFFICERS PROMINENT OPPOSITIONIST LAWYER MINATCHI AS A JOHNNY-COME-LATELY, AND THE RADICAL PARTY'S ENGINEER RAHMATOLLAH MOGHADAM (A FORMER MILITARY OFFICER UNDER THE SHAH) AS ALSO IMPURE IN HIS NATIONAL FRONT CREDENTIALS. THEREFORE, WHILE BAKHTIAR UNDOUBTEDLY MAINTAINS SOME GOOD CONTACTS WITH (PRESUMABLY YOUNGER) ACTIVISTS AMONG IRANIAN OPPOSITIONISTS LIVING IN FRANCE, WE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF ALL THESE FACTORS THAT HE COMMANDS MUCH LOYALTY AMONG HIS FELLOW OPPOSITIONISTS.

7. THOUGH BAKHTIAR RAN FOR PARLIAMENT IN THE 1950S AND EARLY 1960S ON AT LEAST THREE DIFFERENT OCCASIONS, HE WAS NEVER ELECTED, NOR DID HE EVER ACHIEVE MINISTERIAL RANK IN ANY GOVERNMENT OF THAT DAY.

8. A RATHER DAPPER MAN OF MEDIUM HEIGHT AND TRIM BUILD, SPORTING A MOUSTACHE, BAKHTIAR SPEAKS PASSABLE ENGLISH, VERY GOOD FRENCH. SULLIVAN
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#2738

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31 Dec 78 20z

ACTION

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S E C R E T STATE 328080

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/30/78 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINT

SUBJECT: SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR

1. WELL-INFORMED IRANIAN HERE TELLS US THAT BAKHTIAR HAS NOT BEEN AS THOROUGHGOING AN OPPOSITIONIST AS HE MAKES OUT TO BE. DURING THE QUIET YEARS, REGIME TOOK CARE OF HIM HANDSOMELY BY HAVING INDBI APPOINT HIM TO LUCRATIVE TECHNICAL POSITIONS WITH TWO SUGAR FIRMS. VANCE
BT
#8080

Shapur BAKHTIAR
(Phonetic: BAKteeyar)

IRAN

Member, Executive Committee, National Front (since September 1978)

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

Shapur Bakhtiar has had a long career of political activism and opposition to the Shah. From the days of former Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mosadeq until the mid-1960s, he was the leader of the activist wing of Mosadeq's National Front (NF). He was a member of both the Central Council of the NF and of the Executive Committee of the Iran Party, the major component of the NF. Since that time he has practiced law in Tehran and served as the general manager of Aalam, a large French-Iranian trading company. He felt the frustrations of political inactivity keenly, however, and did not lose the taste for taking up political action against the Shah's government.

Opposition Revival

In November 1977, in response to the government's limited liberalization of political expression, the old NF moderate opposition parties reorganized into the new Union of National Front Forces of Iran, with Bakhtiar as one of the key figures. A socialist, Bakhtiar has much to offer to any organization that seeks to broaden its appeal and act as the coordinating group for those opposed to the present government; he retains the uncompromised image of a longtime opposition leader, is experienced in labor affairs, and is attuned to the thinking of Iranian students. Thus, he may be able to draw numerical strength toward the NF and away from the Tudeh (Communist) Party. On 23 August 1978 Karim Sanjabi, now secretary of the NF Executive Committee, announced the resurrection of the old NF coalition of the 1950s as the Iran National Front (usually referred to as the National Front). Bakhtiar became a member of its executive committee.

(cont.)

Classified by 604056
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
Exemption category 58 (1)(2)(3)
Declassification date impossible to determine

The Opposition Man

In June 1976 Bakhtiar was one of several opposition leaders who signed a tract calling for greater human rights and a change from authoritarian rule. Immediately prior to President Jimmy Carter's December 1977-January 1978 visit to Iran, Bakhtiar made public statements supporting the President's human rights campaign, hoping that he would raise the issue with the Shah. In late 1978 Bakhtiar has given frequent statements to the press in the name of the NF and has willingly held substantive discussions with US officials on internal politics and views of the NF.

In earlier years Bakhtiar opposed revolution and preferred a party that could gain its ends through legal means. He objected to the Shah's absolute control of the government but did not want him deposed for fear of creating a power vacuum. Internationally, he wanted Iran to follow a path of neutrality, accept economic aid from both East and West, and avoid military alliances.

Early Career

Shapur Bakhtiar was born in 1914, the son of a leader of the Bakhtiari tribe. He received his early schooling in Isfahan and then earned a B.A. degree at a French-run college in Beirut. In 1930 he went to France and earned another B.A. degree at the University of Paris Faculties of Political Science and Law. During World War II he served in the French Army until the fall of France. In 1946 he obtained a Ph. D. in law from the University of Paris. Returning to Iran in 1946, he became chief of the Khuzestan Labor Office and in that capacity led a strike against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. His opposition to the company and its labor policies earned him popularity and respect from the workers that he still retains.

During the 1950s, as a member of the Iran Party, Bakhtiar ran unsuccessfully for the Majles (lower house of Parliament). He served from 1952 to 1953 as Prime Minister Mosadeq's chief labor consultant. After the latter's downfall, Bakhtiar was imprisoned briefly on

several occasions for his political activities. He was elected to the Executive Committee of the Iran Party in 1956. The Iran Party and the NF were dormant from 1956 to 1960. In 1961 and 1962, while a professor at Tehran University, Bakhtiar headed the University Committee of the old National Front and was responsible for recruiting students and organizing student demonstrations. During those years Bakhtiar was arrested several times for his political activities among university students. During that period, Bakhtiar had frequent conflicts with the more moderate leaders of the NF over what he felt was their loose control and lack of organizational activity.

Personal Data

Rough, blunt and headstrong, Bakhtiar is politically shrewd and ambitious. He is intelligent and is proud of his intellectual accomplishments. He tends to talk in abstractions rather than specifics, and although not evasive, he does not inspire immediate confidence. He is a good organizer and leader.

Because of his education Bakhtiar is more European than Iranian in dress and mannerisms and often injects French or English words into a conversation in Persian. While in France he married a Frenchwoman, by whom he had four children. The couple was divorced circa 1953. Bakhtiar speaks Arabic, French and some English and German.

17 November 1978

File Bakhtiar

BIO NOTE

FROM: Dave Patterson

DATE: January 25, 1979

RE : Shahpour BAKHTIAR

SOURCE: Mr. (FNU) Alagheband, former Asst. Managing Director of IMDBI, owner of automotive filter factory at Qazvin. Younger sister is secretary in Iranian consular section in Washington.

Alagheband said Bakhtiar worked for several years for IMDBI, serving among other things as Managing Director of a textile factory called Vatan and at another time as MD of a specialty steel plant set up by IMDBI in joint benture with a French firm. Two-three years ago, IMDBI was forced to fire him.

Subsequently, Bakhtiar was foa time MD of Abgineh, a glass factory in Qazvin but could not get along with its owner, Yassli (?), a "terrible man" known as the "king of glass" in Iran.